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This paper develops a theory, consistent with empirical evidence, of trade agreements as the exchange of market access. The WTO dispute settlement process is discussed in this context. The role of that process is neither to deter nor to punish violations of trade agreements, but to maintain reciprocity.

Over the last 60 years, multilateral trade liberalization has reduced tariffs to historically low levels. The dominant theory of multilateral trade agreements, based solely on terms-of-trade externalities between national governments, is the conventional wisdom among international trade theorists. But it features two defects that render it inconsistent with reality. This chapter proposes a simple formulation of the political economy of protection that dispenses with terms-of-trade externalities, predicts the properties that empirical work has confirmed, and is free of the counterfactual implications of the dominant approach. The model is applied to trade agreements.

Purpose − Instances of refusal to trade stand in contrast to the theorems on the gains from trade. Two paradigms, second-best and political economy, have been used to explain refusal to trade. Murray Kemp (1962) provided a foundation for the political economy paradigm when he noted that, in the absence of lump-sum redistribution, the theorems on the gains from trade are “true but irrelevant”. This chapter takes Murray Kemp's observation as a point of departure for a consideration of the relation between individual and group gains from trade. Paradigms in explaining refusal to trade are distinguished.

Methodology/Approach − This chapter examines ideas underlying explanations for refusal to participate in international trade.

Findings − Two different approaches are identified in modeling and explaining why the gains from trade are compromised by refusal of governments to allow free trade. The second-best approach suggests a justification for refusal to trade while the political economy approach with public-choice foundations proposes an explanation.

Practical implications − Ideology expressed in how governments are viewed can influence economic analysis.

This paper analyses the stalling of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) and its systemic and institutional consequences through a geopolitical economy approach that integrates the French school of international economic relations and Régulation Theory. These approaches put states and their economic roles at the fore, correcting dominant free trade approaches to world trade. The paper also avoids monocausal explanations for trade talk deadlocks and aims to provide a comprehensive approach on the co-evolution of world trade patterns and its institutions. In this approach, the DDA stalemate is traced to an institution-structure mismatch in how states articulate their accumulation strategies and institutions (competition, state regulation, adhesion to international regime) to the World Trade Organization (WTO) regime occasioned by the emergence of new trade powers. This has given rise to three distinct conflicts in how member states navigate between the main parameters of the multilateral trading system (non-discrimination, reciprocity and balance of power) and their national accumulation strategies: the erosion of non-discrimination and reciprocity; the failure to build an operational compromise between development and ‘globalization’, that is, between multilateral openness and new trade and power balances; and the difficulty in reaching a compromise between historical and emerging capitalisms. The outcome of these conflicts will determine the institutional configuration of the post-Doha WTO agenda.

A principle reason for the inability of the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to serve as the vehicle for international trade liberalization was that it was the protocol for the establishment of the International Trade Organization. It was never intended to become a functioning institution. As such, it did not have a well-designed system for the settlement of trade disputes. At least partially because the GATT was not intended to function as an institution, an arguably excessive reliance on consensus emerged as the vehicle for the resolution of trade disputes. A consensus to accept the recommendations of a dispute panel became the standard for resolution under the GATT. Because the defendant could always object to implementation of the panel's recommendation, thus denying consensus, successful resolution of disputes were relatively infrequent. In the 47 years, during which the GATT was the principle international trade forum, 101 panel reports were adopted. Given that it is possible to file disputes on the basis of nullification and impairment of expected benefits, which is a considerably weaker standard than the allegation of a legal breach, it is apparent that the ineffectiveness of the dispute resolution mechanism was a deterrent to the filing of complaints. As the GATT increased in membership and pressures to address increasingly complex trade issues (intellectual property rights and agricultural subsidies, for example) emerged, it became apparent that the GATT could be undermined by an inability to resolve disputes.

Purpose – The purpose of this essay is to explore further the concept of value cocreation from a service-ecosystems view, by considering the importance of networks and the configuration of relationships and resources in markets.

