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With the rapid development of the sharing economy in manufacturing industries, manufacturers and the equipment suppliers frequently share capacity through the third-party platform. This paper aims to study influences of manufacturers sharing capacity on the supplier and to analyze whether the supplier shares capacity as well as its influences.

This paper deals with conditions that the supplier and manufacturers share capacity through the third-party platform, and the third-party platform competes with the supplier in equipment sales. Considering the heterogeneity of the manufacturer's earning of unit capacity usage and the production efficiency of manufacturer's usage strategies, this paper constructs capacity sharing game models. Then, model equilibrium results under different sharing scenarios are compared.

The results show that when the production or maintenance cost is high, manufacturers sharing capacity simultaneously benefits the supplier, the third-party platform and manufacturers with high earnings of unit capacity usage. When both the rental efficiency and the production cost are low, or both the rental efficiency and the production cost are high, the supplier simultaneously sells equipment and shares capacity. The supplier only sells equipment in other cases. When both the rental efficiency and the production cost are low, the supplier’s sharing capacity realizes the win-win-win situation for the supplier, the third-party platform and manufacturers with moderate earnings of unit capacity usage.

This paper innovatively examines supplier's selling and sharing decisions considering manufacturers sharing capacity. It extends the research on capacity sharing and is important to supplier's operational decisions.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the opaque inventory information disclosure strategy for an online retailer who sells two substitutable products to customers in two selling periods.

The authors develop a two-period model where an online retailer sells two substitute products with two inventory composition structures to maximize profits. The authors investigate the optimal inventory disclosure decision from both ex post and ex ante perspectives. Sensitivity analysis is performed to investigate the effects that discount rate, transaction cost and the probability of agreeable inventory situation have on the equilibrium disclosure outcome. The authors also consider risk-averse customers and horizontally differentiated products to highlight the robustness of our results.

The authors find that the online retailer will choose the opaque information disclosure when attempting to increase revenue and reduce the mismatch of supply and demand in both ex post and ex ante inventory information conditions. Comparing with ex post disclosure strategies, ex ante opaque disclosure is optimal in a larger price region, and the total revenues gap between opaque disclosure and complete disclosure gradually increase as discount rate, transaction cost or the probability of agreeable inventory situation decreases. Furthermore, strategic customers may tend to be risk neutral when faced with opaque inventory information in a two-period sales setting.

This current paper is the first paper to study the online retailer's inventory information disclosure strategy in two selling periods. Moreover, this paper presents the conditions under which the online retailer should share complete or opaque inventory information with customers to maximize the online retailer's total revenues.

From the quantum game perspective, this paper aims to study a green product optimal pricing problem of the dual-channel supply chain under the cooperation of the retailer and manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions.

The decentralized and centralized decision-making optimal prices and profits are obtained by establishing the classical and quantum game models. Then the classical game and quantum game are compared.

When the quantum entanglement is greater than 0, the selling prices of the quantum model are higher than the classical model. Through theoretical research and numerical analysis results, centralized decision-making is more economical and efficient than decentralized decision-making. Publicity and education on carbon emission reduction for consumers will help consumers accept carbon emission reduction products with slightly higher prices. When the emission reduction increases too fast, the cost of emission reduction will form a significant burden and affect the profits of manufacturers and supply chain systems.

From the perspective of the quantum game, the author explores the optimal prices of green product and compares them with the classical game.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the optimal production and financing strategies for the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of a capital-constrained original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a risk-averse authorized remanufacturer (RM).

The authors formulate four models with different scenarios, namely, the OEM has sufficient capital; the OEM has limited capital without financing; the OEM adopts debt financing strategy; and the OEM adopts equity financing strategy. The equilibrium solutions of each scenario are obtained by backward induction method, the influences of risk aversion coefficient on the equilibrium solutions are examined and the OEM's optimal financing strategy is found by comparison analysis.

When the OEM's initial capital is limited and the equity dividend ratio is less than a certain threshold, the equity financing strategy is more advantageous for the OEM. However, if the OEM's initial capital is extremely scarce and the dividend proportion is large, the OEM prefers the debt financing strategy. When considering financing, consumer surplus always decreases as the risk aversion factor increases; the debt financing strategy is more environmentally friendly compared with the equity financing strategy. Only the debt financing strategy can make both members in the CLSC achieve a win-win situation in a certain region when the dividend ratio is sufficiently large.

