Search results

This study examines whether US effective tax rates on foreign income of US multinationals (MNCs) vary according to the favorability of US macroeconomic conditions relative to those of non-US countries. We use the pre-Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 regime as our setting and present evidence that US effective tax rates on foreign earnings are higher (lower) in periods when macroeconomic conditions in the US are favorable (unfavorable) relative to those elsewhere in the world. These results imply that firms seek to maximize after-tax returns when making asset allocation decisions, even when faced with US repatriation tax costs. We provide further evidence indicating that our primary results vary predictably according to certain firm characteristics, namely the ability to acquire funds for investment through less expensive means than repatriation of foreign profits, high intangible asset intensity, and tax aggressiveness. Finally, we show that economic uncertainty in the US counters the positive effects of favorable US macroeconomic conditions on US effective tax rates on foreign earnings. Our findings have implications for the policy debate around the US taxation of foreign earnings and provide a (partial) explanation for the observed lower-than-expected levels of repatriation activity following the implementation of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.

We examine why Cash ETRs of US domestic firms have decreased over time. Using samples from two periods – an early period (1994–1998) and a late period (2011–2015) – we regress Cash ETRs in each period on a set of explanatory variables, and allow coefficients to differ across time periods. We find that, when coefficients are allowed to differ, there is no longer a decline in the unexplained portion of Cash ETR across the two periods, and that the previously observed decline is associated with a change in the relation between firm size and Cash ETR between the two periods. Further analysis suggests that the coefficient on firm size has been declining over the past 20 years, and that controlling for this time trend alone is sufficient to explain the declining trend in Cash ETRs for domestic firms.

Our study concentrates exclusively on the domestic effective tax rate (ETR), with the purpose of finding and characterizing their financial determinants. Using data on almost 5,000 US companies between fiscal years 2003 and 2010, we use regression analysis to find that the domestic ETR is affected by company size (as measured by sales), the extent to which the company is leveraged, level of fixed assets intensity, and the state of the economy. In addition, we find that domestic ETRs are also affected by the company’s level of internationality, which counterintuitively implies that the greater the company’s international activity, the less domestic taxes it pays for every dollar of US income. Both financial managers and policy makers can use our findings to reduce tax liabilities domestically, and to improve corporate tax regulations. While several attempts are made in the literature to compare ETRs of corporations that reside in different geographic locations, this is the first to characterize ETR determinants.

This chapter examines how public attitudes and judgments about tax fairness reflect distributive justice rules about proportionality/contributions, needs, and equality; fairness issues that influence voluntary tax compliance (Hofmann, Hoelzl, & Kirchler, 2008; Spicer & Lundstedt, 1976). Most public polls and some prior research indicate the general public considers progressive income tax rates as fairer than flat tax rates, a reflection of the Needs rule of distributive justice theory; our 1,138 participants respond similarly. However, two-thirds of our politically representative sample of the American public actually assign “fair shares” of income taxes consistently with fairness-as-proportionality above an exempt amount of income, consistent with the Contributions rule of Equity Theory. We argue experimental assignments of fair shares of income taxes can best be understood as a combination of the Needs rule, applied by exempting incomes below the poverty line from income taxation (via current standard deductions) and taxing incomes above this exempt amount at a single tax rate (i.e., a flat-rate tax) consistent with the Proportionality/Contributions rule. Viewed in combination, these two distributive justice rules explain the tax fairness judgments of 89% of our sample and indicate surprising general agreement about what constitutes a fair share of income taxes that should be paid by US citizens from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile of the income distribution. The joint application of these fairness rules indicates how seemingly competing, partisan distributive justice concerns can inform our understanding of social attitudes about tax fairness across income classes.

This paper examines the relationship between environmental uncertainty and tax avoidance at the firm level. We posit that managers faced with more uncertain environments are likely to engage in more tax avoidance activities. We find a significant and negative relationship between environmental uncertainty and effective tax rates, and our results persist through a battery of robust checks. We further find that managerial ability mitigates the above relationship. Moreover, we find that small, highly leveraged, and innovative firms operating in uncertain environments engage in more tax avoidance.

