Search results

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and provide new data and measures of bank regulatory and supervisory policies in 180 countries from 1999 to 2011.

The authors' approach is based upon the quantification of hundreds of questions, including information on permissible bank activities, capital requirements, the powers of official supervisory agencies, information disclosure requirements, external governance mechanisms, deposit insurance, barriers to entry, and loan provisioning, to form indices of key bank regulatory and supervisory policies.

It is found that the regulation and supervision of banks varies widely across countries in many different dimensions. Furthermore, there has not been a convergence in bank regulatory regimes over the past decade despite the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression.

The data are based on survey responses and this requires that the answers be accurate. To better ensure this is the case, several checks were made to ensure greater accuracy in all the answers. Using this database one can perform various statistical analyses in attempt to determine which bank regulatory regimes work best to promote well‐functioning banking systems.

The authors' data and measures are new and unique so as enable policy makers and researchers to examine cross‐country comparisons and analyses of changes in banking policies over time.

This paper examines the need for international regulation of financial markets and suggests the possible role that a global financial supervisor might play in providing effective regulation of international financial markets. The first part discusses the nature of systemic risk in the international financial system and the necessity for international Minimum Standards of prudential supervision for banking institutions. The second part examines the efforts of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision to devise non‐binding international standards for managing systemic risk in financial markets. Recent financial crises in Asia, Russia and Latin America suggest, however, that informal efforts by international bodies such as the Basel Committee are inadequate to address the risk of systemic failure in financial systems. The third part therefore argues that efficient international financial regulation requires certain regulatory functions to be performed by a global supervisor acting in conjunction with national regulatory authorities. These functions should involve the authorisation of financial institutions, generation of rules and standards of regulatory practice, surveillance of financial markets, and coordination with national authorities in implementing and enforcing such standards.

The need for international regulation of financial markets became apparent in the mid‐1970s in response to the post‐Bretton Woods liberalisation of financial markets. The elimination of the fixed exchange rate parity with gold resulted in the privatisation of financial risk, which created pressure to eliminate controls on cross‐border capital movements and the further deregulation of financial markets. It became necessary for national regulatory authorities to promote safe and sound banking systems through the effective management of systemic risk in national markets. Similarly, the need for international standards of prudential supervision was also recognised, to prevent solvent banking institutions in one jurisdiction from losing business to less respectable institutions operating in other jurisdictions whose laws permitted cut‐rate financial services and other risky financial practices. The privatisation of financial risk also created the need for financial institutions to spread their risks over many assets and activities, which led, in turn, to a significant increase in short‐term cross‐border portfolio investment that has, in many instances, exposed capital‐importing countries to increased systemic risk due to the volatility of such investments.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the underlying assumption that social workers need reflective supervision specifically, as opposed to managerial or any other form of supervision or support, and to consider whether our focus on the provision of reflective supervision may be preventing us from thinking more broadly and creatively about what support local authority child and family social workers need and how best to provide it.

The paper provides an argument based on the author’s own research and a selective review of the literature.

Reflective supervision has no future in local authority child and family social work because: first, there is no clear understanding of what reflective supervision is; second, there is no clear evidence for its effectiveness; and third, sizeable proportion of local authority child and family social workers in England do not receive reflective supervision and many never have.

The paper challenges the received wisdom about the value of reflective supervision and advocates exploring alternative models for supporting best practice in child and family social work.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of financial penalties on the stability of the banking sector.

A unique database of 671 financial penalties imposed on 68 international listed banks between 2007 and 2014 and a fixed-effects panel data approach were used.

The results show that financial penalties increase banks’ systemic risk exposure but do not significantly affect banks’ contribution to systemic risk. Additionally, the link between financial penalties and systemic risk exposure is weaker in regulatory and supervisory systems with more prompt corrective power among national authorities. By contrast, supervisory authorities’ stronger power to declare insolvency and a greater external monitoring culture exacerbate the positive effects of financial penalties on systemic risk exposure.

