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This study aims to investigate key aspects of public ownership of land, expropriation and compensation laws and practices in Ethiopia with special reference to Burayu Town.

A mixed research technique of descriptive and analytic approach is applied in the research. This study used a purposive sampling technique to select case study counties and a systematic method for sampling households. Questionnaire surveys, focus group discussions, interviews and observations were used to collect empirical data. Average, percentage and paired-sample t-test analyses are used for quantitative data analysis.

Significant discrepancies exist between the expropriation laws and how property valuation and compensation are practiced in Ethiopia. The findings include the arbitrariness in designating public interest status to projects; unfair property valuation practice that neglects location factor to determine market value due to a skewed understanding of public ownership of land; and the assignment of property valuators who have no valuation expertise and proper knowledge of expropriation related laws. Findings revealed the socio-economic status of expropriated households has deteriorated due to the expropriation of their landholding.

It was difficult to locate the relocated persons as they were resettled in different localities. Furthermore, the town officers were not forthcoming to provide complete information on the expropriation and compensation procedures they followed. However, this study overcame the limitations through persistent requests and availing time for the data gathering.

The findings indicated the need to redefine relationships between public ownership of land, public interest and expropriation of landholding. A proper understanding of the triad will pave the way for better expropriation practice in Ethiopia and in countries where land is under public ownership.

The social implication of the study revealed that the socio-economic situation of relocated persons was adversely affected due to the poor implementation of laws.

The disparity between public ownership of land and the rights of citizens on landholding is misunderstood by policymakers. Research has shown for the first time the root cause for the discontent of expropriated persons in Ethiopia.

This study investigates the impact of bank CEOs’ inside debt on shareholder benefits in the context of bank mergers and acquisitions (M&A) before the 2008–2009 financial crisis.

Employing an event-study methodology, this analysis delves into market reactions to bank M&A announcements during 2006–2007, encompassing 105 M&As by 79 public commercial banks. This era witnessed heightened risk-taking behavior on the verge of the financial crisis. We explore the relation between relative inside debt and market abnormal returns at M&A announcements and the association between relative inside debt and cash payment preferences in M&As.

Evidence suggests that M&A announcements from banks where acquiring CEOs hold a substantial inside debt experience favorable stock market reaction, particularly for smaller banks. Additionally, banks with elevated CEO inside debt tend to favor cash as a payment mode for M&As.

One limitation of this study is the short period of data availability. The data used in this study covers only 2006 and 2007, the periods marked by notable risk-taking activities on the verge of the financial crisis. Although this period is perfectly suitable for our investigation, given the prevalence of conflicts between equity and debt holders, it is essential to acknowledge that our findings may not capture changes or trends over time. Nevertheless, the results offer valuable insights into the factors that influence the behavior of the studied population. Future research could employ a longitudinal design to address this limitation and gain a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics over extended periods.

Our study has significant implications for businesses and policymakers as it provides insights into the factors contributing to financial crises and how compensation mechanisms can be used to moderate bank risk-taking. We propose that CEO inside debt compensation presents a plausible mechanism that boards of directors can incorporate into bank executive compensation contracts. By doing so, they can promote value-enhancing investments and moderate excessive risk-taking, thereby safeguarding the financial stability of individual banks and overall financial system.

Our study sheds light on the beneficial role of bank CEO inside debt for shareholders, contributing empirical backing to the conflict resolution viewpoint in the discourse on wealth appropriation. From a regulatory stance, our findings advocate for the inclusion of bank CEO inside debt in executive remuneration agreements. Such a strategy can empower boards of directors to mitigate undue risk and enhance shareholder value in M&As, safeguarding both individual bank and broader financial system stability.

The effects of ownership concentration on firm performance usually considers two conflicting perspectives: monitoring and expropriation hypotheses. Past studies have produced mix findings. This study aims to shed light on this relationship by focusing on a specific measure of firm performance, firm growth. The moderating effect of industry growth in the aforementioned relationship is also considered, which advances knowledge on the role of moderators.

This study resorts to data from a sample of 21,476 Portuguese firms, which is examined using hierarchical linear modelling. This approach is adequate because the data has a hierarchical structure: the firms are nested within industries.

The results show that equity ownership concentration has a positive effect on firms’ growth and that industry growth amplifies this relationship. Ownership concentration can spur effective monitoring, thereby alleviating principal–agent conflicts of interest and speeding up decision-making, enabling timely competitive actions that promote growth.

The research conceives ownership structure in two groups. However, equity ownership concentration often acquires more complex shapes. In addition, the data used is from a single country.

The results show that firms pursuing growing strategies and operating in growing industries benefit from equity concentration.

Different from past studies, this study focuses on firm growth performance and considers the moderating effect of industry growth.

This study analyses interlocking directorates from the perspective of an emerging market, Mexico, where formal institutions are weak, and family firms with high ownership concentration dominate. It responds to recent calls in the literature on interlocks, which urge the differentiation between family and non-family businesses and to complete more research on emerging economies.

A database was constructed for 89 non-financial companies (52 family-owned) listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange (BMV) from 2001 to 2014. This period includes normal times and an episode of financial crisis (2009–2010). To test the hypotheses, a dynamic panel model (in two stages) is used, applying GMM.

In normal times, the advantages of Board Chairman (COB) interlocks for the performance of publicly traded Mexican family firms are obtained regardless of the weak formal institutional environment. By contrast, during financial crisis, interlocking family COBs are more likely to jointly expropriate minority shareholders with actions that further their family objectives, which mitigates the positive effect of interlocks on performance. These findings contrast with the insignificant effects of COB interlocks found for non-family corporates.

