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Traditionally, firms have been dependent on internal sources such as their own employees – and up to a certain extent, on some external sources, their customers – for innovation. However, in the current scenario of technological dynamism, firms are exploring multiple sources to generate ideas for innovation. Therefore, there is a need to understand the relative effect of various sources of innovations on a firm’s performance.

We offer a conceptual framework where we identify six distinct sources of innovations – firm, customers, external network, competition, macro-environment, and technology and how they create value for focal firms especially their brand equity. We introduce a taxonomy of various costs and benefits related to innovations. We then argue using our proposed taxonomy to understand the relative strengths of various sources of innovation affecting a firm’s brand equity.

We discuss and compare the relative effects of these sources of innovations on a firm’s brand equity by rank-ordering the sources. The customers and the technology as a source of innovation have the maximum impact on the firm’s brand equity followed by the marginal impact of macro-environment and external network of a firm. The firm itself has a moderate impact on its brand equity, while competition has the minimal impact. Further, we also discuss how the relationship is moderated by different innovation characteristics (nature and type of innovations).

The main practical implication is to create awareness among managers about various costs and benefits of the proposed six sources of innovations and their effects on brand equity. Managers would be able to prioritize their sources of innovation based on firms’ current needs, and whether to focus on lower costs or building higher brand equity in the scarce resource environment.

We offer a comprehensive list of six sources of innovation, build a conceptual framework wherein we discuss the relative strengths of these sources affecting brand equity.

The European Union’s Digital Markets Act (DMA) calls for far-reaching changes to the way economic activity will occur in EU digital markets. Before its remedies are imposed, it is critical to assess their impacts on individual markets, the digital sector, and the overall European economy. The European Commission (EC) released an Impact Assessment in support of the DMA that purports to evaluate it using cost/benefit analysis.

An economic evaluation of the DMA should consider its full impacts on dynamic competition. The Impact Assessment neither assesses the DMA's impact on dynamic competition in the digital economy nor evaluates the impacts of specific DMA prohibitions and obligations. Instead, it considers benefits in general and largely ignores costs. We study its benefit assessments and find they are based on highly inappropriate methodologies and assumptions. A cost/benefit study using inappropriate methodologies and largely ignoring costs cannot provide a sound policy assessment.

Instead of promoting dynamic competition between platforms, the DMA will likely reinforce existing market structures, ossify market boundaries, and stunt European innovation. The DMA is likely to chill R&D by encouraging free riding on the investments of others, which discourages making those investments. Avoiding harm to innovation is critical because innovation delivers large, positive spillover benefits, driving increases in productivity, employment, wages, and prosperity.

The DMA prioritizes static over dynamic competition, with the potential to harm the European economy. Given this, the Impact Assessment does not demonstrate that the DMA will be beneficial overall, and its implementation must be carefully tailored to alleviate or lessen its potential to harm Europe’s economic performance.

This chapter provides a selective survey of the theoretical and empirical literature to date on the relationship between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and measures of innovation and international technology transfer. The chapter discusses the empirical implications of theoretical work, assesses the theoretical work based on the evidence available, and identifies some gaps in the existing literature.

Purpose – This chapter aims to contribute to the policy debate on private sector involvement in traditionally core defence activities through rigorous economic analysis. Punishment and correction in the US military prisons have traditionally been considered as a core activity that has been governed, regulated and managed by the military service personnel. It has been shown however, that military facilities such as stockades and brigs have often failed to meet their correctional objectives – a quality issue.

Methodology – The chapter constructs a case study to illustrate the method of analysis. Well-trained and motivated military custodial personnel play an important correctional role but are not available in sufficient numbers in military prisons. It is therefore proposed to source these services through the private sector. Specifically, the chapter proposes that private sector providers should provide custodial personnel for stockades and brigs. Traditionally the private sector has been employed to reduce costs, rather than improve quality. This chapter adapts and applies the framework developed by Hart, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) to study the governance model and incentive regime that could enable the use of the private sector, reduce the risk of excessive cost cutting and enable quality outcomes to be achieved.

Findings – This chapter argues that private sector involvement could effectively increase the contestability of supply.

