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This study aims to define a “technological statecraft” concept to distinguish tech-based measures/sanctions from an array of economic measures ranging from restrictions of rare earth elements and natural gas supplies to asset freezes under the wider portfolio of economic statecraft. This concept is practically intended to reveal the USA’s “logic of choice” in its employment of technology as an efficient instrument to deal with China in the context of the great power rivalry.

This study follows David A. Baldwin’s statecraft definition and conceptualization methodology, which relies on “means” rather than “ends.” In addition to Baldwin and as an incremental contribution to his economic statecraft analysis, this study also combines national political economy with statecraft analysis with a particular focus on the utilization of technological measures against China during the Trump administration.

The US rationale for choosing technology, namely, emerging and foundational technologies, in its rivalry against China is caused at least by two factors: the nature of the external challenge and the characteristics of the US innovation model based largely on radical innovations. To deal with China, the USA practically distinguished the role of advanced technology and followed a grammer of technological statecraft as depicted in the promulgated legal texts during the Trump administration.

Despite a growing volume of literature on economic statecraft and technological competition, studies focusing on countries’ “logic of choice” with regard to why and under what conditions they choose financial, technological or commodity-based sanctions/measures/controls are lacking. Inspired from Baldwin’s account on the “logic of choice” from among alternative statecrafts (i.e. diplomacy, military, economic statecraft, and propaganda). This study will contribute to the literature with a clear lens to demonstrate the “logic of choice” from among a variety of economic statecraft measures in the case of the US technological statecraft toward China.

This study explores a hegemonic alliance and the role of relational forms of accounting and accountablity in the making of contemporary capitalism.

We use the WikiLeaks “Cablegate” documents to provide an account of the detailed machinations between interest groups (corporations and the state) that are constitutive of hegemonic activity.

Our analysis of the “Cablegate” documents shows that the US and Chevron were crafting a central role for Turkmenistan and its president on the global political stage as early as 2007, despite offical reporting beginning only in 2009. The documents exemplify how “accountability gaps” occlude the understanding of interdependence between capital and the state.

The study contributes to a growing idea that official accounts offer a fictionalized narrative of corporations as existing independently, and thus expands the boundaries associated with studying multinational corporate activities to include their interdependencies with the modern state.

The study traces how global capitalism extends into new territories through diplomatic channels, as a strategic initiative between powerful state and capital interests, arguing that the outcome is the empowerment of authoritarian states at the cost of democracy.

The study argues that previous accounting and accountability research has overlooked the larger picture of how capital and the state work together to secure a mutual hegemonic interest. We advocate for a more complete account of these activities that circumvents official, often restricted, views of global capitalism.

This paper aims to examine rising geopolitical tensions associated with the implementation of the US Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) Act of 2022.

To provide background for the analysis, the authors conduct a theoretic analysis of the literature to introduce the current geopolitical environment while examining the rising threat of conflict, general factors driving change in the world order, and the critical role that the international semiconductor supply chain plays to all involved.

In this paper, the authors observe that in good times, economic forces drive capital-intensive industries toward a free-trade-inspired concentration of manufacturing in low-cost centers of production. In challenging economic and geopolitical times, however, the trend reverses toward retrenchment and what some call techno-nationalism. This occurs as nations struggle to secure access to critical sources of supply for themselves while stifling access for competitors and rivals.

The CHIPS Act of 2022 signifies a pivotal change in global trade dynamics, shifting away from liberal norms to techno-nationalism. This shift may spark supply chain hurdles as countries adopt nationalistic sourcing, potentially causing shortages in vital components like chips. Consequently, consumers may face disruptions as companies seek alternative suppliers, resulting in higher costs and lower-quality products. Supply chain disruptions may also delay product launches, and retaliatory trade actions could affect multiple industries, limiting access to lucrative markets.

The passage of the US CHIPS Act of 2022 has major implications related to global supply chain issues and potential geopolitical concerns. This study uses the threat of potential conflict as a lens for examining the international semiconductor supply chain.

This paper aims to explore how a shared service centre (SSC) is mobilised in a power-dominant context of a Chinese state-owned enterprise (SOE). Specifically, it examines the mobilisation of SSC within this multi-divisional SOE, the role and dynamics of actors involved and the influence of changes in the integrated information system (IIS) during the mobilisation process.

