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Deregulation and other factors permit and encourage financial institutions to become more integrated, both within their own (financial) industries, such as banking and insurance, and across these industries. Financial regulators have responded with like integration. As financial institutions increasingly compete with firms from other industries and areas, financial regulators similarly compete more across borders. The resulting competition in financial regulation enhances innovation, choice, and efficiency. The advent of home-run regulation, which in general allows financial institutions to adhere only to the financial regulations of their home area and is spreading across the US and Europe, may allow numerous regulatory regimes within a given market.

The applicable jurisdiction for insolvency proceedings, as provided by the Regulation (EC) No 1346/2000 on insolvency proceedings, is the court of the Member State where the debtor's center of main interest (COMI) is located (Article 3(1)). The Regulation, however, does not provide a comprehensive definition of the COMI. This paper seeks to explore the meaning and developments behind the meaning of COMI as influenced by judicial reasoning and conflicts across Member States.

The study centres around the emerging jurisprudence and analyses case law across Member States in order to draw conclusions on the meaning of COMI and the emerging concepts. Extensive consideration of statutory interpretation, case reports and judicial comment is present in order to inform and develop conclusions.

In the absence of a definition it appears that the only relevant European guidance emerges from recital 13 and Article 3 (1). With little guidance in the Regulation, it has therefore been left to national courts to decide how the notion of COMI should be interpreted. Determining the COMI has emerged as one of the most controversial aspect and the principle point of legal conflict, with some highly debated cases within member states’ courts. On the basis of the case law, it is suggested that the interpretation of COMI is more flexible in UK and Italian courts. The approach adopted in continental Europe is referred to as the “centre of operations approach”, i.e. the debtor's COMI has to be determined by the place where he is “ascertainable by third parties”. The Anglo Saxon approach, on the other hand, is known as the “mind of management approach”, i.e. the debtor's COMI must be situated where decisions are actually made. The latter seems to enjoy a more practical and accessible approach.

Not only will the findings assist those seeking to understand the process and COMI requirements across member states but it will also assist those researchers seeking to understanding the comparative and conflict of law barriers to pan‐European insolvency proceedings.

To discuss the regulation of professional wrestling in the USA in order to explore how the business of professional wrestling is regulated and deregulated.

Using desk-based research, the regulation and deregulation of professional wrestling will be explored.

The regulation of professional wrestling in the USA is inconsistent. The extent of regulation and deregulation of professional wrestling is dependent on the state in which the event takes place. Whether regulated or deregulated, professional wrestling is a painful, risky and injurious business wherein the economic health and well-being of the World Wrestling Entertainment (WWE) corporation, and the location in which events take place, take precedence over the health and well-being of working sports participants.

The research is limited to sports participants working in the dominant, visible and therefore arguably most accountable professional wrestling corporation in the USA. Implication of the research is that a more in-depth investigation into the utility of regulation is needed. Additionally, it raises concerns regarding the potential hidden work-related premature deaths, harms and injuries in other promotions in the USA and beyond.

Examines the situation in the UK in some detail with regard to three aspects of the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights of the European Union. Looks at the aims, together with an analysis and appraisal. Considers, first, information and consultation rights with regards to the transfer of undertakings and redundancies, followd by the right to collective action and, lastly, protection in the event of unjustifiable dismissal. Presents case law throughout as examples. Concludes that the UK has attempted to prevent social and economic rights for workers from being included in the final charter despite fierce opposition. Compares this view together with the UK suspicion of Europe against the views of the other member states.

North Carolina is one of fourteen states directly regulating and controlling milk markets. The regulations are administratively complex and vary from state to state, but the general pattern of regulation follows that set by the comprehensive Federal regulation which began in 1937 with the passage of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act. Milk markets in most of the country, including the major producing regions, are regulated and controlled by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). As a result of both state and federal controls, virtually no markets are unregulated. The consequences of Federal regulation of milk markets have been studied intensively, notably by Kessel and more recently by Kwoka. Less is known about the form and effects of state regulation. In this paper we analyze the case of milk market regulation in North Carolina. Specifically, we (1) review the ongoing regulation and assess the market structure and conduct of market participants including regulators; (2) review and analyze the economic implications and legal developments in reconstituting milk; and (3) investigate the policy alternatives with the purpose of determining whether there are options which, if adopted, will generate more social gains than associated social losses.

A typology of interventionism can categorize regulations, taxes, and subsidies both theoretically and as they sequentially unfold in practice. This typology is inspired by, but broader than, the Mises interventionist thesis, which, similar to Madison's lament, recognizes the propensity of intervention to expand from its own shortcomings in the elusive quest to achieve economic rationality (Lavoie, 1982, p. 180; Ikeda, 1997, pp. 41–46; Bradley, 2006).