Methodology/approach – We use a conceptual approach to extend a service-dominant (S-D) logic, ecosystems view of value cocreation by drawing on the literature regarding networks in marketing and related research.

Findings – A service-ecosystems approach to cocreating value-in-context is proposed, which points toward networks as mediating factors in value cocreation because they influence the ability to access, adapt, and integrate resources by establishing exchange relationships and shaping the social contexts through which value is experienced.

Research implications – This research suggests that value cocreation is a complex and multidimensional process that is best studied in the context of dynamic networks or ecosystems of service exchange.

Practical implications – This research suggests that networks mediate value cocreation, and thus, firms should consider the configurations of relationships and resources to develop more compelling value propositions.

Social implications – This research draws on the idea that exchange relationships are embedded within society and suggests that processes of value cocreation not only draw on but also contribute to the social contexts that frame market exchange.

Originality/value of essay – This research extends the value cocreation and S-D logic literature by exploring the role of networks in service ecosystems. In this framework, networks are mediators of value cocreation because they enable access to resources and help to (re)shape social contexts through which value is derived.

This chapter reconsiders commonly held views on the ownership and management of private property, contrasting capitalist and simple property, particularly in relation to how a firm shareholder governance model has shaped society. This consideration is motivated by the scale and scope of the modern global crisis, which has combined financial, economic, social and cultural dimensions to produce world disenchantment.

By contrasting an exchange value standpoint with a use value perspective, this chapter explicates current conditions in which neither the state nor the market prevail in organising economic activity (i.e. cooperative forms of governance and community-created brand value).

This chapter offers recommendations related to formalised conditions for collective action and definitions of common guiding principles that can facilitate new expressions of the principles of coordination. Such behaviours can support the development of common resources, which then should lead to a re-appropriation of the world.

It is necessary to think of enterprises outside a company or firm context when reflecting on the end purpose and means of collective, citizen action. From a methodological standpoint, current approaches or studies that view an enterprise as an organisation, without differentiating it from a company, create a deadlock in relation to entrepreneurial collective action. The absence of a legal definition of enterprise reduces understanding and evaluations of its performance to simply the performance by a company. The implicit shift thus facilitates the assimilation of one with the other, in a funnel effect that reduces collective projects to the sole projects of capital providers.

Because forsaking society as it stands is a radical response, this historical moment makes it necessary to revisit the ideals on which modern societies build, including the philosophy of freedom for all. This utopian concept has produced an ideology that is limited by capitalist notions of private property.

This chapter explores Hong Kong's future as a major public securities market. It concludes that Hong Kong has the potential to become one of the world's major – if not the number one – public securities market in the coming decades. However, there are four major factors that will affect how much this potential is realized: (1) How Hong Kong's market is treated by the Central Government in Beijing vis-a-vis its competitors in Shanghai and Shenzhen. If Hong Kong is allowed full access to the Chinese saver/investor and Chinese firms are allowed the choice of listing in Hong Kong, then Hong Kong will outcompete its Shanghai and Shenzhen rivals regardless of whether Shanghai and Shenzhen are opened for listings by foreign companies and to foreign investors. Hong Kong will thrive in an environment of no capital constraints on the renminbi. Conversely, a retention of the renminbi capital controls combined with free access of foreign firms to list on Shanghai or Shenzhen and/or restrictions on Chinese firms listing in Hong Kong would be very harmful to Hong Kong. (2) How skillful and aggressive Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd. are in making Hong Kong into a global competitor as a securities market. Hong Kong's principal competitors on a global basis are New York and London and the new electronic exchanges that have sprung up in Western countries. (3) The full force of new technologies is not inhibited in Hong Kong to protect a monopoly position of the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd. (4) Hong Kong maintains its stable relationship with the US dollar, no capital controls are introduced in Hong Kong, and that Beijing continues to respect Hong Kong's information freedom as specified in the Basic Law.