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The purpose of this paper is to focus on the enterprise lending and control process in closely held banks, with special reference to Sri Lanka. It explores how those processes are being influenced by the distinctive cultural and political processes at organizational and societal levels.

The study relies on three cases built upon the life experiences of several employees in a closely held bank, articulating multiple sources of evidence: interviews, observations, documents, archival records, open-ended questionnaires, internet conversations and exchange of e-mails. The data analysis adopts cultural political economy theory.

The study’s findings reveal how cultural and political factors, such as egoistic motives and politics, gifts/rewards and a manipulative culture, along with exploitative and discriminatory politics at organizational and societal levels, articulate into the enterprise lending and control process (“five Cs”) in closely held banks. “Rational” enterprise lending and control processes in this context merely become a “ceremonial” practice, serving the petty interest of powerful capitalist business owners. Whereas previous studies emphasize that the criteria (five Cs) discriminate against ordinary people, as distinct from the élite, the findings of this study implicate that over and above that the criteria are set aside when it suits in order to favor or accommodate the élite.

The paper provides a “qualitative inquiry” on how cultural politics at organizational and societal-level effect on enterprise lending and control process within closely held banks in less developed countries (LDCs). The previous studies on bank lending and control used either large-scale surveys or alternatively devoted their interest toward the role and impact of accounting in World Bank and IMF-led lending schemes and policies, particularly in LDCs.

A new financial asset (Allotment Trading Unit or ATU) that allows a firm to pollute was issued to a number of Chicago firms in 2000 as part of a cap‐and‐trade model to reduce emissions in the Chicago area. A model of this market was developed to enable us to: 1.) Estimate equilibrium tradable credit prices and quantities and calculate compliance costs for comparison with traditional environmental regulation; 2.) Estimate the consequences for prices and quantities of introducing changing emitter costs; and 3.) Estimate the impacts on prices and quantities of changing market features such as auctioning tradable credits instead of a free allocation, introducing spatial constraints, and changing the emissions cap. The model's results on the price determination of this new financial asset are of interest to accountants and financial analysts. A dated bankable ATU credit has a one‐year life expectancy, but future tradable credits can be bought or sold for use at the appropriate future date. It is an intangible asset that should be disclosed, measured and valued. The valuation to place on this asset is an important research topic in finance and accounting and various valuation approaches are discussed to handle the short‐term and long‐term price paths.

The Howard Shuttering Contractors case throws considerable light on the importance which the tribunals attach to warnings before dismissing an employee. In this case the tribunal took great pains to interpret the intention of the parties to the different site agreements, and it came to the conclusion that the agreed procedure was not followed. One other matter, which must be particularly noted by employers, is that where a final warning is required, this final warning must be “a warning”, and not the actual dismissal. So that where, for example, three warnings are to be given, the third must be a “warning”. It is after the employee has misconducted himself thereafter that the employer may dismiss.

To reopen for discussion the issue of credit creation and control in the area of Islamic banking.

In view of a rapid expansion of Islamic banking in recent decades, the answer to questions whether Islamic banks can create credit like mainstream banks and, if yes, what methods central banks could use to control it in their case is of paramount importance. An overview of the literature on the subject is provided and credit creation process is explained as background material for the discussion.

The literature on the subject is scanty, controversial and inconclusive. One reason seems to be the mismatch between structural design of Islamic banks and the objectives they are supposed to meet. It is concluded that Islamic banks can create credit in the usual manner but central banks will have to design new tools for credit control applicable to Islamic banks.

It is not a rigorous analytical exercise as the main purpose of the paper is to reopen an important issue for discussion. It is an opinioned work and presents rather tentative answers to the questions raised.

The findings of the paper may have serious implications for the current structure of Islamic banks and the legal framework for regulating their credit creation activities.

The paper draws attention to a rather neglected issue in Islamic banking and offers guidelines to resolve it.

The authors evaluate financial stability and capital flows management objectives of capital controls in the context of four capital control events: removing or imposing controls on capital inflows and removing or imposing controls on capital outflows. The authors use synthetic control method to solve the endogeneity problem stemmed from the timing of capital control implementation. The authors find new evidence that capital controls are not consistently effective in reaching financial stability outcomes but are consistent in reaching capital flows management outcomes. The authors compare our results to estimates using difference-in-difference (DID) and carry out placebo analysis. Finally, we use synthetic DID to correct for the parallel trend bias and show that the results still hold.

This paper aims to explore the interplay between risk management and control systems in banks, specifically investigating the managerial intentions underlying the design of management control systems.

This study is based on 31 interviews with personnel of two banks in a European country.

The main finding is that belief systems drive the interplay between risk management and control systems in the studied banks. In several instances, belief systems and boundary systems were operating complementarily. Cross-case analyses of the two banks demonstrate that risk management (i.e. the Basel II Accord) replaced established operating procedures for loan origination and portfolio monitoring at the first bank, whereas senior managers suppressed Basel II to maintain established loan origination and portfolio monitoring procedures at the second one.

This is one of very few studies investigating the interplay between risk management and control systems in banks.

The assignment of targets to instruments in developing countries cannot satisfactorily follow any simple universal rule. Which approach is appropriate is influenced by whether the economy is dominated by primary exports, by the importance of the domestic bond market and bank credit, by the extent of existing restriction in foreign exchange and financial markets, by the presence or absence of persistent high inflation, and by the existence or non‐existence of an active international market in the country's currency. Eighteen observations and maxims on stabilisation policy are tentatively drawn (pp. 64–8) from the material reviewed, and the maxims are partly summarised (pp. 69–71) in a schematic assignment, with variations, of targets to instruments.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the management control system, the bank’s control package, influences opinion about the usefulness of risk measurement (RM) in different control contexts before and after a financial crisis, to understand what influences the usefulness of enterprise risk management (ERM) manifested in RM.

The study is based on semi-structured interviews in 2000-2010, with senior bank managers of two international banks (Bank A and Bank B) – both ranking among the top 100 in the world but differing structurally and culturally.

The two banks took opposite trajectories. Bank A went from high to low expectations of usefulness; Bank B went from low to high expectations. The different attitudes toward RM exhibited by Bank A and Bank B are explained by differences in their control packages, manifested by technocratic control and socio-ideology.

This study reveals that there are not merely different degrees of RM usage in the two banks but that they also show two diverting trajectories. Given this finding, the significance of the organization structure and its control packages (especially the alignment between these two factors) is analyzed to find a plausible explanation for the different experiences of senior managers toward the usefulness of RM. This study contributes to ERM research and to the contingency theory of management accounting.

This paper aims to explore the extent to which the control quality impacts non performing loans (NPLs) of Tunisian listed banks by integrating the guidelines of Circular No. 2011-06 issued on 20 May 2011 by Tunisian Central Bank.

Regressions using panel data are applied on a sample of 11 listed banks during the period from 2010 to 2015.

The results show that the presence of foreign directors on the Tunisian bank board affects credit risk. These administrators, with knowledge, independence and technology transfer, exercise more control than institutional administrators or state representatives. The risk committee is more effective than the other committees (audit committee and credit committee) in reducing non-performing loans. The role played by this body is the most important.

Testing empirically the impact of control quality on NPL by integrating the guidelines of the Central Bank leads to a better evaluation of reforms’ application and effective measures to strengthen the banking governance practices.

By exploring the application of the Central Bank’s guidelines for strengthening post-revolutionary banking governance practices, it becomes easy to assess the extent of the Circular No. 2011-06 by accounting practitioners, auditors and authority bodies to give the necessary recommendations for further reforms.