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This study aims to investigate the tendency for firms, exhibiting an entrepreneurial spirit in their growth strategies, to engage in misconduct within the context of China's rapidly developing economy. The authors also examine how this relationship is influenced by governance mechanisms, specifically management shareholding and executive functional diversity. Furthermore, the authors explore the mediating roles of organizational complexity and performance pressure in linking entrepreneurial growth to firm misconduct. This research provides a novel perspective for understanding the impact of entrepreneurial growth on corporate ethical risks, and offers practical insights for maintaining ethical standards in firms during their pursuit of growth.

This study focuses on publicly traded, mature companies that exhibit an entrepreneurial inclination in their growth strategies, demonstrating entrepreneurial vigor through activities such as product innovation and market expansion. This exploration incorporates both theoretical and empirical approaches, scrutinizing A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2019. To validate the robustness of this study's findings, the authors have applied diverse methodologies such as propensity score matching, classification regression, and alternative indicator analysis.

This study found that the entrepreneurial growth-oriented strategy is positively related to firm misconduct. It also uncovers that governance mechanisms like management shareholding and executive functional diversity moderate this relationship. Moreover, organizational complexity and performance pressure partially mediate the relationship between an entrepreneurial growth strategy and firm misconduct.

For instance, more detailed categorization of corporate misconduct, based on punishment severity, could be explored. Additional characteristics like age, education, gender, and team/board diversity could help further understand the relationship between entrepreneurial growth strategy and misconduct. By addressing these limitations and exploring further avenues for research, the authors can deepen the understanding of this relationship and provide valuable insights for firms seeking to mitigate potential risks.

First, for regulators, shareholders, creditors and investors, knowing and understanding the relationship between growth-oriented strategies and corporate violations is helpful for them to scientifically evaluate the potential risks that may exist in the company, and can also carry out differentiated supervision on the company based on different types of company-oriented strategies. Second, when designing the corporate governance mechanism, listed companies should fully consider the role of management shareholding. Finally, executives should treat cross-functional experience dialectically, especially in growth oriented strategic companies.

This research provides a novel perspective for understanding the impact of entrepreneurial growth on corporate ethical risks, and offers practical insights for maintaining ethical standards in firms during their pursuit of growth.

This study stands out by examining the influence of entrepreneurial growth strategy on firm misconduct, thus enhancing previous studies that primarily centered on entrepreneurial start-ups. The authors offer a nuanced comprehension of the potential risks intrinsic to corporate entrepreneurship and highlight the crucial role of efficient governance structures in curbing corporate misbehavior while fostering entrepreneurial growth.

The authors examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and abnormal executive compensation. The authors hypothesize that socially responsible firms are more likely to pay their executives at a level that is in line with economic determinants.

Using the expected compensation model developed by Core et al. (2008), the authors test our hypothesis using a large sample of US public companies.

The authors find that CSR performance is negatively associated with how much executive compensation deviates from the expected level. The authors further examine whether CSR performance is associated with excess compensation or inadequate compensation and find that socially responsible firms are less likely to pay their executives either excessively or inadequately.

This study provides evidence on the association between CSR performance and abnormal executive compensation, especially how CSR is associated with inadequate compensation, an area that has been largely overlooked by the literature.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the motives for granting additional remuneration to majority managers in Tunisian limited liability companies. The theoretical explanation is based on the tax avoidance hypothesis on the one hand and on the conflict of interests hypothesis on the other hand.

The sample used consists of 48 Tunisian limited liability companies throughout the period ranging from 2015 to 2020. The authors use the panel data with the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimate in first difference.

The results provide evidence of a positive relationship between the accounting performance of the company and the granting of additional remuneration to majority managers, alongside their share in profits. What is more, there is a positive relationship between the change in the company's accounting results and the granting of additional remuneration to majority managers, alongside their share in profits. Likewise, the tax avoidance carried out by the firm is positively and significantly correlated with the granting of additional remuneration to majority managers, alongside their share in profits.

The results may help corporations consider their future growth opportunities. This is in a context where the approach to tax avoidance and conflict of interests occupies a central place in the assessment of the granting of additional remuneration to majority managers, alongside their share in profits.

This article is motivated by the low number of works in the context of granting additional remuneration to majority managers, alongside their share in profits. It makes a substantial contribution to the academic literature through adding to the limited body of research on tax avoidance and conflict of interests in a corporate context.

The board structure (BS) is pivotal in modern corporate governance (CG). This study aims to investigate BS variables (BSIZE, BIND and chief executive officer [CEO] duality) and their correlation with risk-taking behavior indicators, enriching the understanding of how CG shapes financial institutions’ (FIs) decision-making in Pakistan.

By scrutinizing data from 67 financial entities listed on the Stock Exchange of Pakistan spanning from 2011 to 2022 through panel data regression techniques, the research emphasizes that BS holds a substantial influence over the risk tendencies exhibited by these firms.

Key findings suggest that board size has a positive influence, aligned with previous CG research. Smaller boards perform better and avoid excessive risk-taking, contrasting some negative relationship claims. More independent directors are recommended to curtail risk and financial disruption. Holding both CEO and chair roles reduces risk exposure, resonating with reputational and employment risk theory. It is essential to recognize that BS’s impact on risk-taking is nuanced and context-dependent.

Policymakers, scholars, practitioners and investors working in the market for financial companies might greatly benefit from the empirical findings of this study. Imposing mandates on FIs to uphold adequate capital reserves functions as a safeguard against unforeseen losses, thereby diminishing the probability of unwarranted risk-taking.

