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This chapter examines corporate governance–related financial reporting issues in the context of globalization. Over the past few decades, the process of globalization has substantially altered the fields of corporate governance and accounting. More specifically, Anglo-American models of corporate governance and financial reporting have received increasing momentum in emerging economies, including China. However, a review of relevant studies suggests that there is limited research examining the implementation of Anglo-American concepts in various countries regardless of their growing acceptance. This monograph extends the existing literature by comprehensively investigating the adoption of internationally acceptable principles and standards in China, the largest transitional economy that has different institutional context from Anglo-American countries. In addition, the review has a number of implications for developing the theoretical framework, and determining the research methodology for the monograph.

The chapter focuses on the personal characteristics of top executives in companies involved in corporate financial crime as well as the introduction of human governance as one of the mechanisms in preventing corporate misbehaviour. This chapter discusses directors’ and top management teams’ personal characteristics – in the context of corporate governance – that may influence the occurrence of corporate financial crime. The study further proposes the human governance factor as a possible mechanism to improve corporate governance in preventing such misbehaviour. This chapter highlights the personal characteristics of top executives, which may become the indicators of corporate financial crime, as well as human governance, which is shown to be one of the most important mechanisms of corporate governance for corporate financial crime prevention.

Islamic financial institutions offer a different paradigm from conventional institutions. From corporate governance (CG) viewpoint, it embodies a number of interesting features since equity participation and profit-and-loss sharing arrangements form the basis of Islamic financing. These financial arrangements imply different stakeholder relationships and governance structures, and distinct from the conventional model since depositors have a direct financial stake in the bank's investment and equity participations. On top of that, the Islamic bank is subject to an additional layer of governance since the suitability of its investment and financing must be in strict conformity with Islamic law and the expectations of the Muslim community. Other form of governance such as accounting standards have also been an issue whether they have met the reporting requirement of Islamic financial institutions that carry title as “Islamic” as there is no uniformity. Therefore, there should be concerted efforts to revisit the existing good CG and accounting standards for Islamic financial institutions.

This chapter highlights the variations of agency theory in the unique and complex context of Islamic banks in Saudi Arabia. The results provide an insight into agency structures in the context of Islamic banking that may lead to trade-offs between shari'ah compliance and mechanisms for protecting the rights of investors. This empirical study finds that most of the surveyed Islamic banks appear to recognize the value of governance and have implemented some basic mechanisms. Certain flaws in governance pertaining to audit, control, and transparency were also noted. The situation gets worse in cases where the investment account holders do not have any representation on the board or any voice for control or monetary rights. Other peculiar models balancing the two key requirements may be effective regarding agency dynamics. This study should motivate the policy makers to tailor the regulations to safeguard the interests of all investors without violating the principles of shari'ah.

An Islamic social finance ecosystem has its specific instruments in terms of funding and investment that are in line with Shariah (Islamic law) principles. These include waqf (Islamic endowment), zakat (compulsory alms), ṣadaqah (donation), qarḍ ḥasan (benevolent loan) and others. In this context, the Islamic financial institutions can be considered as Islamic social finance institutions since it has the elements of Islamic social finance concepts. The uniqueness of these two types of institutions is that they operate with the absence of riba, maysir, gharar and thus the requirement of Shariah governance comes into existence. The practice of Shariah governance in Islamic financial institutions needs to be extensively examined by using a comprehensive measurement. Therefore, this chapter attempts to discuss on the needs of Shariah Governance Practices Index (SGPi) as a comprehensive measurement to measure the Shariah governance practices. In conclusion, it is proposed to have a comprehensive index to measure the Shariah governance practices which consider few components of Shariah governance such as the board of directors, the management, Shariah Committee and Shariah compliance functions.

The 17 December 2004 was a turning point in both Turkish and European history: The European Council followed the European Commission's recommendation and approved the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey, which commenced on 3 October 2005. The goal of accession to the European Union (EU) has become one of the main driving forces for broadly defined legal, political, economic, and financial reforms in Turkey.²

The governance of capital market institutions did not receive much interest compared to their banking sector counterparts, partly due to their different ownership structures. Recent trends; increased competition, technological advances, structural changes, globalization, all had their share of impact on governance systems of capital markets institutions particularly on exchanges. Corporate governance of non-financial firms and capital markets institutions differ in several ways. Firstly the role of risk management differs since they may impose systemic risks to the financial system. Secondly well-implemented governance structures and processes are required but are not sufficient in capital markets since there are several conflicts of interests to be addressed. Therefore whether and how effectively they function is what matters. Thirdly the governance structures of such institutions exhibit different effectiveness on their decisions.The governance of FIs in capital markets is discussed in terms of board structure and management, risk governance, supervisors, shareholders, executive compensation, role of regulators, authorities and values and culture. The role of stock exchanges in corporate governance are discussed separately in terms of implementing corporate governance codes, demutualisation and its impact on regulations, transparency and accountability issues and the effects of M&As among exchanges. Market needs strong analytical tools and reliable benchmarks to assess governance risk. The corporate control and the regulation of the institutions by the exchanges when the corporations (regulated) are the competitors of the exchanges (regulators) or owned by the stockholders of the exchanges must be addressed. The risk of regulatory arbitrage, calls for the need of harmonisation among regulators. Better regulation of FIs and greater global coordination among regulators are seen as the most two important issues to prevent another crisis.

This study investigates the effect of corporate governance mechanisms and country-level factors on the extent of Internet Financial Reporting (IFR). We used a sample of 106 listed firms from five African countries. A financial reporting disclosure index was used to compute the aggregate IFR scores, which are made up of two components: content and presentation. Our results indicate that IFR relates to board size, firm size, country-level governance, economic development and index return. These results evidence the predominance of country-level factors over firm-specific factors in explaining the extent of IFR in Africa. It also shows that corporate governance mechanisms via board practices are insufficient to explain IFR in Africa. By further extending our analysis into the two components of IFR, we find that factors affecting the content and presentation dimensions are different. This study is among the first to investigate the extent of IFR in several African countries and adds to the existing evidence that has mainly focussed on firm-specific factors.