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1 – 10 of 704The paper aims to study the effect of tenure on the structure of CEO compensation. The relation between CEO compensation and CEO tenure provides a good testing bed for many…
Abstract
Purpose
The paper aims to study the effect of tenure on the structure of CEO compensation. The relation between CEO compensation and CEO tenure provides a good testing bed for many effects: the managerial power effect, the portfolio consideration effect, the learning effect, and the career concern effect.
Design/methodology/approach
Tobit regressions were run of the percentage of equity‐based compensation on CEO tenure and the effect of tenure compared between inside CEOs and outside CEOs.
Findings
It was found that the percentage of equity‐based compensation increases during the early years of tenure for outside CEOs, and decreases during the later years of tenure for inside CEOs. Before they are tenured, outside CEOs have significantly higher and faster growing percentage of equity‐based compensation than inside CEOs. Furthermore, the portfolio consideration effect and the learning effect are the major effects in explaining the effect of tenure on the compensation structure.
Practical implications
The evidence that boards of directors take into account the CEOs’ holdings of equity incentives, the types of CEOs, and their years on tenure to adjust the structure of CEO compensation indicates that firms should, and do, try to optimize their CEO compensation structure on the basis of firm‐specific or CEO‐specific characteristics. It is suggested that there is no simple formulaic approach to governance reform.
Originality/value
The paper contributes to the literature by studying and explaining the different patterns of compensation structure over CEO tenure between inside CEOs and outside CEOs.
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Chunwei Xian, Fang Sun and Yinghong Zhang
This study aims to investigate the moderating effect of equity-based compensation on the sources of book-tax differences. The authors investigate whether equity-based compensation…
Abstract
Purpose
This study aims to investigate the moderating effect of equity-based compensation on the sources of book-tax differences. The authors investigate whether equity-based compensation affects the association between book-tax differences and tax planning, and the association between book-tax differences and earnings management.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use a sample of 9,024 firm-year observations (913 firms) spanning the period 1992-2011, obtained from ExecuComp and Compustat. They estimate cross-sectional regressions of the proxy for tax planning, discretionary accruals and their interactions with equity-based compensation on book-tax differences.
Findings
The authors find that tax planning-related book-tax differences increase as the equity-based pay of executives does, and that earnings management-related book-tax differences decrease as the equity-based pay of executives increases. The results are robust across three alternative measures of tax planning.
Originality/value
Equity-based compensation plays an important role in managerial discretion on tax planning and earnings management. The findings suggest that, although equity incentives promote a high level of both tax planning and earnings management, they motivate managers to constrain the level of earnings management to avoid larger book-tax differences.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of cross-listing on the size and structure of director compensation at individual director level. While much of the prior…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of cross-listing on the size and structure of director compensation at individual director level. While much of the prior literature has focused on executive compensation, more recent literature has started to examine director compensation. Additionally, there has been extensive literature examining the impact of cross-listing on the corporate governance and equity valuation of listed firms. The literature, however, has largely ignored the effect of cross-listing on director compensation schemes. This study attempts to combine these two literature streams and examine the effect of cross-listing on director compensation.
Design/methodology/approach
This study uses American Depository Receipts (ADRs) and matched non-ADRs from the same country and industry to test the relationship between cross-listing and director compensation. Regressions with country, year and industry fixed-effects are employed. The relationship is further examined using only ADR firms during pre-listing and post-listing periods.
Findings
This study finds that directors of ADR firms receive higher total compensation and greater percentage equity-based compensation relative to directors of non-ADR firms. This study also finds that such differences in director compensation are dependent on the cross-listing program a firm is registered to. Directors of ADR firms also receive higher total compensation and greater percentage equity-based compensation during post-listing periods relative to their own compensation during pre-listing periods.
Originality/value
This study extends the literature on director compensation in a global setting, and is the first to examine an unanswered question regarding the effect of cross-listing on director compensation. This study provides important information that cross-listing affects the size and structure of director compensation between ADR and non-ADR firms, as well as between pre-listing and post-listing periods for ADR firms themselves.
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Arash Arianpoor and Somaye Efazati
The present study investigates the impact of accounting comparability on chief executive officer (CEO) incentive plans and the moderating role of board independence for companies…
Abstract
Purpose
The present study investigates the impact of accounting comparability on chief executive officer (CEO) incentive plans and the moderating role of board independence for companies listed in Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE).
