Market power, dismissal threat, and rent sharing

Anabela Carneiro (Faculdade de Economia da Universidade do Porto and CETE, Porto, Portugal)
Pedro Portugal (Banco de Portugal and Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal)

International Journal of Manpower

ISSN: 0143-7720

Publication date: 21 March 2008

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this study is to investigate to what extent the existence of high labor adjustment costs has some influence on the process of wage negotiation. In particular, it aims to analyse if the risk of being laid off has any impact on insiders' bargaining power and, consequently, on their wage claims.

Design/methodology/approach

A collective bargaining model that closely follows those developed by Nickell et al. and Bentolila and Dolado is adopted and a longitudinal panel of large Portuguese firms from all sectors over the 1993‐199 period is used.

Findings

The results reveal that firms where insider workers appear to have more bargaining power tend to pay higher wages. In particular, we found that the threat of dismissal tends to weaken insiders' bargaining power and, consequently, to depress wages.

Research limitations/implications

In future research an attempt should be made to measure directly the labor turnover costs.

Originality/value

This paper presents robust empirical evidence using micro‐data for individual firms that support one of the predictions of the insider‐outsider theory that wages will be higher in sectors (firms) with high labor turnover costs.

Keywords

Citation

Carneiro, A. and Portugal, P. (2008), "Market power, dismissal threat, and rent sharing", International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 29 No. 1, pp. 30-47. https://doi.org/10.1108/01437720810861994

Download as .RIS

Publisher

:

Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2008, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Please note you might not have access to this content

You may be able to access this content by login via Shibboleth, Open Athens or with your Emerald account.
If you would like to contact us about accessing this content, click the button and fill out the form.
To rent this content from Deepdyve, please click the button.