European air transport policy, emerged through the confluence of case law and legislation, in four broad areas: liberalization, safety and security, greening, and the external policy. Following the implementation of the single market for air transport, policy shifted to liberalizing and regulating associated services and in recent years to greening, the external aviation policy, and safety and security. Inclusion of air transport in the Environmental Trading Scheme of the European Union exemplifies the European Commission’s proactive stand on bringing the industry in line with emission reduction trajectories of other industries. However, the bid to include flights to third countries in the trading scheme pushed the EU into a controversial position, causing the Commission to halt implementation and to give ICAO time to seek a global multilateral agreement. The chapter also discusses how the nationality clauses in air services agreements breached the Treaty of Rome, and a court ruling to that effect enabled the EC to extend EU liberalization policies beyond the European Union, resulting in the Common Aviation Area with EU fringe countries and the Open Aviation Area with the USA. Another important area of progress was aviation safety, where the EU region is unsurpassed in the world, yet the Commission has pushed the boundary even further, by establishing the European Safety Agency to oversee the European Aviation Safety Management System. Another important area of regulatory development was aviation security, a major focus after the woeful events in 2001, but increasingly under industry scrutiny on costs and effectiveness. The chapter concludes by arguing that in the coming decade, the EU will strive to strengthen its position as a global countervailing power, symbolized in air transport by a leadership position in environmental policy and international market liberalization, exemplified in the EU’s external aviation policy.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the viewpoints of key stakeholders on the European Commission’s proposal for a regulation for a mechanism to resolve legal and administrative obstacles in cross-border regions. The mechanism known as ECBM, or European Cross-border mechanism, was presented as part of the legislative package for EU Cohesion Policy 2021-2027. The regulation will allow one Member State to apply their legal provision in another Member State for a concretely defined case. This proposal is particularly interesting as it does not give further competence to the European level, but changes how Member States may interact with one another, yet, it raises critiques as regards to its compliance with constitutional, international and European law.

This paper outlines the main elements of contention, which are legal justification, state sovereignty, compliance with the subsidiarity and proportionality principle, thematic and territorial scope, voluntariness and the administrative burden.

The author concludes that the assessment of the voluntariness of the regulation will be crucial in examining the regulations compliance with EU principles and suggests that a more nuanced reading as to which parts of the regulation are voluntary is needed. The author further expects the legal text to change substantial during the legislative procedure, in particular in regard to the thematical scope and the bindingness.

This piece summarises the debate currently held in the European Council and the European Parliament in a structured way to an interested readership. Examining the proposed regulation and the arguments for and against it offers the opportunity to review the main arguments that will be raised in any future debate on legal proposals on territorial development initiatives.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze a recent proposal by the State of New York that would subject a large portion of the credit default swap (CDS) market to state‐based insurance regulatory oversight.

Using the collapse of AIG as an example of the systemic risk inherent in unregulated CDS transacting, the Coase Theorem is then applied to determine the optimal level of CDS regulatory oversight.

Although CDSs resemble insurance contracts in many respects, they are also uniquely complex financial instruments that are continually changing and thus not well suited for the antiquated state‐based model of insurance regulation. Furthermore, the external forces that influence state‐based regulatory decision‐making are likely to produce inefficient regulation.

The Coase Theorem states that the optimal level of regulatory oversight is the one that causes market participants to internalize the risk inherent in transacting and does so at the lowest cost. Because of the complexity of CDS contracts and the unique forces that guide state‐based regulatory decision‐making, the State of New York's proposal is ill advised.

By utilizing a law and economics perspective, it becomes clear that although a state‐based model of regulatory oversight may force market participants to internalize systemic risk, it is nevertheless suboptimal because it does not do so at the lowest cost.

The Bureau of Economics in the Federal Trade Commission has a three-part role in the Agency and the strength of its functions changed over time depending on the preferences and ideology of the FTC’s leaders, developments in the field of economics, and the tenor of the times. The over-riding current role is to provide well considered, unbiased economic advice regarding antitrust and consumer protection law enforcement cases to the legal staff and the Commission. The second role, which long ago was primary, is to provide reports on investigations of various industries to the public and public officials. This role was more recently called research or “policy R&D”. A third role is to advocate for competition and markets both domestically and internationally. As a practical matter, the provision of economic advice to the FTC and to the legal staff has required that the economists wear “two hats,” helping the legal staff investigate cases and provide evidence to support law enforcement cases while also providing advice to the legal bureaus and to the Commission on which cases to pursue (thus providing “a second set of eyes” to evaluate cases). There is sometimes a tension in those functions because building a case is not the same as evaluating a case. Economists and the Bureau of Economics have provided such services to the FTC for over 100 years proving that a sub-organization can survive while playing roles that sometimes conflict. Such a life is not, however, always easy or fun.