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This study aims to explore the potential impact of country-level governance in corporate financing structures.

A two-step system generalized method of moment was used due to the endogeneity issue. The whole sample comprises 3,761 firms in five economies – China, India, Pakistan, Singapore and South Korea – from 2007 to 2016.

The results indicate that the debt option for financing is not favorable under governments with an adequate governance arrangement. However, there is a direct and significant link between country governance and equity financing because in adequate governance arrangements, the possibilities of information asymmetry are minimal and businesses consider equity a more appropriate and safer financing instrument. In contrast, firms prefer to trade-credit financing in poor governance economies, which confirms an adverse link between trade credit and adequate governance.

The country’s governance should be considered a sensitive matter when deciding about corporate financing.

This arrangement of variables has not been previously analyzed in the literature, suggesting the study’s novelty.

This study aims to investigate whether country governance, regulated industry and firm-level characteristics, namely, ownership structure and firm size, are associated with the likelihood of firms having a politically connected board (PCB). This study also examines whether country governance and concentrated ownership moderates the association between institutional ownership and PCB.

This study uses cross-country analysis using 20 countries and hand-collected PCB data from 574 firms and 1,701 firm-year. This study performs logit regression analyses to examine hypotheses.

The results document that countries’ accountability, industry type and institutional ownership are associated with the likelihood of firms having a PCB. This study also finds that country governance, especially accountability, moderates the relationship between institutional ownership and PCBs. The results thus indicate the importance of country governance, especially accountability, in determining institutional investors’ political strategies.

This study provides several implications. First, firms tend to elect PCBs as a non-financial strategy because it arguably delivers additional resources and improves their performance, especially in countries with lower accountability and regulated industries. Meanwhile, investors and management must also hire PCBs cautiously because PCBs are closely related to agency issues. Agency issues reflect on the finding that institutional investors tend to avoid PCBs. However, the relationship between institutional investors and PCBs is closely related to the country-level context, especially accountability. This study also advises policymakers that country governance, especially accountability, is crucial in regulating the relationship between business and politics.

This study uses a relatively large number of new PCB and institutional ownership data collected manually from 20 countries. This study also examines several variables of country governance, such as accountability to PCB decisions that have not been tested before. This study examines the relationship between institutional ownership and PCB ownership decisions that were not examined before and uses a cross-country sample. In addition, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first one that examines the role of state governance, especially accountability for the relationship between institutional ownership and PCBs.

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether the corporate environmental, social and governance (ESG) performance of companies is influenced by the barriers and opportunities created by three factors characterising a country’s governance landscape: democracy, political stability and regulatory quality. Additionally, this study separately explains the influence of the three country governance factors on the ESG performance of companies and how they are affected by the profitability of the company.

Fixed effects multiple linear regression is performed on 6,035 firm-year observations drawn from 27 countries relating to 1,207 unique constituents of the S&P Global 1200 index for a five-year period from 2015 to 2019. Clustered standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity and serial correlation are estimated for a specification that includes Refinitiv ESG scores as the dependent variable, selected Worldwide Governance Indicators as the independent variables and several country- and firm-level controls.

The study finds that companies’ ESG performance is higher in countries with a lower level of democracy and political stability, and corporate governance performance is higher in countries with higher regulatory quality. A component-level analysis finds significant variation in the results across the different ESG pillars. Firm profitability moderates the relationship between country-level governance factors and companies’ ESG performance.

The study reveals that national governments can prompt companies to enhance their governance performance, invariably leading to greater engagement in sustainability by improving their regulatory environment and enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the implementation of regulations targeting corporate environmental and social performance is not always needed to prompt better corporate ESG performance.

This study shows that internationalised companies proactively work towards achieving sustainability in countries where the country governance landscape is ineffective and inadequate to enable it.