The study follows a qualitative case study methodology. The authors draw on actor-network theory to examine the network and translation processes constructed in mobilising SSC in the chosen SOE. The data sources of this study were collected through semi-structured interviews, observations and documentary reviews.

The mobilisation of SSC is not a linear process but rather a “spiral” interplay through continuous interactions and compromises between human and non-human actors. Power gave the core actor as an orchestrator legitimacy and formality to reduce resistance and obstruction in translation for the mobilisation of SSC. The changes in IIS appear to facilitate the interaction between the heterogeneous actors.

This case study contributes towards understanding the mobilisation of SSC in a power-dominant context by highlighting the impact of changes in IIS and the details of the mobilisation of SSC in terms of the role played by both the individual actors and the technology.

This study provides a broader understanding of the interactions of the heterogeneous actors for mobilising SSC in a power-dominant context. More importantly, the study inspires future research into examining how SSC practices unfold and how the changes in IIS influence the mobilisation of SSC.

This paper aims to discuss the emergence of science, technology and innovation (STI) institutions in Indonesia during the Dutch East Indies colonial period in 1778–1941. The emergence of these institutions reflected the dynamics of science and technology development and innovation in that era.

This paper navigates a historiographical approach. Data collection techniques use “secondary data research,” with archival investigation published by official sources in the Dutch East Indies in the 18th and 19th centuries as well as other reference sources, and data analysis techniques use “supplementary analysis.”

This research indicates that the STI institution during the Dutch East Indies colonial period was formed to maximize the natural resources of the Dutch East Indies. The STI institution at that time was constructed as part of Buitenzorg’s Plantentuin the lands, plantations, solutions for health, astronomy, geology, forestry and culture.

The limitations of this research, as well as future research. Relying too much on “secondary data” is a limitation of this study. Therefore, it is necessary to collect primary data through in-depth interviews with historical scientists studying STIs in Indonesia in future research.

This study, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, considered the first study, reveals the dynamics of STI in Indonesia during the Dutch East Indies colonial era by examining the dynamics of the institution. In addition, this study succeeded in dividing five institutional STI clusters in the Dutch East Indies Colonial period 1778–1941, namely, units/institutions formed as part of Planuntungin te Buitenzorg; units/institutions formed based on plantations, initiated by private plantations to find solutions to the pests and diseases that attack their crops; units/institutions formed to seek solutions in the health sector; units/institutions formed based on astronomy, geology and forestry; and units/ institutions regarded as scientific councils/associations.

This paper aims to provide a more comprehensive look behind the China’s rapid ascent and influence across the African continent by exploring the Sino-African funding data at the project level while incorporating recipient nations’ economic characteristics of interest such as trade data and natural resources endowment.

Combining AidData’s project reported data with country bilateral exports and imports data and other pertinent African countries’ data, the authors are able to perform a cross-sectional interrogation of China’s finding motives and their impact on the continent. The results indicate that the China’s funding to Africa mostly goes to energy and transportation sectors, as expected, and the recipient country’s exports to China increase as the funding increases. However, the authors find that the impact of China’s financing on the bilateral trade flow is unbalanced because the recipient country’s imports from China are not found to be significant.

Interestingly, although the analysis confirms that oil is a key contributing factor in attracting China’s funding, the authors discover that there exists no positive relationship between the China funding amount and the recipient country’s general natural resource level. The results do not support the common notion that China is primarily interested in extracting natural resource deposits, aside from oil, from the host nation when they allocate their funding.

Overall, the paper supports the theoretical propositions of the new structural economics framework when it comes to the relationship between China’s funding and the recipient country’s characteristics.

The game strategies differ when different regions participate in the oil game. Under what circumstances will different participants choose cooperation or sanction strategies? This is the core issue of this paper.

Regarding the current and future game behavior between different regions in the oil trade, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model between two regions to explore the possibility of sanctions strategies between the two sides in different situations.

