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In March 2004, the NASD and the New York Stock Exchange (the “NYSE,” together with the NASD, the “SROs”) issued a joint memorandum (the “2004 Joint Memorandum”) that provides interpretative guidance on NASD Rule 2711 and the research analyst provisions of NYSE Rules 351 and 472, as amended in July 2003 (the “SRO rules”), and addresses issues raised by members regarding these rules. The SROs state in the 2004 Joint Memorandum that the guidance provided in their first joint memorandum issued in July 2002 (the “2002 Joint Memorandum”) continues to apply unless stated otherwise in the 2004 Joint Memorandum. This article will identify and discuss the major issues addressed in the 2004 Joint Memorandum and attempt to provide general guidance to practitioners seeking to understand the implications of these issues for their clients” research analysts’ activities. In analyzing the application of the SRO rules and derivative material, including the 2004 Joint Memorandum, the starting point always must be an understanding of what activities and materials the SRO rules address. The SRO rules apply to registered broker‐dealers that are members of either the NYSE or NASD (“member firm” or “member firms”) with research analysts who produce “research reports” and “public appearances” with regard to any “equity security” as defined in section 3(a)11 of the Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Act”).

This article is a philosophical investigation of the “Freedom and Authority Memorandum”, written by A.W. Jones then Director‐General of Education in South Australia. The article has several purposes. First, it is an example of the contribution that philosophy can make to the formulation of educational policy. Second, it compares and contrasts two institutional styles for the purpose of elucidating the kind of bureaucratic organization commended by the memorandum. Third, the article attempts to demonstrate that contractual consent theory, in and of itself, does not dissolve many of the most serious problems that revolve around ideas of freedom and authority. Last, the article illustrates why, given the assumptions of institutional collectivism, the commitment to institutional individualism implicit in the “freedom and Authority Memorandum” cannot necessarily lead to happiness.

This chapter investigates journalistic practice in Greece during the period of the memoranda (2010–2015). By focussing on press journalism, the research probes journalistic practice and structuration by investigating how communicating with political sources and managing incoming information took place in the significant case of the Greek memoranda. Furthermore, this chapter investigates these practices in order to determine what they can reveal about the Greek press system as well. An innovative multilevel theoretical framework is introduced that combines insights from political economy and framing theory, in order to shed light on journalistic practice in content production, and media system structures. Original data stemming from 12 semistructured interviews with Greek journalists that covered that memoranda are presented, in order to reveal the structuration of Greek journalism and how the structure of the newspaper constraints journalistic practice in content production and in the collection of information from political sources. This chapter ultimately argues that Greek press journalism developed in an even further entrenched political role during and postcrisis, due to the political and economic developments of the crisis and their impact in the press system. This entrenched political role had a significant role in how incoming information regarding the memoranda was managed and what kind of options Greek journalists had when constructing news about the case.

From a relational political brand perspective, newly elected governments are primarily concerned with maintaining the trust of the electoral coalition that brought them in office in order to secure their re-election. Hence, as Needham (2005) has suggested, governing parties tend to employ a political communication strategy aimed at promoting an effective brand consisted of six components: simplicity, uniqueness, reassurance, aspiration, values and credibility. In this context, this study examines the communication strategies of three Greek governments (PASOK, New Democracy and SYRIZA) in the period 2009–2019 that failed to be re-elected once they implemented the bail-out packages, against the six branding criteria. Following a qualitative methodological approach, this chapter analyses the key speeches of the respective prime ministers along with polling evidence and secondary data. It argues that all these three governments failed to be re-elected once they implemented the memoranda, not only because of the unpopular nature of the austerity measures but also because of their failure to fully retain their political brands in office since they hardly succeed to deliver on their promises, though it is unclear whether they employed self-consciously such a branding strategy.

Civil Specification Memorandum No. 28 1. This Memorandum cancels the following Civil Specification Memoranda:—

To discuss the implications of Information Memorandum No. 05‐65, issued on September 14, 2005, in which the NYSE's Division of Enforcement explains to the Exchange community its thinking on the meaning and virtues of corporate cooperation with regulators.

Discusses cooperation in the context of Securities and Exchange Commission Seaboard Report and the Department of Justice Thompson Memorandum; describes the eight standards of “extraordinary cooperation” in the Information Memorandum; and discusses pitfalls such as the lack of any guarantee that a member organization and the exchange will agree on what behavior constitutes extraordinary cooperation, the need to balance prompt reporting of a problem with the need for thorough investigation, and the problem that a member firm may feel pressured to waive attorney‐client privilege to earn “cooperation points.”

The Information Memorandum is noteworthy because it attempts to fit the concept of “creditworthy” cooperation into the framework of a self‐regulatory organization by defining a new goal of “extraordinary cooperation,” and also highlights some of the dicier aspects of the “cooperative” regime under which corporate America has lived for the past four years.

Provides helpful interpretation of NYSE Information Memorandum No. 05‐65 and its implications for a member firm that faces an investigation.