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We examined the relationship between employee equity compensation, incentive compensation, and firm growth using a sample of 480 privately held firms from the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation’s database of Ernst & Young Entrepreneur Of The Year (EOY) winners. Using frameworks from agency and motivation theories, we argued that larger percentages of both equity- and incentivebased compensation allocated to top managers and employees would be associated with firm growth. After controlling for firm and industry effects, the results of the study showed that while the firms in the sample preferred providing incentive compensation, providing equity compensation for employees was a positively significant predictor of firm growth over a three-year period. These findings suggest that prescriptions for growth in larger firms developed from agency theory also may be applicable to entrepreneurial firms, and founder/CEOs seeking to grow their firms should consider using equity compensation to motivate their current employees and to attract new ones.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.

This paper aims to study the impact of audit quality on the components of executive cash compensation. It is predicted that as audit quality improves, greater emphasis will be placed on the incentive components of cash compensation, and lower emphasis on the salary (fixed) component. Specifically, it is predicted that as audit quality enhances, greater emphasis will be placed on earnings and sales revenues in determining executive cash compensation. Using auditor specialization as a proxy for audit quality, empirical support is provided for all of our predictions.

This paper provides empirical support with agency theoretic predictions.

This paper developed the following hypotheses: H1 – in executive cash compensation, more weight is being placed on earnings-based measures as auditor specialization improves; H2 – in executive cash compensation, more weight is also being placed on sales revenues as auditor specialization improves; H3 – in executive cash compensation, salary levels decrease as auditor specialization improves; and H4 – the impact of auditor specialization on the weight on earnings, sales and the salary levels is lower in the post-Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) period compared to pre-SOX period.

First, the article limits itself to cash compensation, while current executive compensation is largely made of equity. Second, the measure of audit quality used, ‘national level auditor specialization’, may not be as effective in the post-SOX era.

Compensation committees should pay attention to audit quality (in whatever way it may be proxied by) in determining executive compensation.

This is the first paper to show that audit quality not only improves the earnings response coefficient in firm valuation but also enhances the weight placed on earnings (and sales revenues) in executive compensation.

Literature documents that executives' inside debt holdings (debt-based managerial compensation) such as defined-benefit pensions and retirement funds are often unfunded and unsecured and have long maturities, and thus provide managerial incentives to pursue strategies to avoid the overall firm risk. This study investigates the effect of managerial inside debt compensation relative to equity-based compensation on a firm's dividend payout policy. We find that a inside debt holdings are positively associated with various measures of a firm's dividend payout policy. Additionally, we find empirical evidence in firms with inside debt holdings that the inverse relationship between high default risk measured by KZ index and dividend payout weakens as the portion of inside debt relative to equity-based compensation rises. This finding indicates that the needs for the firm to restrain dividend payouts to equity holders is reduced as the executive's debt-to-equity compensation ratio becomes larger. Overall, the results suggests the mitigating effect of executives' inside debt holdings on the conflicts between bondholders and shareholders can lead to generous payout policy.

The objective of this study is to construct a theoretical framework concerning wage determination, grounded in principles and supplemented by conventional theories. It discusses the Islamic perspectives on minimum wage and examines contemporary challenges and intricacies in its application.

This study uses thematic analysis to create the conceptual framework, drawing upon a review of pertinent literature such as academic papers, books and articles published up to 2023.

The framework encompasses various categories, namely, employee characteristics, job characteristics, market factors, compensation practices and Islamic principles. Each category consists of multiple variables. The resulting framework offers a holistic and ethically grounded methodology for wage determination, aligning with both Islamic and conventional perspectives. This study notes the absence of a universally agreed-upon minimum wage. Islamic economics faces challenges due to the unclear application of principles, limited awareness, legal constraints and a lack of empirical evidence on wage systems, along with complexities in their implementation.

The paper’s limited scope focuses solely on the Islamic perspective on wage determination, without comparing it to the conventional viewpoint. This may have implications for future research.

The insights on Islamic principles and wage determination guide scholars and policymakers interested in promoting just and equitable wages.

This study is distinct in its integration of various factors to propose an all-encompassing framework for wage determination, rooted in the Quran and principles, while also reinforcing the framework with conventional theories. Additionally, it adds to the growing body of literature by investigating the Quran’s stance and principles on minimum wage, as well as discusses the challenges involved in implementing an Islamic approach to wage determination, which has received limited attention in Islamic literature.

This paper aims to establish a theoretical framework that can comprehensively explain the executive compensation in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) within the context of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

The author develops a theoretical framework for executive compensation in SOEs from the perspective of Marxist economics and points out that the executives in SOEs are engaged in management labor, and their compensation should adhere to the principle of distribution according to labor contribution.

Based on this theory, the author posits that the continuous upward trend of executive compensation in SOEs, is consistent with the trend of SOEs' ongoing expansion, which reflects a continuous improvement of SOE executives' management labor in both quality and quantity.

It is necessary to start with Marxist economic theory and scientifically study the issue of SOE executive compensation, adhere to the principle of distribution according to work in the context of a socialist market economy and implement the specific guideline of the Party Central Committee; only in this way can the long-term healthy development of SOEs be promoted continuously.

At present, China’s industrial spatial layout faces the predicament of over-agglomeration of Eastern China industries and the near disintegration of industrial structure in the central and western regions. The paper aims to discuss this issue.

Based on the perspective of differentiated inter-regional labor mobility, this paper constructed a model framework of quadratic sub-utility quasi-linear preference utility function, and conducted model deduction and numerical simulation on causal factors of this spatial imbalance along the two dimensions of individual and regional welfare.

The study finds that in the long run, industrial spatial layout imposes a certain threshold limit on the portfolio proportion of differentiated labor. The dilemma of China’s industrial spatial layout is attributable to the deviation of the market’s optimal agglomeration from the social optimal agglomeration, and to the disfunction of Eastern China’s role as an intermediary between the global and the domestic value chain.

To resolve this predicament of industrial layout, the unitary welfare compensation based on fiscal transfer payment has to be switched to a more comprehensive approach giving consideration to industrial rebalancing.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the empirical relationship between gray directors (non-executive non-independent directors) and executive compensation among companies listed in India’s National Stock Exchange (NSE). The paper also examines the possible interplay of relationships between controlling shareholder duality (controlling shareholder being the CEO), ownership category and executive compensation.

A sample of 438 firms listed in the NSE of India was studied using data spanning five financial years, 2012–2013 to 2016–2017.

Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive association between the proportion of gray directors on the board and executive compensation. The sensitivity of executive compensation to gray directors is found to be higher among family controlled firms. This research has also found that CEOs who belong to controlling shareholder groups received higher pay than professional CEOs. The authors conjecture that these results suggest cronyism and may contribute to lower levels of corporate governance practices in the country.

The hybrid board structure, which India has adopted with the desire to bring the best of Anglo Saxon and Japanese board philosophies, has paradoxically led to self-serving boards. Exploration of alternative thinking to bring about changes in the regulatory framework is, therefore, necessary.

Serious problems are identified with the philosophy behind board composition mandated by Listing Requirements for Indian firms with empirical evidence showing how the existing rules generate cronyism and unfairness to minority shareholders.