It will be more fascinating if the model extends to such a case that the production operation situation in the CLSC composed of multiple OEMs in multiple periods. Furthermore, the remanufacturer's risk-averse information is asymmetry may be more realistic in our daily life.

There are three main differences from the existing research. One is that the remanufacturer's risk aversion originates from the uncertain remanufacturing cost instead of the uncertain market demand. Another is that the boundary conditions of the OEM prefer to adopt debt financing is obtained through the envelope theorem with Lagrange multiplier method. Last but not the least, this paper provides a good theoretical reference and practical guidance for the OEM to make the rational financing strategy selection in face of different degree of capital scarcity in the CLSC system. The value of the three aspects provides a theoretical basis for the optimal operation decisions of capital-constrained manufacturer considering the remanufacturer's risk aversion in the CLSC operation system.

In recent years, private brands for e-commerce platforms have experienced rapid growth. However, whether these platforms developing private brands should share their demand information with others and how such information sharing affects the sales format selection of national brand manufacturers have puzzled firm managers in practice. This paper aims to investigate the information-sharing strategy for the e-commerce platform and its influence on the sales format selection in the presence of the private brand.

The authors use a game-theoretical model to examine the interaction between the information-sharing strategy and sales format selection in a supply chain consisting of a manufacturer and a platform that operates a private brand.

The equilibrium results show that when the commission rate is low, the manufacturer favors agency selling, and the platform shares demand information with the manufacturer; when the commission rate is high, the manufacturer prefers reselling, and the platform does not share the information. This preference is affected by information forecasting accuracy; as the information forecasting accuracy increases, the manufacturer prefers to adopt agency selling, and the platform tends to share the information. Interestingly, under agency selling, sharing information with the manufacturer can increase the platform’s profit from selling the private brand and achieve a win-win situation for them. Furthermore, we show that the manufacturer can inspire the platform to share the information with himself by adopting agency selling, whereas the platform sharing the information improves the probability that the manufacturer adopts agency selling. Moreover, the manufacturer may have a first-mover advantage. In particular, the manufacturer moving first increases the likelihood that the manufacturer chooses agency selling and the platform shares the information.

This paper contributes to sales format literature by exploring the effect of information sharing strategy on sales format selection in the presence of the private brand and can help manufacturers and platforms to make suitable decisions regarding information sharing and sales format selection.

This paper aims to explore product pricing and green promotion effort policies and further analyzes the influences of financing interest rate, green promotion effort and free-riding behavior on the optimal strategies.

Research will be conducted with the aid of Stackelberg game research method, considering that the manufacturer has financial constraints and financing from e-commerce platform, and consumers have dual preferences, based on the two models of no green promotion effort for physical store and green promotion effort for physical store to explore dual-channel green supply chain strategies.

This research puts forward the following findings, in the two models: the rise in financing interest rate leads to an increase in wholesale and selling prices of dual channels and a decrease in demand of dual channels. The green promotion effort has a positive impact on wholesale prices, selling prices and demand of dual channels. The rise of free-riding rate makes offline wholesale and selling prices fall, whereas online wholesale and selling prices rise.

This research results can provide reference for the decision-making in the context of supply chain financing and free-riding.

Considering the network externalities of online selling, this paper builds three different online direct selling models: manufacturer direct selling (MN model), network platform direct selling (NN model) and retailer direct selling (RN model). The optimal advertising and pricing decision and corporate profits under each selling model are investigated.

Combining the characteristics of online direct selling, this paper formulates direct selling models that are dominated by different companies as Stackelberg game models. Numerical analyses are carried out, along with the comparison of the equilibrium solutions for each model.

The authors' research shows that increasing network externalities is conducive to the development of enterprises. The network platform's profit is the lowest in the RN model and the highest in the NN one. The comparison of manufacturers' profits between the MN model and the NN model primarily depends on consumers' sensitivities for sales price and advertising promotion level. The manufacturer does not benefit from the RN model due to the lowest efficiency.

Coupled with three different online direct selling models and detailed analyses of the optimal solutions, this study has enriched the theoretical foundation of online direct selling. Moreover, this study extends the research of network externalities to the field of e-commerce, revealing the network externalities' influence on the decision-making of the e-supply chain.