This study addresses the association between country-level governance and firm-level ESG performance, in contrast to firm-level corporate social responsibility disclosure that has been the focus of prior research. As disclosures can be symbolic and may not reflect actual ESG performance, the results of prior studies examining the relationship between country-level governance performance and corporate social responsibility disclosure is inappropriate to explain the factors affecting the ESG performance of companies.

The authors investigate the impact of governance on the leverage of East Asian firms in the financial crisis context, in order to understand the puzzle whether debt acts as a substitute for governance or an outcome of the governance mechanism.

The authors use 86,030 firm-years and the country-level governance data from eight East Asian countries over the period 1996–2017. The authors employ the fixed effects (FE) model, in the main analysis and the weighted least squares model, as a robustness check in order to compare the two competing hypotheses of agency theory, substitute and outcome models.

The authors’ results show that debt acts as a substitute for governance before the GFC, but during and after the GFC the picture changes. Namely, debt acts as an outcome of the governance mechanism during the GFC and its aftermath. Since during financial downturns both agency costs increase, and information asymmetry widens, firms in poor-governed countries may be reluctant to increase their leverage in order not to face financial distress and additional restrictions. Thus, the results imply that the use of debt as a tool to mitigate agency conflicts and a substitute for governance strongly depends on the environment that the firms operate and the general macroeconomic conditions, such as facing a financial crisis or not.

This study provides an interesting case of the firms' capacity to raise money during a crisis and that governance plays an important role in borrowing activities of firms. This will undoubtedly help motivating owners and policymakers for improving governance. The authors’ findings may be useful for policymakers to develop policies considering the adverse effects caused by exogenous shocks. This is crucial because the severity of GFC as a shock seems to change the macro and institutional environment that firms operate. While the authors properly address the research hypotheses using country governance data, future research may employ corporate governance data to attain firm-level results by testing two competing hypotheses.

There are several important areas where this study makes original contributions. First, while Tsoy and Heshmati (2019) focus on the dynamics of capital structure for only Korean firms, the authors extend the sample including eight East Asian countries considering the impact of country governance on capital structure policy. Specifically, this study is the first in using the robust country governance data, which differs by country and year, in the crisis context. Next, the authors investigate both the AFC and GFC to compare whether these two crises have different effects on capital structure policy of East Asian firms. Finally, the authors aim to understand whether leverage is used as a substitute for governance or an outcome of governance mechanism considering recessions.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of country-level governance and accounting standards on corporate tax avoidance.

This paper is an empirical work using a sample of listed companies from 36 countries.

This paper finds that firms resident in countries with stronger country-level governance engage in less tax avoidance. Aspects of stronger country-level governance include higher government effectiveness and regulatory quality, and stronger enforcement of law and control of corruption. This paper also finds that firms adopting international accounting standards (IFRS) engage in less tax avoidance than those using local accounting standards. Further examination of the effect of interactions between country-level governance and the adoption of IFRS on tax avoidance finds that there is a substitute relationship between country-level governance and the adoption of IFRS.

This study has significant implications for policy makers, corporate management and academics. It documents that when a country implements governance targeting improving government effectiveness, enhancing regulatory quality, strengthening enforcement of laws and controlling corruption, this will lead to less corporate tax avoidance. It also shows that the adoption of IFRS will reduce corporate tax avoidance, probably by enhancing accounting quality and disclosure, and that the adoption of IFRS provides a bond mechanism in reducing tax avoidance in countries with weak governance.

This paper is the first study to examine the impact of country-level governance on tax avoidance at the corporate level. It is also the first study to examine how country-level governance interplays with IFRS in shaping firms’ tax avoidance activities.

The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of country-level governance on sustainability performance, taking into account the effect of sustainable development goals (SDGs) and board characteristics.

This study uses panel data analysis using fixed effect models to investigate the influence of country-level governance on sustainability performance while considering the effect of SDGs and board characteristics. The sample comprises 8,273 firms across 41 countries during the period spanning from 2016 to 2021. The sample is divided into two categories based on the score of SDGs.