The punishment of misconduct should correct the social harm and prevent future misconduct while ensuring the banking system’s stability. Therefore, authorities should punish misconduct by implementing penalties against the financial institutions at a specific amount that offsets the damages of misconduct but does not threaten systemic stability. Penalties against institutions may be complemented by financial penalties against upper management to induce a more responsible culture in banks.

This paper is the first to study the effect of financial penalties on the stability of the financial system. The results contribute to the ongoing debate on the appropriateness of financial penalties and address the question of whether bank regulators reduce or contribute to banks’ systemic risk.

Several recent developments (notably, the breakdown of traditional distinctions between different types of financial activity, the globalisation of financial markets and increasing emphasis on systemic stability as a regulatory objective) have prompted policy‐makers to search for an ‘optimum’ regulatory structure that is adapted to the new market environment. Further impetus has been given to this debate by the radical overhaul of regulatory structures, along quite different lines in Australia, the UK and Japan, and the ongoing deliberations within the US Congress over structured financial reform. This paper examines alternative ways of organising the regulatory function in the context of the new financial market environment. The first section reviews the objectives, targets and techniques of regulation. The second section describes the new market environment and the restructuring of the financial services industry. The third section assesses the implications of this new environment for the structure of regulation. The fourth section addresses the international dimension. The final section provides a summary and conclusion. The paper is based on a presentation made at the World Bank Conference, El Salvador, June 1998.

Nearly eight years ago, a study “Global Institutions, National Supervision and Systemic Risk” was released by the Group of Thirty (G‐30), a private, nonprofit international body that seeks to deepen understanding of international economic and financial issues. The report observed that in a world of global financial conglomerates, supervisory structures that are divided by industry and nationality may create “gaps” that could place the financial system at greater risk of instability. The 1997 report recommended that global institutions‐working with the jurisdictions in which they operate‐develop principles of risk management to which they will adhere, as well as a mechanism for making that adherence transparent to the markets. It further proposed that financial regulators focus more attention on the systemic risk presented by markets and clearing mechanisms that link financial institutions and systems around the world.

The increased and varying presence of spirituality within mental health services has assisted practitioners to consider how individual beliefs might shape behaviors, relationships, and communication patterns. Constraints arise when assumptions about the meaning and nature of the spiritual beliefs is associated with an organized religion such as Christianity, which can hinder open inclusion within clinical and supervisory practice. When there is a dominant discourse about how Christianity (and other religions) has inherent and current instances of historical abuse at the foreground, policy-makers have used this as reason to be cautious about open inclusion in practice. This chapter seeks to open a more integrated conversational space between spirituality, reflexivity, and black mental health.

Given there is a great deal of scope for transforming mental health services for Black service users there remains a plethora of possibility for joining systemic reflexivity with spirituality (Cook, Powell, & Sims, 2010). There is less discourse around the applicability of spirituality expressed within leadership and supervisory practice; however, it can play a significant role for leaders, managers, and supervisors who practice from positions of spiritual awareness, orientation, and competence. There is particular relevance for Black African-Caribbean practitioners that consider they have a history of strength-based spiritual approaches and support systems inherent within their cultural identity (Boyd-Franklin, 1989). Consideration needs to be given as to how the associated concepts of collaboration, community cohesion, and support systems might assist professionals within leadership and organizational development roles as part of addressing Black mental health service provision.

Asks the question: what if the focus of educational supervision was to shift from inspecting individual teacher‐behaviour to examining and improving three sets of key organizational variables ‐ work processes, social architecture and environmental relationships? What if supervision could be transformed from performance evaluation into a process for designing high performing schools? Presents the paradigm of Knowledge Work Supervision, an innovative model of educational supervision designed to achieve what is alluded to in the above questions. It is a systemic and systematic model for redesigning the anatomy (structures), physiology (flow of information and webs of relationships) and psychology (beliefs, values) of an entire school system. Explains that the paradigm is cyclical, having four phases each with several activities, and it was constructed by reviewing real‐world practices in several interrelated areas: socio‐technical systems design, knowledge work, quality improvement, business process re‐engineering and organization development. Claims that Knowledge Work Supervision marks the leading edge of an emerging paradigm shift in the field of educational supervision.