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This paper is a study of how people with heterogonous individual characteristics self-select into different compensation schemes. A laboratory experiment is designed in which “workers” can join “companies” that pay according to various schemes: piece rate, revenue sharing, individual tournament, and team tournament. The main findings are: (1) Subjects with high relative performance always prefer individual tournament. (2) Risk-averse subjects are less likely to choose competitive schemes. (3) Individual tournament attracts fewer women than men, which is partially explained by gender-specific social preferences. (4) Compared to people with siblings, only children are less likely to accept any team-based schemes without information about their teammates. (5) The provision of feedback about relative performance can adjust individuals’ biased self-beliefs and then influence their self-selections.

This study aims to examine the effects of local tournament incentives on environmental, social and governance (ESG) disclosure and the quality of such disclosures among Chinese A-share listed companies. Furthermore, it seeks to investigate the moderating roles of CEO duality, institutional investors’ shareholding and product market competition in this relationship.

This study uses a quantitative approach, and data from A-share listed companies in China spanning from 2012 to 2021. To test the proposed hypotheses, the authors conduct hierarchical regression analysis along with a series of robustness tests to ensure the validity of our findings.

The findings of this study indicate that local tournament incentives have a positive impact on companies’ propensity to disclose ESG information, yet they negatively influence the quality of these disclosures. Additionally, the presence of CEO duality and product market competition attenuate this relationship, whereas the shareholding of institutional investors serves to strengthen it.

This study’s findings can aid policymakers and regulators in China and other emerging economies in policies that promote high-quality ESG information disclosure, taking into account local tournament incentives. Furthermore, the study underscores the importance of maintaining robust corporate governance structures within firms to ensure that CEOs’ self-serving motivations do not undermine ESG disclosure.

This study adds to the ongoing discourse on the significance of ESG disclosure in emerging economies by analyzing the influence of executive promotion incentives on ESG disclosure from an external labor market standpoint. By exploring the potential self-serving motivations of CEOs in promoting ESG values and practices within organizations, this paper addresses a gap in the existing literature.

While the tournament format is common within organized sports, little is known about the supporting behavior of tournament event fans. The defeat of the supported team and its' subsequent elimination could influence how fans associate themselves with the event. Hence, the present study aims to investigate the fans' responses to the favorite team's elimination at a knockout tournament focusing on whether they are willing to continue following the event and choose another team to support.

In this paper fans' temporal switching behavior was explored in relationships with fans' identification with geographic area, sport itself and teams. The audience watching the Japanese National High School Baseball Championship was targeted for the online survey in March 2020, resulting in the final sample of 502 (287 observations used for reliability and validity tests).

Independent sample t-tests and logistic regression were employed in the study. 80% of respondents intended to continue following the tournament, which was associated with a higher attachment to sports. Place attachment by itself was not associated with the intention to continue. Most of the respondents who chose a certain team to support after the favorite team's elimination have retained their pattern of choosing the team (63.9%). Interestingly, fans with higher place attachment not only choose to continue following the tournament after their prefectural team's elimination but were willing to support another team from the same region.

This is one of the first papers providing evidence of tournament fan behavior and temporal switching.

The structure of the Malaysian fund market presents a unique setting in which to examine behavioural and cultural differences in the performance of fund managers. The purpose of this paper is to utilise Taylor's extension of the tournament model of Brown et al. who argued that using an exogenous (endogenous) benchmark induces losing (winning) managers to gamble. This presents two competing testable hypotheses that are investigated in the current study.

The authors use a sample of Malaysian unit trusts covering the period 1982 to 2010, applying the non‐parametric cross‐product ratio methodology to test all Malaysian funds and determine whether there is empirical evidence of tournament behaviour. The authors separate Malaysian funds into two main categories (conventional and Islamic) to find out whether different fund types affect the behaviour of the funds as a whole.

Overall, Taylor's theory does not hold in the Malaysian fund market, as conventional funds display tournament behaviour regardless of the benchmark used. However, Islamic funds do not display any significant tournament behaviour.

The current study uses a non‐parametric approach to look for evidence of tournament (gaming) behaviour in the performance of fund managers in Malaysia. In doing so, the authors extend the tournaments literature by examining the performance of three data sets pertaining to the performance and evidence of tournament behaviour in: all managed funds in Malaysia; Islamic funds; and conventional funds. A major motivation for choosing the Malaysian data of unit trusts is to investigate and examine the behaviour of funds operating in an economy that is an emerging market in the rapidly expanding Asian economy; is a market that has a reporting period in line with the calendar year; and is an economy with a strong presence of Islamic funds (Shariah) and Muslim population.

Tournament theory provides important insights into organizational reward systems. It examines the incentive properties of reward systems based on rank‐order rather than absolute individual performance. Tournament theory may explain the pattern of managerial pay. It may also explain risk‐taking behavior by mutual fund managers. We use data from the PGA tour to examine the pattern of risk‐taking by professional golfers in an explicit tournament. The PGA tour provides a natural laboratory where such behavior can be studied. Our evidence shows that behavior by players in golf tournaments is consistent with the predictions of tournament theory.