By reducing the real value of nominally fixed tax band limits, deductions and tax credits, inflation can lead to higher real tax burdens (“fiscal drag”). The traditional view is that this reduces aggregate demand and thus acts as an automatic stabiliser. Yet, this familiar reasoning ignores the supply side and, in particular, possible effects of higher tax burdens on labour costs. Recent work on imperfect labour markets has shown that such effects can indeed arise as employees are able to bargain for higher wages that partly compensate for tax increases. In this case, the resulting upwards pressure on real labour costs can be inflationary. To illustrate this mechanism, this article analyses labour tax burdens in four European countries and how they are altered if tax systems are not adjusted for inflation. This is then combined with available results on the effects of tax changes on wages in imperfect labour markets. The results suggest that, in an unadjusted tax system, inflation can produce a moderate upward pressure on wages. It is argued, however, that more detailed empirical work on the role of taxes in the wage-setting process is needed as existing work ignores the substantial heterogeneity of workers and the tax rates they face.

This study investigates the relation between residential property values and both property taxes and public services in Georgia’s counties. Capitalization theory predicts that property values relate negatively to property taxes, and positively to public services. Palmon and Smith (1998) state that errors in public service measures create a capitalization coefficient bias that makes it difficult to isolate tax effects from public service effects. This paper is a first step in defining and quantifying public services and their marginal effect on housing values. It develops public service measures in four quality-of-life areas – economy, education, health, and public safety. The models suggest a strong negative relation between effective tax rates and property values, and a significant positive association between the public service measures and property values. Analyses indicate that property taxes are capitalized into housing prices at greater than 100%, suggesting prior underestimations based on measurement errors in public service variables.

Current US tax laws provide investors an incentive to time the sales of their bonds to minimize tax liability. This gives rise to a tax-timing option that affects bond value. In reality, corporate bond investors’ tax-timing strategy is complicated by risk of default. Existing term structure models have ignored the effect of the tax-timing option, and how much corporate bond value is due to the tax-timing option is unknown. In this chapter, we assess the effects of taxes and stochastic interest rates on the timing option value and equilibrium price of corporate bonds by considering discount and premium amortization, multiple trading dates, transaction costs, and changes in the level and volatility of interest rates. We find that the value of the tax-timing option accounts for a substantial proportion of corporate bond price even when interest rate volatility is low. Ignoring the timing option value results in overestimation of credit spread, and underestimation of default probability and the marginal investor’s income tax rate. These estimation biases generally increase with bond maturity and credit risk.

Geographical relocation of ventures, together with rates of firm formation and closure, determine the entrepreneurial population dynamics of a region. However, venture migration has remained largely unaddressed by prior entrepreneurship scholars. This paper draws from theoretical frameworks and prior findings in the economic demography literature to explore policy and environmental determinants of regional venture migration rates, referred to as entrepreneurial transience. Using county-level data for the state of Ohio, we show that local taxation is an important driver of entrepreneurial transience. In particular, local income tax rates are found to be negatively related to subsequent net transience – i.e., venture migration deficits or surpluses. Local business property taxes also influence net transience, but the direction of their impact depends on the average income level in the locale.

We survey private foundations for governance factors and internal processes that help explain why they barely miss (or not) the benchmark for qualifying distributions that would save them taxes on net investment income. Private foundations are subject to a 2% tax rate on their net investment income. If qualifying distributions are above a benchmark, the foundation qualifies for a 50% reduction in the tax rate to a 1% tax rate. This tax rate structure provides a “cliff effect” where the additional distributions required to qualify for the lower tax rate may actually be less than the potential tax savings (Sansing & Yetman, 2006). For example, one foundation in our sample could have saved $15,613 in tax by paying an additional $318 in distributions. We view this situation as a clear governance failure. Our first contribution to the literature is that board interest and information system strength affect the likelihood of avoiding such a governance failure, even after controlling for the general quality of management with management compensation and professional fees. Our second contribution is that foundations without sufficient financial savvy and sophistication appear to pay higher taxes. Given the large number of small, relatively unsophisticated foundations in America, differential tax rates based on sophistication is an interesting policy debate.