Design/methodology/approach
The information about 177 companies in 2014–2021 was examined. In this study, equity-based compensation and cash-based compensation were used as the CEO incentive plans. The equity-based compensation was calculated through the ownership of the CEO shares.
Findings
The results suggest that the higher accounting comparability increases not only CEO equity-based compensation, but also cash-based compensation. Board independence also strengthens the relationship between accounting comparability and CEO compensation. Hypothesis testing based on robustness checks confirmed these results.
Originality/value
The paper is pioneering, to the authors' knowledge, in identifying how board independence moderates the impact of accounting comparability on CEO compensation. The findings provide insights into economic consequences to the firm related to accounting comparability and board monitoring. The results have important practical implications for international investors to evaluate accounting comparability, corporate governance mechanisms and CEO incentives.
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Chialing Hsieh, Vivek Pandey and Hongxia Wang
The purpose of this paper is to examine CEO compensation in immigrant-founder firms vs CEO compensation in non-immigrant-founder firms.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine CEO compensation in immigrant-founder firms vs CEO compensation in non-immigrant-founder firms.
Design/methodology/approach
Univariate and multi-variate tests are implemented. CEO compensation is designed as a function of the origin of a firm’s founder (immigrant or native), executive characteristics and firm characteristics with firm and year fixed effect regressions. CEO compensation is measured with cash pay, equity-based pay and total compensation.
Findings
CEOs of immigrant-founder firms receive higher equity-based compensation and higher total pay than CEOs of non-immigrant-founder firms and the levels of their equity-based and total compensation are contingent upon their stock ownership. CEOs in high-growth immigrant-founder firms receive higher stock-based pay than their counterparts in non-immigrant-founder firms. Immigrant-founder family firms compensate their CEOs with higher equity-based pay than immigrant-founder non-family firms.
Practical implications
The paper provides some explanations on the success of immigrant-founder firms. CEO compensation designs in immigrant-founder firms can be adopted in other firms.
Social implications
The paper provides some rationale for immigration legislation to encourage the talented to come to the USA and start their business in the USA.
Originality/value
This paper is the first to study executive compensation practice in immigrant-founder firms. The findings provide some practical and policy implications on immigration reform.
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Hyungkee Young Baek and Philip L Fazio
Small public family firms apply contracting differently given the peculiar motivations of founding families and the degree to which they monitor operations. The purpose of this…
Abstract
Purpose
Small public family firms apply contracting differently given the peculiar motivations of founding families and the degree to which they monitor operations. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of family ownership, control, and CEO dividends on CEO incentive compensation.
Design/methodology/approach
The sample consisted of 194 firms, covering about 40 percent of the relevant S&P SmallCap 600 firms. Employed were a logistic regression of the presence of incentive compensation plan and a panel regression of incentive compensation ratio against the family ownership, family CEO, CEO ownership, and dividend income variables as well as firm-specific and CEO-specific control variables.
Findings
For 1,532 firm-year observations among S&P SmallCap600 index firms during 1999-2007, the authors found that family ownership and CEO dividend income ratio negatively related to the likelihood of an incentive compensation plan and to the ratio of equity-based compensation to total CEO pay. Additionally, the effect of CEO dividend income was limited to firms with outside CEOs.
Practical implications
Boards of small capitalization firms should consider the incentive effects of CEO dividend income and CEO family membership when setting their compensation policies.
Originality/value
S&P SmallCap600 index firms are unique because they are much smaller than those listed in the S&P 500 or the Fortune 500, and are subject to more family influence. SmallCap firms are comparable in size to the foreign firms previously researched but are still well covered by analysts, and benefit from audited financial statement variables, which include dividends and stock market returns.
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Melissa A. Williams, Timothy B. Michael and Edward R. Waller
The purpose of this paper is to review and summarize research into managerial incentives, merger activity, performance, and the use and structure of compensation to mitigate…
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to review and summarize research into managerial incentives, merger activity, performance, and the use and structure of compensation to mitigate agency problems in the firm.
Design/methodology/approach
The authors discuss studies of size elasticity and compensation, pay for performance, changes in managerial compensation due to merger activities, incentives and risk taking, and the relationship between managerial risk aversion and acquisitions.
