Corporate Payout Policy and CEO‘s Inside Debt Holdings

Yura Kim (University of Seoul)
Jeongsun Yun (Kookmin University)
Gyuyoung Hwang (Kookmin University)

Journal of Derivatives and Quantitative Studies: 선물연구

ISSN: 1229-988X

Article publication date: 28 February 2015

Abstract

Literature documents that executives' inside debt holdings (debt-based managerial compensation) such as defined-benefit pensions and retirement funds are often unfunded and unsecured and have long maturities, and thus provide managerial incentives to pursue strategies to avoid the overall firm risk. This study investigates the effect of managerial inside debt compensation relative to equity-based compensation on a firm's dividend payout policy. We find that a inside debt holdings are positively associated with various measures of a firm's dividend payout policy. Additionally, we find empirical evidence in firms with inside debt holdings that the inverse relationship between high default risk measured by KZ index and dividend payout weakens as the portion of inside debt relative to equity-based compensation rises. This finding indicates that the needs for the firm to restrain dividend payouts to equity holders is reduced as the executive's debt-to-equity compensation ratio becomes larger. Overall, the results suggests the mitigating effect of executives' inside debt holdings on the conflicts between bondholders and shareholders can lead to generous payout policy.

Keywords

Citation

Kim, Y., Yun, J., Choi, H.W. and Hwang, G. (2015), "Corporate Payout Policy and CEO‘s Inside Debt Holdings", Journal of Derivatives and Quantitative Studies: 선물연구, Vol. 23 No. 1, pp. 99-123. https://doi.org/10.1108/JDQS-01-2015-B0005

Publisher

:

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2015 Emerald Publishing Limited

License

This article is published under the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY 4.0) licence. Anyone may reproduce, distribute, translate and create derivative works of this article (for both commercial and non-commercial purposes), subject to full attribution to the original publication and authors. The full terms of this licence may be seen at http://creativecommons.org/licences/by/4.0/legalcode