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The paper aims to explore the national security implications of a potential for a World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute on data flow restrictions. It proposes a basic conceptual framework to assess data flows’ restrictions under General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) security exception.

If a case were to be brought before the WTO dispute settlement, the defender could support its case by invoking the security exception. This paper analyzes three main arguments that could be brought up: protection from cyber espionage, protection from cyberattacks on critical infrastructure and access to data needed to prevent terrorist threats. These three cases are analyzed both legally and technically to assess the relevance of restrictions on data flows under GATS security exception. This analysis can, more generally, inform the debate on the protection of national security in the digital era.

In the three cases, restrictions on data considered critical for national security might raise the cost of certain attacks. However, the risks would remain pervasive and national security would not be significantly enhanced both legally and technically. The implementation of good security standards and encryption techniques appears to be a more effective way to ensure a better response to cyber threats. All in all, it will be important to investigate on a case by case basis whether the scope of the measure (sectors and data covered) is considered proportionate and whether the measure in question in practice reduces the exposure of the country to cyber espionage, cyberattacks and terrorist threats.

This paper represents a contribution to the literature because it is the first paper to address systematically the issue of data flows and national security in the context of a GATS dispute and because it provides a unique perspective that looks both at legal and technical arguments.

I discuss the case of Hassan Almrei, one of the five Arab men detained as suspects who have the potential to engage in terrorism. Hassan Almrei's detention arises out of a section of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act of Canada that authorizes security certificates. A security certificate permits the detention and expulsion of non-citizens who are considered to be a threat to national security. Detainees have no opportunity to be heard before a certificate is issued and a designated judge of the Federal Court reviews most of the government's case against the detainee in a secret hearing at which neither the detainee nor his counsel is present. The detainee receives only a summary of the evidence against him. I discuss this legal situation as a state of exception that is part of a legal structure in which non-citizens have fewer rights than do citizens. Two conceptual tools shape my understanding of security certificates and their use in the “war on terror”: race thinking and the state of exception. The five detainees are more than simply victims of racial profiling. Their Arab origins, and the life history that mostly Arab Muslim men have had, operate to mark them as individuals likely to commit terrorist acts, people whose propensity for violence is indicated by their origins. When race thinking, the belief in the division of humanity into those prone to violence and those who are not according to racial descent, is accompanied by the idea that there must be two different, hierarchical legal regimes for each, and when we begin to grow accustomed to places without law and to people to whom the rule of law does not apply, we enter the terrifying world of the colonies and the concentration camp. This article examines how a space where law is suspended operates in the “war on terror” and it attends to the work that ideas about race do in the environment of the exception.

The purpose of this paper is to survey the landscape of recent federal securities class actions filed in state court and explore arguments for removal of those cases to federal courts under the Securities Litigation Reform Act (SLUSA) or the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA).

The paper discusses: US Congressional legislation designed to bring the bulk of securities class actions back into federal courts, including the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and SLUSA; CAFA, another law designed to redirect class action litigation away from state courts; recent cases that have tested the limits of SLUSA and CAFA for removal from state to federal courts; and arguments for removal under SLUSA and CAFA.

Legislative history for both SLUSA and CAFA suggests that these statutes should be read as evidence of Congressional intent to return most securities class actions to federal court. Nonetheless, plaintiffs have continued to devise legal schemes to litigate class actions in what they perceive to be friendlier forums in state courts.

Although the arguments discussed in this paper are not exhaustive, they are a starting point for defendants seeking removal once litigation arises.

This paper aims to examine the prospect for international investment disputes in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic due to measures implemented by the Australian government to tackle the pandemic.

Doctrinal research. Contains qualitative analysis.

This paper finds that claims based on the protections in the International Investment Agreements (IIAs) signed by Australia are unlikely to succeed and that Australia’s COVID-19 measures can be justified as necessary measures under the general and security exception clauses included in more recent IIAs and under customary international law.

In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, scholars have written papers apprehending possible claims by international investors against emergency measures adopted by host countries to face the pandemic which might also have damaged the interest of the foreign investors. The existing literature is too vague and general. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper that draws some specific conclusions in this regard applicable to the COVID-19 regulatory measures taken by Australia. While the existing literature projects the possibility of such investor claims, this paper argues that at least no such claim would succeed against the COVID-19 measures taken by Australia.

This paper aims to explore trade policy measures taken in response to COVID-19 and analyses in detail their extent and nature. It assesses their compatibility with World Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements: specifically, whether they were necessary and justifiable efforts to protect the security and health of populations and asks how this widespread recourse to trade barriers may impact on international business?

This paper analyses an extensive database from the International Trade Centre of trade measures taken in response to COVID-19. It differentiates by type of country, nature and coverage of measures (imports or exports, type of product…). On the basis of existing jurisprudence, this paper analyses whether restrictive measures were likely to be judged legal under WTO rules.