Findings
The paper identifies several prominent themes in the literature. First, size and performance both appear to be positively related to managerial compensation. There appears to be a strong relation between pay and performance, but results depend upon whether the pay measure includes all forms of compensation. With mergers, any merger gains seem to accrue to the acquired firm. It appears that acquiring managers can increase their pay by merging with other firms, and this is likely to happen in cases where shareholder returns are negative. Regarding managerial risk taking and compensation, it is likely that the sensitivity of a manager's equity‐based compensation (options, in particular) to changes in the total risk of the firm is an indicator of how willing managers will be to seek out more risk on behalf of shareholders.
Originality/value
This paper synthesizes a large body of research into an organized discussion of the issues relating to merger activity, managerial incentives, compensation, and pay for performance issues.
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Jonghan Park, Tianming Zhang, Spencer Pierce and Yonghong Jia
The authors examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and abnormal executive compensation. The authors hypothesize that socially responsible firms are…
Abstract
Purpose
The authors examine the association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and abnormal executive compensation. The authors hypothesize that socially responsible firms are more likely to pay their executives at a level that is in line with economic determinants.
Design/methodology/approach
Using the expected compensation model developed by Core et al. (2008), the authors test our hypothesis using a large sample of US public companies.
Findings
The authors find that CSR performance is negatively associated with how much executive compensation deviates from the expected level. The authors further examine whether CSR performance is associated with excess compensation or inadequate compensation and find that socially responsible firms are less likely to pay their executives either excessively or inadequately.
Originality/value
This study provides evidence on the association between CSR performance and abnormal executive compensation, especially how CSR is associated with inadequate compensation, an area that has been largely overlooked by the literature.
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Wen‐Chung Guo, Shin‐Rong Shiah‐Hou and Yu‐Wen Yang
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the relative firms’ performances of equity‐based compensation schemes using a panel regression approach from Taiwanese experience.
Abstract
Purpose
The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the relative firms’ performances of equity‐based compensation schemes using a panel regression approach from Taiwanese experience.
Design/methodology/approach
Previous theory considers executive stock options as an important input in the production process, but the empirical support for the performances of equity‐based compensation schemes is mixed in developed countries. This paper uses a panel data regression to analyze the influence of stock bonus and executive stock option on performance.
Findings
The evidences in Taiwan suggest that there exist positive associations between the amount of stock bonuses and firms’ operating performance. It is also found that firms with larger firm size or high growth opportunity tend to adopt stock bonus
Research limitations/implications
The first limitation is that we the dataset over our sample period 1999‐2001 is still incomplete because the executive stock options allowed by the regulation are not prevalent in Taiwan over that period. The second limitation is the unique stock bonus system in Taiwan is not observed for developed countries.
Practical implications
The result imply a positive association between stock bonus and firm's operating performance. Companies with well‐designed bonus compensation may lead to better performance.
Originality/value
The unique stock bonus compensation schemes in Taiwan are used in general to contribute to the success of the high‐tech companies. This paper first addresses the importance of the stock bonus on compensation issue for high‐tech companies. This added knowledge is beneficial to practitioners and academics whose interest lies in equity‐based compensation and performance.
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Lisa M. Victoravich, Pisun Xu and Huiqi Gan
The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between institutional investor ownership and the compensation of executives at US banks during the financial crisis period.
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between institutional investor ownership and the compensation of executives at US banks during the financial crisis period.
Design/methodology/approach
This paper uses a linear regression model to examine the association between institutional ownership and the level of executive compensation at US banks.
Findings
Institutional investors influence executive compensation at banks with the impact being most pronounced for the CEO. Ownership by the top five investors is associated with greater total compensation. Active investors have the strongest impact on executive compensation as evidenced by a positive association between active ownership and both equity compensation and total compensation. As well, active ownership is negatively associated with bonus compensation. The paper also finds that passive and grey investors influence compensation but to a less significant extent than active investors.
Research limitations/implications
The results suggest that the monitoring role of active and passive institutional investors is different in the banking industry. As well, institutional investors were likely a driving factor in shaping the compensation packages of the top executive team during the financial crisis period.
Practical implications
Stakeholders at banks should be aware that not all types of institutional investors act as effective monitors over issues such as controlling the amount of executive compensation paid to the highest paid executive, the CEO. Prospective investors should consider the type of institutional investor that owns large blocks of equity when making an investment decision. Namely, the interests of existing institutional investors may differ from their own interests.
Originality/value
This paper provides a new perspective on the monitoring roles played by different types of institutional investors. Furthermore, it provides a more comprehensive analysis by investigating the role of institutional investors in shaping the compensation packages of CEOs and other top executives including chief financial officers (CFOs) who play a vital role in risk management at banks.
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