The confirmation of receipt of orders by consumers means that the online retailer actually receives the payments on many retail platforms (e.g. Taobao). In order to recoup funds as soon as possible, the retailer will take steps (e.g. improving the level of delivery and adopting a rebate policy) to encourage consumers to confirm receipt earlier. It is significant for the retailer to identify an appropriate strategy and determine the optimal product price. To address the above issues, this paper examines and compares the pricing strategies and profits under different strategies to show some managerial insights for the retailer's decision-making.

In this paper, the authors discuss four models, i.e. adopting common delivery and offering consumers no rebates, adopting common delivery and offering rebates, adopting fast delivery and offering no rebates and adopting fast delivery and offering rebates, which the retailer may consider. Under different models, consumer utility and firm's profit structure are disparate. After comparing the retailer's profits under four models, the optimal strategy, profit and product price are obtained.

Some interesting results are as follows. When the cost of fast delivery is not very high, improving the level of delivery would bring more profit to the retailer and create a positive impact on consumers. Interestingly, our results also show that offering proper rebates to stimulate consumers to confirm receipt early only serves to improve the profit only when the motivation of consumers to confirm the receipt is very low. Moreover, the authors find that a higher level of delivery services can promote the implementation of the rebate policy to improve the retailer's earnings.

This paper is the first study on the transaction mode of retail platforms and the problem of confirming receipt by a model-based method.

The paper aims to clarify the effects of brand differentiation on the platform's formulation of channel strategy and help the online platform formulate the optimal channel strategy, which involves selecting a proper selling mode for each brand.

The paper develops a multistage game model consisting of one online platform and two competing manufacturers with differentiated brands and examines the effects of brand differentiation on these three channel members' profits under each candidate channel strategy.

The results show that the platform prefers to offer the reselling mode for both brands when the brand differentiation is low, and this preference will be enhanced by the decrease in order fulfilment cost. By contrast, when the brand differentiation is high, it will offer the reselling mode for the premium brand but the marketplace service for the economy brand if the order fulfilment cost is not high; or the marketplace mode will be offered to both brands if this cost is high.

This study assumes that the order fulfilment costs of platform and manufacturer are fixed and symmetric. Therefore, researchers are encouraged to consider asymmetric costs of order fulfilment.

The paper guides the online platform to formulate the optimal channel strategy for differentiated brands and provides managerial insights for differentiated brands entering online markets.

This paper explores platforms' optimal channel strategy by jointly considering the effects of brand differentiation and investigates the impacts of brand differentiation on the optimal decision making under four candidate options. Moreover, this paper has been extended to examine the case when the manufacturers' production costs cannot be neglected.

This paper investigates the dynamic pricing strategy of a firm for the successive-generation products under the conditions of the limited trade-in duration and strategic customers. Further, it explores the effect of a limited trade-in duration on the choice of the myopic and strategic customers, besides the optimal dynamic pricing and trade-in strategy of the firm.

Based on the choice behavior of the myopic and strategic customers, the authors have developed a two-period game-theoretic analytical model to decide the optimal retail prices of the successive-generation products and the optimal trade-in rebate when the firm adopts a dynamic pricing strategy and then investigate three extensions of the basic model to discuss the change in the results owing to the relaxation of certain conditions.

The authors find from the results that, in terms of profit maximization, it is better to extend the limited trade-in duration, and hence, the firm should implement a dynamic pricing strategy. However, in the situation of using a static pricing strategy, the firm should extend the limited trade-in duration only if the incremental value of the new generation products is below a certain threshold. Moreover, the firm should use a dual rollover strategy instead of a single rollover one. If all customers in the market are myopic, then the firm should also extend the limited trade-in duration.

This study mainly discusses the impact of limited trade-in duration on the firm's dynamic pricing strategy when facing strategic customers, which provides several directions for future research. First, if the government offers subsidies to consumers, how will strategic consumers make purchase decisions? How would the enterprise make its pricing decision? Second, when asymmetric information exists between consumers and firms, how will it affect consumers' choice behavior and firms' pricing decisions? All these issues are worth exploring in the future.

These results offer certain managerial insights for the firm in the decision making on pricing within the trade-in program.

This is the first work to study the dynamic pricing strategy of the firm for the successive-generation products under the conditions of the limited trade-in duration and strategic customers. Further, this work discusses the changes in results owing to the relaxation of certain conditions.