The research finds: (1) When the benefits of in-depth cooperation between the two regions are greater, both sides tend to adopt cooperative strategies. (2) When the trade conflict losses between the two regions are smaller, both sides adopt sanctions strategies. (3) When a strong region trades with a weak region, if the former adopts a sanctions strategy, the net profits are greater than the benefits of in-depth cooperation between the two regions. If the latter adopts a sanctions strategy, the net profits are less than the trade conflict losses between the two regions. There will be the strong region adopting a sanctions strategy and the weak region adopting a non-sanctions strategy. At this time, the latter should reasonably balance the immediate and future interests and give up some current interests in exchange for in-depth cooperation between the two regions. Otherwise, it will fall into the situation of unilateral sanctions by the strong against the weak.

There is no paper in the existing literature that uses the evolutionary game method to analyze the oil game problem between the two regions. This paper constructs a two-party evolutionary game model composed of crude oil importers and crude oil exporters and, based on this, analyzes the evolutionary stability between the two regions under sanctions and cooperation strategies, which enriches the energy research field.

This study investigates the economic strategies street beggars (SBs) employ in Ghana to gain a competitive advantage within the contested urban spaces they occupy. By conceptualising SBs as economic actors, the research shifts the focus from perceiving them as passive recipients of charity to recognising their intentional decision-making and strategic behaviour to maximise financial benefits.

The study adopts a qualitative case study approach, using non-participant observation and semi-structured interviews with 40 SBs in Kumasi, Ghana. Thematic analysis was used to identify the economic strategies used by SBs to gain a competitive advantage.

The study reveals three main strategies adopted by SBs: child advertisement, body marketing, and narrative marketing. These strategies emerge from the SBs' contextual understanding of the public’s social protection needs and are used to develop strategies that give them an advantage over other SBs within contested urban streets.

Future research could explore the effectiveness of different economic strategies employed by street beggars and compare their financial outcomes. Investigating the public’s perceptions and attitudes towards these strategies could provide valuable insights.

Policymakers and city authorities should acknowledge some street begging as an economic activity and develop regulations, designate begging areas, and establish guidelines for acceptable practices. Creating targeted skill training, entrepreneurship programs, and access to microfinance can facilitate the transition of street beggars from begging to more sustainable forms of livelihood.

This study challenges the perception of street beggars as passive victims, highlighting their agency and strategic decision-making. Recognizing their economic strategies can inform policies that regulate begging as an economic activity, create alternative opportunities, and prevent exploitation of vulnerable groups, ultimately promoting more sustainable and dignified livelihoods for street beggars.

This study seeks to enrich the current literature and bridge the research gap by investigating the phenomenon of street begging and the diverse economic strategies street beggars employ to gain a competitive advantage within urban areas. This research moves beyond computing financial income and regulating begging by conceptualizing SBs as economic actors and begging as an economic activity. It explores how SBs use conscious efforts and rational strategies to maximize financial benefits from passers-by and outperform other SBs, providing novel insights into the complex dynamics of street begging.

After decades of hypergrowth, since the 2008 global financial crisis there has been a deceleration of globalization and a partial jamming of its main engines (trade and foreign direct investment [FDI]). This study aims to critically reflect on the current phase, labeling it as “win-lose globalization” characterized by firm-firm competition increasingly intertwined with that between the respective nation-states, which aim to be the relative winners, even at the expense of joint absolute gains. Acting as “strategists,” states implement policies to weaponize economic interdependences, which the paper analyzes.

The approach is “problem setting” rather than “problem solving.” The latter offers well-defined solutions but often assumes unambiguous definitions of problems, which obscure their complexity. This phase is so intricate that the problem itself is problematic. Thus, to advance knowledge, the focus is given on nation-state policies: FDI screening and the politicization of international trade relations; protectionism; misuses of antitrust and regulation.

The intensification of firm-firm/state-state competition, seeking disproportionate gains over rivals, is the ultimate result of the contradictions and dissatisfactions accumulated over decades of globalization, the benefits of which have been far from equally distributed. Conflicts in international economic relations are bound to intensify, and a return to win-win globalization is unlikely. International cooperation to strengthen existing/new supranational governance institutions in the interest of absolute global inclusive benefits is urgently needed.

The paper integrates the international business debate on the fate of globalization with interpretations from industrial policy studies and international relations theory. This allows for suggestions for policymakers, corporate executives and scholars.