This paper examines an apparent contrast in organizing innovation tournaments; seekers offer contestant-agnostic incentives to elicit greater effort from a heterogeneous pool of contestants. Specifically, the study tests whether and how such incentives and the underlying heterogeneity in the contestant pool, assessed in terms of contestants' entry timing, are jointly associated with contestant effort. Thus, the study contributes to the prior literature that has looked at behavioral consequences of entry timing as well as incentives in innovation tournaments.

For hypothesis testing, the study uses a panel dataset of submission activity of over 60,000 contestants observed in nearly 200 innovation tournaments. The estimation employs multi-way fixed effects, accounting for unobserved heterogeneity across contestants, tournaments and submission week. The findings remain stable across a range of robustness checks.

The study finds that, on average, late entrant tends to exert less effort than an early entrant (H1). Results further show that the effort gap widens in tournaments that offer higher incentives. In particular, the effort gap between late and early entrants is significantly wider in tournaments that have attracted superior solutions from several contestants (H2), offer gain in status (H3, marginally significant) or offer a higher monetary reward (H4).

The study's findings counter conventional wisdom, which suggests that incentives have a positive effect on contestant behavior, including effort. In contrast, the study indicates that incentives may have divergent implications for contestant behavior, contingent on contestants' entry timing. As the study discusses, these findings have several implications for research and practice of managing innovation tournaments.

Using data from the Senior PGA Tours we analyze the incentive effects of rank order tournaments. Previous studies using data from the PGA Tour reached conflicting conclusions. To resolve the issue, the Senior PGA Tour was chosen for its unique format where players are not cut from the tournament before completion, eliminating any survival bias. The findings support the hypothesis that the level of prizes in Senior PGA tournaments influences players’ performance, indicating that tournaments can be used to motivate performance.

This paper aims to summarize antecedents and consequences of risk-taking in tournaments and show the development of tournament optimization considering risk-taking. Moreover, further expansion expectations related to antecedents and consequences of risk-taking in tournaments and tournament optimization considering risk-taking are discussed.

A comprehensive bibliographic retrieval and further literature review and systematics re-organization are used to build the framework with respect to risk-taking in tournaments. Then, qualitative analysis is used to present conclusions of existing research.

By summarizing various antecedents, different consequences and tournament optimizations with regard to risk-taking in tournaments of existing research, the authors present a series of research opportunities regarding risk-taking in tournaments that can propel the advancement of tournament theory.

The studies on risk-taking in tournament have been recently received wide attention and are growing vigorously. Based on the summary and re-organization, the framework of literature studying risk-taking in tournaments is built. This literature review also helps researchers learn the advance of risk-taking in tournament and provides fruitful direction for future research on this topic.

This study aims to investigate the question concerning whether tournament incentives motivate chief executive officers (CEOs) to be socially responsible.

Data from all A-share Chinese companies listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges for the period from 2010 to 2015 are used. To draw inferences from the data, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and cluster OLS are used as a baseline methodology. To control for the possible issue of endogeneity, firm-fixed-effects regression, two-stage least squares regression and propensity score matching are used.

A reliable evidence is found that tournament incentives motivate CEOs to be more socially responsible. Additional analysis reveals that the positive effect of CEO tournament incentives on corporate social responsibility performance (CSRP) is more pronounced in state-owned firms than it is in non-state-owned firms. The study’s findings are consistent with tournament theory and the conventional wisdom hypothesis, which proposes that better incentives lead to competitiveness, which improves financial and social performance.

The study’s findings have implications for companies and regulators who wish to enhance CSRP by giving tournament incentives to top managers. Investment in social responsibility may reduce the conflict between executives and employees and improve the corporate culture.

This study contributes to the existing literature by providing the first evidence that CEOs’ tournament incentives play a vital role in CSRP. The study’s findings contribute to tournament theory.

Many companies use competition for either monetary or non-monetary rewards to induce employee effort. Pitting employees against each other in a competition could come at a thus far insufficiently considered cost of leading to lower employee cooperation. The authors examine how competition for monetary rewards in the form of tournament incentives or non-monetary rewards in the form of standing in uncompensated public rankings affects employee cooperation with former competitors in a subsequent task where the extent of the cooperation does not affect the welfare or social standing of the person deciding to cooperate. The authors hypothesize that competition in the first task negatively affects cooperation in the second task. The authors further predict that competition leads to psychological pressure, which mediates differences in cooperation. The results support the authors’ hypotheses. In addition, the authors find that the decrease in cooperation results from the behavior of low performers, whereas cooperation by high performers is not affected. The findings are important because they show that inducing effort in one dimension leads to an unintended cost in the form of lower cooperation in another dimension. This cost occurs for both types of competition – competition for monetary payoffs and for non-monetary rewards. Ultimately, the size of this cost depends on the marginal benefit from any cooperation of low performers.