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While most West European nations were formed around pre-existing entities that could be called “countries” before the modern age, this was not the case in the Middle East. Some entities, like Egypt, did have a clear political and cultural identity before colonialism, others, like Algeria, did not. This chapter discusses the four states of the Maghreb: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and Libya, through the perspective of “country creation” going into and coming out of colonial rule. We can see here two “models” of fairly similar types of historical development, one showing a gradual process through a protectorate period to relatively stable modern nations, another through violent conquest and direct colonization ending in violent liberation and military and wealthy but fragile states. The article asks whether these models for the history of country creation and the presence or absence of pre-colonial identities can help explain the modern history and nature of these states in the Arab Spring and the years thereafter. Then, a more tentative attempt is made to apply these models to two countries of the Arab east, Syria and Iraq. While local variations ensure that no model can be transferred directly, it can show the importance of studying the historical factors that go into the transition from geographical region to a country with people that can form the basis of a nation.

Financial instability and economic crises are closely intertwined. There is no universally accepted definition. The term ‘stability’ or ‘instability’ refers to the behaviour of the system rather than to individual institutions. However, one cannot rule out that failure of a single financial institution can trigger significant financial turmoil as was happened in 2007–08 global financial crises. Like unstable equilibrium, instability implies inability to correct itself on its own. Instability, if it persists, turns into a crisis. In the above backdrop, the objective of this chapter is to investigate the financial crises and instability viewed both from economic and international political economy perspectives with a tale of four generation crisis models as it has been evolved over time to explain the phenomenon of different types of crises.

The purpose of this research is to examine the connections between liquidity risk, credit risk, and bank profitability in India.

In order to examine the interlinkage between liquidity risk, credit risk, and profitability of banks in India, the researcher has gathered data from all commercial banks in India from 2004–2005 to 2020–2021. The data sources included in this study encompass the International Country Risk Guide, World Development Indicators and Reserve Bank of India (RBI). Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) has been utilised for the study.

Findings of this research identified that liquidity risk is inversely proportional to credit risk. Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are both impacted negatively by liquidity risk. ROA is impacted positively by credit risk, while ROE is impacted negatively by it. The profitability of banks is harmed by the interaction between liquidity risk and credit risk. It also shows that law and order, are beneficial to bank earnings and risk management. The capital risk-adjusted ratio has a negative relationship with bank profitability, indicating the need for better capital allocation.

The originality of this work lies in its unique contributions, It emphasises explicitly the Indian context, thereby providing insights tailored to this particular setting. It employs the SUR methodology, a statistical approach allowing for a more comprehensive data analysis. Additionally, it identifies and explores interaction effects, which can shed light on the complex relationships between variables.

What kinds of support do interstate rivals provide to domestic actors in ongoing civil wars? And how do domestic actors utilize the support they receive? This chapter answers these questions by comparing Iranian and Saudi military and non-military (mediation, foreign aid and religious soft-power promotion) support to the Houthis and to the Government of Yemen (GoY) during the Saada wars (2004–2010) and the internationalized civil war (2015–2018). It also focuses on the processes through which the GoY and the Houthis have utilized this support for their own strategic purposes. This chapter applies a structured, focused comparison methodology and relies on data from a review of both primary and secondary sources complemented by 14 interviews. This chapter finds that there were less external interventions in the conflict in Saada than in the internationalized civil war. During the latter, a broader set of intervention strategies enabled further instrumentalization by domestic actors, which in turn contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict. This chapter contributes to the literature on interstate rivalry and third-party intervention. The framework of analysis is applicable to civil wars that experience intervention by rivals, such as Syria or Libya.