This paper finds that, although the majority of trade measures are probably justifiable, there were nevertheless many measures whose coverage and/or nature was such that a justification under existing WTO exceptions is, at the very least, arguable. Such widespread and intense instigation of potentially WTO incompatible measures in such a short period of time undoubtedly undermines the global trade rules on which international business has relied for decades.

There is little existing analysis of the legality of measures taken under the security exceptions and no substantial analyses of the measures taken in response to COVID-19. Furthermore, little scholarly attention has been paid to the impacts on international business of the increasing use of WTO “exceptions” to justify trade measures to protect national industries and populations.

Radio frequency identification (RFID) provides a useful tool for the prescreening or detection of goods and containers moving across the border and for controlling the trade of illicit materials and preventing or mitigating the effects of terrorism. Although anti-terrorism measures are important in today’s dangerous world, RFID tools, if misused, may violate the WTO trade rules. Whenever goods or container control measures using RFID are proposed, their contents, objectives, and rationale must be published, and WTO members must be notified through the WTO Secretariat and allowed to make comments. WTO members should not take such measures that are designed or applied in a discriminatory manner and those measures must be adopted only under necessary situations and to the extent necessary. These measures must reduce the incidence and complexity of import and export formalities, and there should not be substantial penalties for minor breaches of the requirements under the measures. If the measures require country-of-origin information in RFID tags, they must apply in the same way to like products, and they must not cause unnecessary inconveniences or unreasonable cost. If the measures deal with containers in international transit, they must be reasonable, consider the conditions of the traffic, and guarantee transit through the most convenient routes for international transit.

A container control measure designed to restrict the flow of fissionable materials or their derivative materials, traffic in arms, ammunition, and implements of war, or traffic in military supply goods and materials may be justified, even if it violates some of the GATT rules. In addition, a measure established in time of war or other emergency in international relations or based on the United Nations Charter and designed to maintain international peace and security can also be justified. As a last resort, WTO members may request a waiver from GATT and TBT Agreement obligations for container control measures that include RFID.

Superpowers must be careful not to use RFID to practice power politics and create regulations to deal with national security and anti-terrorism issues that do not conform to international law. The key question is how to maintain a balance between the two inalienable values of free trade and national security in this era of globalization, harmonization, and terrorism .

In the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic, supply chains have become important policy tools to ensure the security and resilience of regional trading blocs of major economies. The US government’s focus on supply chains for selected strategic industries and the EU Commission’s renewed efforts to strengthen its supply chains using ‘sustainability standards’ coincides with the global trend in the shift towards digital and low-carbon economies. Furthermore, the rising tensions between the US and China, with no signs of reconciliation over key issues of contention, have emphasized the need for more credibility and trust in global supply chains. However, such policies also have the potential to serve as new barriers to participation in supply chains by less-developed economies which are not yet prepared to meet the high-level sustainability criteria which aim for higher protection of the environment and labor rights. There also seems to be an apparent shift in paradigm supporting the interventionist role of government that emphasize the need for more discretion for policy objectives that pursue societal and democratic values, not to mention national security interests. The current rules of international trade, however, do not sufficiently address these new issues and need to be realigned in order to meet the new demands. The current ‘rules of the game’ need to be reinforced in order to accommodate the rising need of countries for increased consideration of issues of sustainability and competitiveness.

The purpose of this study is to examine the legal system that overrules these concerns within the body of the international investment laws. The question which remains is how can host countries and their ruling bodies maintain their national security without disregarding the legitimate expectations of foreign investments and their international responsibilities?

Balancing the relationship between the national security of the host country and the legitimate expectations of the foreign investments is one of the oldest challenges within the body of the international investment laws because the realization of the right to maintain the national security, without regulating the host countries, leaves room for corruption, and meeting the legitimate expectations of the foreign investments can lead to the disruption of the national sovereignty of the host country.

Studies show that the international investment laws do not take a clear stance when it comes to regulating the relationship between the national security of the host countries and the legitimate expectations of the foreign investments and that they are, in fact, in some cases, paradoxical and disorganized; there are instances of attempts to overprotect the national security of the host country, while the rights and the benefits of the foreign investments are disregarded,

At times there is an attempt to expand the realm of legitimate expectations of the foreign investments which would, in turn, disrupt the national security of the host country.

This new act has substantially changed the legal landscape for the futures markets as well as the over‐the‐counter securities markets. The author explores this act with particular attention in the new provision allowing for the trading of futures on individual stocks.

The Korea-China-Japan Investment Promotion, Facilitation and Protection Agreement is the first treaty in the economic field that binds the three Northeast Asian countries together under a single legal instrument. The existence of effective dispute-settlement procedures under the treaty will contribute to the creation of a favourable investment climate in the host country. Nevertheless, there have been fears about frivolous or vexatious claims that could inhibit legitimate regulatory actions by governments. How to compose an investment chapter of the Korea-China-Japan FTA that is being negotiated is a pressing demand for all in the region. Any pertinent answers to such a quest require a thorough comparison of the benefits and drawbacks of any development of relevant rules and governance. In the end, a quest for better international investment governance in Northeast Asia in the future requires sound evaluation of lessons from the past and present.