Implications – The chapter demonstrates the scope for private sector involvement to increase quality, rather than just decrease costs. It follows that the private sector can contribute to core national security outcomes. However, this implication needs significantly more exploration for specific contexts.

Value – The adopted mode of analysis provides a template for rigorous analysis of similar proposals in the future.

In this paper we look at patents as alternative to trade secrets. We disentangle the disclosure motive for patent protection from the traditional reward motive by adjusting the level of patent protection so as to make the innovator just indifferent between patenting and keeping the innovation secret. Thus, we keep the reward (expected profits) to the innovator fixed and focus on ex post efficiency. When duplication is not feasible and secrecy only entails the risk of public disclosure (a leakage), patents and secrets are perfect substitutes. Yet, a distinctive features of trade secret protection is that it allows for independent creation. The duplicative efforts to reproduce a concealed innovation make patents and secrets imperfect substitutes. If such duplicative efforts are actually exerted under secrecy, patents provide the pre-specified incentive to innovate at least social cost. If, however, the threat of duplication induces the innovator to preemptively license her trade secret, and such licensing agreements allow the innovator to appropriate all the saved duplication costs, then secrets can reward innovative activity more efficiently than patents. Thus, the issue of whether patents are socially preferable to secrets boils down to an assessment of the prevalence and the efficiency of trade secret licensing. The available empirical evidence suggests that licensing of trade secret information is limited and so hints at the superiority of patents.

We present theoretical and empirical evidence challenging early studies that found unions were detrimental to workplace innovation. Under our theoretical model, unions prefer product innovation to labor-saving technological process innovation, thus making union wage bargaining regimes more conducive to product innovation than competitive pay setting. We test the theory with population-representative workplace data for Britain and Norway. We find strong support for the notion that local bargaining leads to product innovation, either alone or together with technological innovation.

“It should also be noted that the objective of convergence and equal distribution, including across under-performing areas, can hinder efforts to generate growth. Contrariwise, the objective of competitiveness can exacerbate regional and social inequalities, by targeting efforts on zones of excellence where projects achieve greater returns (dynamic major cities, higher levels of general education, the most advanced projects, infrastructures with the heaviest traffic, and so on). If cohesion policy and the Lisbon Strategy come into conflict, it must be borne in mind that the former, for the moment, is founded on a rather more solid legal foundation than the latter” European Commission (2005, p. 9)Adaptation of Cohesion Policy to the Enlarged Europe and the Lisbon and Gothenburg Objectives.

This chapter examines the role of pharmaceutical patents in the on-going support of pharmaceutical innovation. The social value of pharmaceutical innovation and the importance of its sustained growth are explained. The government buy-outs of patents to reduce drug prices for all American consumers while preserving vital drug innovation are proposed.

This chapter proposes a survey of the main results produced by the literature on licensing and some original insights, with a particular focus on globalization, North–South models of technology transfer, the issue of how the intellectual property rights influences international licensing, and asymmetric information.

The authors provide new quantitative evidence of the relationship between technologies and organizational design in the context of complex one-off products. The systems that produce complex, one-off products in mature, fragmented industries such as construction lack many of the typical organizational features that researchers have deemed critical to product development success (e.g., team familiarity, frequent communication, and strong leadership). In contrast, the complexity of these products requires a diverse knowledge base that is rarely found within a single firm. The one-off nature of construction’s products further requires improvization and development by a distributed network of highly specialized teams. And because the product is complex, significant innovations in the end product require systemic shifts in the product architecture. Riitta Katila, Raymond E. Levitt and Dana Sheffer use an original, hand-collected dataset of the design and construction of 112 energy-efficient “green” buildings in the United States, combined with in-depth fieldwork, to study these questions. A key conclusion is that the mature US construction industry, with its particularly fragmented supply chain, is not well suited to implementing “systemic innovations” that require coordination across trades or stages of the project. However, project integration across specialists with the highest levels of interdependence (i.e., craft, contract integration) mitigates the knowledge and coordination problems. There are implications for research on how technology shapes organizations (and particularly how organizations shape technology), and on the supply chain configuration strategies of firms in the construction industry as well as building owners who are seeking to build the best buildings possible within their budgets.