A new framework is proposed which, through agency theory, finds points of concordance among resource dependence and class hegemony theories, to understand the effect of interlocking directorates on the performance of family firms operating in Mexico. The results of the empirical exercise for family companies listed on BMV during normal and financial crisis periods suggest its applicability.

This chapter analyzes how the industry environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, common participants in the product market are competitors, suppliers, and customers. These micro-stakeholders create competitive pressures on firms and thus affect their current and future performance. Competitors influence dividend decisions through three mechanisms, namely predation threat, corporate governance, and imitation. Predation threat reduces firms' incentives to pay dividends when facing high rivalry. Competition helps firms improve corporate governance. However, strong corporate governance may increase or decrease dividend payments since dividend policy may be the outcome of strong corporate governance or the substitute for weak corporate governance, respectively. Besides, firms tend to imitate their industry peers in dividend policy. Second, as a financial policy, dividend policy is also affected by participants in the financial market like investors, creditors, and auditors. These financial stakeholders' behaviors are important to stock prices. Due to the agency problem, creditors have high incentives to restrict firm's dividend payments in order to protect their benefits. On the other hand, creditors are effective external monitors who help firms improve their corporate governance. Outside investors affect corporate dividend policy through their valuation. Firms pay more dividends if investors prefer dividends to capital gains. Auditors play the role of a third-party monitor, and thus, they help firms reduce managers' expropriation of shareholders and improve the quality of accounting information. Furthermore, we also investigate dividend policy of regulated industries in both financial sector (banking, insurance, and real estate) and utilities sector (energy, telecommunications, and transportation).

This study aims to advance knowledge on the direct impact of the investor’s protection level on the stock market volatility, that is, whether investor’s protection is an important stock market volatility determinant.

A panel data was estimated using a sample of 48 countries, from 2006 to 2018, totalizing 31,808 observations. To measure stock market volatility and the investor protection level, a generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity model and the World Bank Doing Business investor protection index were used, respectively.

The results evidence that the protection of investors’ rights reduces the stock market volatility. This result indicates that a high level of investor protection, which is the result of a better quality of laws and policies in place that protect investor’s rights, promotes the country as a “safe haven.”

The relationship that the authors intend to analyze becomes important, given that investor protection will give outsiders guarantees on the materialization of their investments. This study contributes important knowledge for investors and for the establishment of government policies as a way of attracting investment.

Although there have been a few studies addressing this relationship, to the knowledge, none of them directly analyses the influence of investor protection on the stock market volatility.

This study aims to explore the potential impact of country-level governance in corporate financing structures.

A two-step system generalized method of moment was used due to the endogeneity issue. The whole sample comprises 3,761 firms in five economies – China, India, Pakistan, Singapore and South Korea – from 2007 to 2016.

The results indicate that the debt option for financing is not favorable under governments with an adequate governance arrangement. However, there is a direct and significant link between country governance and equity financing because in adequate governance arrangements, the possibilities of information asymmetry are minimal and businesses consider equity a more appropriate and safer financing instrument. In contrast, firms prefer to trade-credit financing in poor governance economies, which confirms an adverse link between trade credit and adequate governance.

The country’s governance should be considered a sensitive matter when deciding about corporate financing.

This arrangement of variables has not been previously analyzed in the literature, suggesting the study’s novelty.

The purpose of the study is to examine how operating efficiencies from incentive alignment compensate for rent extraction in family firms. The author asks whether ownership (1) improves operating efficiencies to increase firm value, (2) positively affects related-party transactions (RPTs), or (3) destroys firm value. Finally, the author assesses whether the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect.

This study employs a panel of 333 listed family firms (and 185 nonfamily firms) and handles endogeneity using a dynamic panel system GMM and panel VAR.

Ownership decreases discretionary expenses and increases asset utilization to add firm value. The efficiency gains generate more value in family firms, especially majority-held ones, than in nonmajority ones. However, ownership is also related to increased RPTs (especially dubious loans/guarantees), reducing firm value. RPTs destroy value more severely in the family (or group) firms than in nonfamily (nongroup) firms. It could be why ownership's positive impact on value is lower in family firms than in nonfamily firms. Overall, the incentive effect dominates the entrenchment effect and is robust to controlling private benefits of control in the dynamic ownership-value model.

(1) A family firm's ownership may not be optimal. (2) The firm's long-term commitment as a dynasty limits the scale of expropriation yet sustains impetus for long-term value creation. The paradox partly explains why large family holdings and firm-specific investments endure over generations. (3) This way, large ownership substitutes weak investor protection in India despite tunneling as skin in the game provides necessary investor confidence. (4) Future studies can examine whether extraction varies with family generations and how family characteristics affect the incentive effects.

(1) Concentrated ownership may not be a wrong policy choice in emerging markets to draw firm-specific investments. (2) Investors, auditors, or creditors must pay closer attention to loans/guarantees. (3) More vigorous enforcement, auditor scrutiny, and board oversight are needed.

Family firms are not necessarily a bad organization type that destroys investor wealth. They can be valuably efficient due to their ownership and wealth concentration, and frugality. They matter in the economic growth of a developing market like India.

(1) Extends ownership-performance research to family firms and shows that although ownership facilitates tunneling, the incentive effect dominates; (2) family ownership is not impacted by firm value; (3) family ownership levels reduce discretionary expenses and increase asset utilization to create added value, especially in majority-held family firms; (4) RPTs and loans/guarantees increase with ownership; (5) value erosion from RPTs is higher in family (group) firms than in other firms.