The findings of this study show that countries with high SDGs score have better overall country-level governance and board attributes which have a statistically significant positive impact on sustainability performance. However, for those countries with low SDGs, political stability shows a statistically insignificant and negative impact on sustainability performance, while government effectiveness indicates a statistically insignificant positive impact on sustainability performance.

This study contributes to the literature by providing empirical evidence on the relationship between country-level governance, SDGs, board characteristics and sustainability performance. The study also highlights the importance of considering the effect of SDGs on the relationship between country-level governance and sustainability performance. The findings of this study could be useful for policymakers and firms in improving their sustainability performance and contributing to sustainable development.

Purpose – The question of whether the corporate governance practices of firms in diverse countries are converging to those of U.S. firms, and the extent of convergence or divergence, is examined.

Design/methodology/approach – Company level governance measures of board structure and organization, firm audit attributes, antitakeover defenses, and compensation design attributes of international firms are compared with those of U.S. firms.

Findings – We find that the evidence for convergence is more mixed than previously believed, with firms in some nations converging, others essentially static, and a number diverging from U.S. practices. We further determine that country factors such as measures of national economic freedom, increased shareholder rights, and impartial judiciaries help to explain convergence. Greater participation by banks in the national economy is associated with greater divergence from U.S. governance standards. Firm characteristics which are suggestive of a future need for external equity encourage convergence while those which capture the use of leverage or the ability to service additional debt are correlated with greater divergence.

Research limitations/implications – This study suggests that inquiry into whether convergence is occurring might be the wrong question to ask. Rather, our findings suggest that the research focus should be shifted toward an inquiry of what specific areas of governance are converging and in what countries or regions.

Originality/value – This study helps to describe what constitutes effective corporate governance design for firms worldwide. It provides managers with insights on how governance mechanisms can be tailored to reflect local practices and laws.

This chapter looks at the relationship between governance and economic development in selected Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) member countries. This chapter outlines the concept of good governance in Islamic faith and episteme and provides some empirical evidence on the governance development nexus in the literature. It also describes the state of governance in OIC countries through descriptive statistics on some indicators. It looks at the relationship between governance and economic development. In contrast, it explores the relationship between governance and economic growth. The results highlight the need for reforms in the quality of institutions, establishing rule of law, emphasising on governance in the policy agenda and bringing strong accountability mechanisms.

Many of the emerging and transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been building their economies largely on the infrastructure inherited from Communist times. It is widely recognized that much of the infrastructure in both the private and public sectors must be replaced if those economies are to achieve acceptable rates of economic growth and participate successfully within the broader European Union (EU) economic zone (The Economist, 2003). Upgrading infrastructure includes the likely importation of technology and management expertise, as well as substantial financial commitments. In this regard, inward foreign direct investment (FDI) is a particularly important potential source of capital for the emerging and transition European economies (ETEEs). FDI usually entails the importation of financial and human capital by the host economy with measurable and positive spillover impacts on host countries’ productivity levels (Holland & Pain, 1998a). The ability of ETEEs to attract and benefit from inward FDI should therefore be seen as an important issue within the broader policy context of how these countries can improve and expand their capital infrastructure, given relatively undeveloped domestic capital markets and scarce human capital.

This paper investigates the impact of governance on economic growth, considering the spatial dependence between countries.

The study employs spatial regression models to estimate the impact of governance on economic growth in a sample of 116 countries worldwide in 2017.

The findings imply that the influence of governance on economic growth is statistically significant. Moreover, if all other economic control variables are constant, 1% increase in governance raises the economic growth on average by 1% at 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Furthermore, each country's rise in economic growth favorably and substantially influences the economic growth of its bordering nations. The unobserved characteristics or similar unobserved environments in adjacent countries also affect its economic growth.

This study adds to the discussion and investigation of the influence of governance on economic growth by considering the spatial dependence between countries, which is lacking in the literature.