Prior studies in this domain predominantly focus on nonfinancial sectors. In addition, existing research often explores the relationship between BS and firm risk-taking solely within the banking sector, overlooking other FIs. This study contributes by using a comprehensive data set encompassing all types of FIs, thus extending the existing literature.

This study explores the influence of female executives on the misalignment between corporate ESG commitments and practices, a phenomenon known as ESG decoupling. It also enhances the understanding of female power on affecting ESG decoupling under different ownership settings.

This study uses a quantitative research design to explore the impact mechanism of female executives’ proportion on corporate ESG decoupling under different ownership contexts based on a sample of 2,585 firm-year observations from publicly traded Chinese companies between 2011 and 2021.

Based on agency theory, upper echelons theory and gender socialization theory, our findings indicate that (1) female executives are significantly effective in reducing ESG decoupling, and (2) this effect is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs) compared to state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

This study contributes original insights into the ESG decoupling literature by demonstrating the external influences of corporate governance structure, particularly in the context of China’s unique corporate ownership environment. It also provides strong social implications by highlighting the role of gender dynamics in corporate governance, corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviors and ESG alignment.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.

This study investigates the empirical association between environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) performance and top executive compensation in the US financial services industry. Considering that financial firms can inflict systemic shocks across the economy, it has been argued that they must conduct ethical and sustainable business in accordance with ESG principles. This study examines whether ESG efforts are beneficial to managers.

The authors use CEO compensation and ESG performance ratings data for all US financial firms (SIC 6000–6799) from 2015 to 2019. Employing fixed effects regressions, the authors test whether lagged ESG performance is related to CEO compensation, after controlling for other firm characteristics such as size, financial performance, leverage and CEO stock ownership.

The authors find that lagged ESG ratings are strongly associated with all forms of compensation. An increase of one standard deviation in the composite ESG rating is associated with a 14%–16% increase in the total pay. Among the three ESG pillars, only S (social) and G (governance) exhibit persistent and significant associations with both short- and long-term executive pay. The authors also document the significant moderating effects of ESG on the relationships among firm performance, size, leverage, ownership and executive pay, identifying how ESG is associated with compensation.

The authors conclude that managers receive ESG incentives implicitly and explicitly. The novel finding of direct and indirect associations between ESG and top executive compensation contributes to the growing ESG literature on the financial sector and ongoing debate about the explicit inclusion of ESG targets in compensation design.

Clawback provisions entitle shareholders to recover previously awarded incentive compensation after the discovery of accounting manipulation or misconduct. The author evaluates the impact of clawback enforcement heterogeneity on the horizon of executive compensation.

The author provides empirical tests to evaluate the impact of clawback adoption decisions. The author deals with the endogeneity of clawback adoption decisions through an instrumental variables strategy that exploits the transmission of governance choices within firms’ networks.

While the author finds that clawback adoption reduces the frequency of accounting manipulation, this reduction is accompanied by heterogeneous effects on the horizon of executive pay across firms. Clawback adopters with high director independence, high leverage, high managerial termination payments and low executive ownership tilt their compensation toward the short-term.

The results, robust to alternative specifications, suggest that clawbacks allow strong-enforcement firms to tilt compensation toward the short-term, offsetting some of the direct manipulation disincentives generated by the clawback. The stock market reacts positively to the adoption in firms with weak enforcement, suggesting that clawbacks significantly reduce the managers’ rent-extraction capacity.

Using a novel empirical and identification approach, the results suggest that clawbacks allow strong-enforcement firms to tilt compensation toward the short-term, offsetting some of the direct manipulation disincentives generated by the clawback.

This study explores whether the unique organizational form of family firms helps to mitigate the negative effects caused by the announcement of product recalls.

The authors use an event study, for a sample of 2,576 product recalls in the United States (US) automobile industry, between January 2010 and June 2021.

The authors found that stock market's reaction to a product recall announcement is less negative for family firms. This superior performance is partially driven by the family firms' long-term investment horizons and higher strategic emphasis on product quality. However, the relationship between family ownership and cumulative abnormal returns around product recall announcements is nonlinear as the impact of family ownership starts by being positive but becomes negative for higher levels of family ownership. The authors also find that family firm's chief executive officer (CEO) and managerial ownership influence positively the stock market reaction to product recall announcements.

This work has several implications for family firms' management as well as for investors and financial analysts. First, as higher managerial ownership is associated with a greater emphasis on product quality, decreasing stock market losses when a product recall occurs, family firms should consider increasing equity-based compensation. Second, as there seems to exist an optimal proportion of family ownership, family firms should consider the risks of increasing too much their ownership share. Third, investors and financial analysts can use the results in the study to help them in their investment and trading decisions in the stock market.

The authors extend the knowledge of product recalls by studying the under-researched role of the flexible, internally focused culture of family businesses on the stock market reaction to product recalls.

Green transition is a long-term direction of corporate development that can achieve sustainable corporate development. This study aims to investigate whether state ownership promotes corporate green transition by mitigating managerial myopia and the impact of environmental regulations, internal controls and ownership on this pathway.

Using data from 2,608 Chinese listed companies for 2010–2019, the authors investigate the relationship between state ownership, managerial myopia and corporate green transition by using fixed-effects and moderated mediation models.

State ownership can boost green transitions and alleviate managerial myopia. Managerial myopia mediates the relationship between state ownership and corporate green transition. Furthermore, environmental regulations, internal controls and ownership moderate the mediating effects of managerial myopia.

The authors construct a multidimensional green transition index to examine the influence of state ownership on corporate green transition behavior and reveal the underlying mechanism by which state ownership promotes green transition by “mitigating managerial myopia.” This study enriches the literature on state ownership, management myopia and green transition and provides important evidence for the promotion of mixed ownership reforms.