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This study seeks to examine whether CEO duality further exacerbates CEOs' motivation of self‐interest to engage in mergers and acquisitions to increase their compensation.

Regression tests using CEO compensation as the dependent variable, and CEO duality, firm size and firm performance as independent test and control variables. The regression tests are used for various sub‐samples of the firms, those that merge and those that have CEO duality.

The results indicate that for merging firms CEO compensation is positively associated with firm size. However, this association is unaffected by CEO duality. For non‐merging firms, the results indicate that CEO compensation is positively associated with firm size and firm performance. CEO duality moderates the positive association between CEO compensation and firm performance.

This study is limited to the extent that it does not observe the deliberations of compensation committees in their setting of CEO compensation, but only examines the outcomes of those deliberations. A future area of research is to examine compensation schemes of merger/acquisition CEOs in the context of other government structures, such as board independence and composition.

Shareholders who desire to keep CEO compensation levels positively associated with firm performance may consider supporting the separation of the positions of CEO and Chairperson of the Board.

This study contributes to the literature by concluding that governance structure influences CEO compensation schemes and CEOs of merging firms command higher compensation in spite of governance structure and firm performance.

CEOs' compensation has received a great deal of attention in recent years. Some criticised that CEOs' compensation is not responsive to their performance, because some CEOs still received the same or more compensation even if their companies incurred losses. Others complained that the compensation received by some of the CEOs was so astronomical that it can not be justified with any rational explanations. Many also maintained that some CEOs do not care about employees' wellbeing and shareholders' interest in the determination of their compensation in view of the facts that many workers received pay cuts or declining compensation in real terms and are laid off in the re‐structuring of organisations in order for firms to become more competitive domestically and worldwide.

Jensen and Murphy (1990) and others have found a small but statistically significant relationship between firm performance (as measured by change in shareholder wealth or firm profits) and executive compensation. In this study we investigate the pay‐ performance relationship further by considering the relationship between an outside measure of firm performance (changes in the firm's bond rating) and the contemporaneous change in the compensation of the firm's CEO. We find that when a firm's bond rating is down‐graded, CEO total compensation declines by a relatively small amount ($165,500) and when a firm's bond rating is upgraded, CEO total compensation increases markedly ($3,202,900). Thus, while a positive pay‐performance relationship exists, the relationship is not symmetric. CEO compensation changes (increases) much more when firm performance improves than it changes (decreases) when firm performance declines. Further, most of the change in CEO compensation occurs in the stock gains (profits from the exercise of stock options) category for both firms experiencing bond rating upgrades and down‐grades.

This study examines the relationship between ethical reputation, CEO compensation and firm performance for the top corporate citizens as rated by Business Ethics magazine. The results show that there was not a direct relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance, that a high level of CEO compensation combined with a high ethical reputation did not impact the financial performance of the firm, and firms with a high ethical reputation had only average financial results, while firms with low ethical reputations displayed both high and low financial performance. Furthermore, CEOs of unfirms had, on average, higher compensation levels than firms that were profitable. These findings bring useful inputs for CEO on how they can justify high levels of compensation even during periods when the firm is not profitable or has a low level of profitability. An interesting sidelight of the study is that three CEOs in the sample whose firms were profitable did not accept any compensation during 2002, probably because the financial performance was below expectations.

Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.

We examine the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE), asymmetry in pay for skill/luck, and compensation benchmarking for a sample of firms involved in a spinoff. The spinoff affects firm characteristics that influence the use of the identified compensation practices. We test for differences in the compensation practices for the pre- and post-spinoff firms. We find that RPE is used for post-spinoff CEOs, but not pre-spinoff CEOs. Post-spinoff CEOs are also paid asymmetrically for luck where they are rewarded for good luck but not punished for bad luck. Both pre- and post-spinoff CEOs receive similar levels of compensation benchmarking. The study provides additional evidence on factors that influence compensation practices. Our spinoff sample allows us to examine how compensation practices are affected by changes in firm characteristics while keeping other determinants of compensation constant (i.e., the board and, in many cases, the CEO). Our findings contribute to the understanding of how the identified compensation practices are used.

Remuneration policies may differ from country to country, and their effect on bank stability could be due to the legal framework. Therefore, this study aims to investigate how the legal system impacts the relationship between CEO compensation and bank stability across countries.

To test the study hypotheses, the authors use panel data of 74 banks operating in ten OECD countries during the period 2009–2016 and apply the generalized moments method regression model to better remediate the endogeneity problem.

The findings confirm that a country’s banking regulations significantly affect its bank stability. Common law countries have less bank stability than civil law countries. This result can be interpreted by the fact that, in common-law countries, banks’ CEO are strongly protected by the law, so they allocate a large part of bank assets to risky loans to improve their variable remuneration.

The research can help policymakers understand bank stability in one country. Any legal reform would require prior knowledge of how risk-taking may arise in executive compensation.

The contribution is to explain the controversial effect of executive compensation on bank stability in the framework of legal theory. The authors argue that regulators should monitor compensation structures and that the country’s legal origin of law shapes the CEO compensation structure and is a determinant of bank stability. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, there are no studies exploring this field. So, this study tries to shed more light on the dark side of CEOs’ behavior when undertaking risky projects to maximize their remuneration.

The authors study and compare the effects of three CEO compensation restricting policies issued by the Chinese government in 2009, 2012 and 2015. This paper aims to shed light on the conditions under which CEO compenstation can be effectively regulated without negatively affecting firm performance.

These policies targeted state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs). Using these policies as natural experiments, the authors investigate how their effects differ on CEO compensation, firm performance and two known performance-decreasing mechanisms: perk consumption and tunneling activities.

The authors show that restricting CEO pay does not necessarily backfire in terms of deteriorating firm performance. This non-decreasing firm performance can be achieved by restricting perk consumption and tunneling activities while introducing CEO pay regulations.

The authors exploit a powerful experimental setting in the context of China. The evidence contributes to the literature on CEO pay regulations and is relevant to the managerial decisions of policy makers and boards of directors.

This paper aims to investigate how a US firm’s political landscape affects the integration of environmental, social and governance (hereafter ESG) measures in CEO compensation contracts, thereby affecting the firm’s ESG performance and credit rating.

Based on the results of state senatorial and presidential elections and the location of a US firm’s headquarters, the authors categorize whether a firm has a political environment that is predominantly Democratic (blue) or Republican (red). The empirical analyses are based on a sample of US firms in the period 2014–2021.

The authors find that firms in blue states are more likely to link CEO compensation to ESG performance measures. Further, the results show that firms in blue states with ESG-linked compensation contracts have better ESG performance. Lastly, the authors find evidence that a firm’s ESG performance has a positive impact on its credit rating, but the impact is weakened if firms in red states link ESG performance to executive compensation.

To the best of the authors’ knowledge, this is the first research that explores how a firm’s political environment affects the use of ESG performance measures in CEO compensation contracts. Furthermore, the authors contribute to the literature by showing evidence that the political environment interacts with the impact of ESG-linked compensation incentives on the firm’s ESG performance and, thus, its credit rating.