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Based on stakeholder, agency and institutional theory, this study aims to examine the role of institutional ownership in the relationship between environmental, social and governance practices and CEO compensation.

Utilizing a fixed-effect panel regression analysis, this research utilized a panel data approach, analyzing data spanning from 2014 to 2021, focusing on US companies listed on the S&P500 stock market index. The dataset encompassed 219 companies, leading to a total of 1,533 observations.

The analysis identified that environmental scores significantly impact CEO equity-linked compensation, unlike social and governance scores. Additionally, it was found that institutional ownership acts as a moderating factor in the relationship between the environmental score and CEO equity-linked compensation, as well as the association between the social score and CEO equity-linked compensation. Interestingly, the direction of these moderating effects varied between the two relationships, suggesting a nuanced role of institutional ownership.

This research makes a unique contribution to the field of corporate governance by exploring the relatively understudied area of institutional ownership's influence on the ESG practices–CEO compensation nexus.

Following the optimal contracting hypothesis, this study investigates the issue of whether the board of director's ex ante choice to incorporate individual performance evaluation (IPE) measures into the CEO bonus plan rewards managerial decisions not reflected in measures of the firm's current financial performance. Empirical results provide evidence that the use of IPE in the CEO bonus plan is an increasing function of the proportion of outsider directors on the board and a decreasing function of the informativeness of financial performance measures. This study also demonstrates how the use of IPE in incentive contracting can explain CEO cash compensation that is not explained by the firm's current performance and governance variables. Finally, the CEO incentive cash compensation not explained by observable performance measures or governance structure is positively associated with firm future performance one year after its award. Overall, results support the optimal contracting hypothesis. IPE appears to be used to increase the informativeness of CEO actions and determine the level of current CEO cash incentive compensation.

We examine the use of relative performance evaluation (RPE), asymmetry in pay for skill/luck, and compensation benchmarking for a sample of firms involved in a spinoff. The spinoff affects firm characteristics that influence the use of the identified compensation practices. We test for differences in the compensation practices for the pre- and post-spinoff firms. We find that RPE is used for post-spinoff CEOs, but not pre-spinoff CEOs. Post-spinoff CEOs are also paid asymmetrically for luck where they are rewarded for good luck but not punished for bad luck. Both pre- and post-spinoff CEOs receive similar levels of compensation benchmarking. The study provides additional evidence on factors that influence compensation practices. Our spinoff sample allows us to examine how compensation practices are affected by changes in firm characteristics while keeping other determinants of compensation constant (i.e., the board and, in many cases, the CEO). Our findings contribute to the understanding of how the identified compensation practices are used.

This study examines the links between financial performance and executive compensation for high-performance companies (HPC). HPC display sustained and superior cash flow returns, asset growth, and total shareholder returns. In previous empirical analysis, HPC companies displayed specific identifiable financial performance drivers and measures when compared to companies in the S&P 500 (Needles et al., 2004). Most recently, HPC sustained their high performance when compared to the S&P 500 over varied economic periods. Further, the research identified operating asset management characteristics of these companies, especially as they relate to the cash cycle (Needles et al., 2004). Continuing this stream of research, this study first identifies the financial and non-financial performance measures related to compensation of top management of HPC as reported in the companies’ public disclosures. Then, these findings for HPC are matched to a set of comparable non-HPC. Finally, we evaluate the stated performance measures for executive compensation in light of the performance drivers and measures identified by previous research to be distinguishing characteristics of HPC. We hypothesize that HPC will more closely align stated performance measures for executive compensation with performance characteristics that have been shown to be characteristics of HPC. We find that HPC are more focused and unambiguous in their use of both financial and non-financial performance measures in executive compensation.

This paper investigates the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act on top executive compensation and empirically examines the changes in relationship between top executive compensation and corporate performance expectations.

A theoretical framework is presented based on previous literature and testable hypotheses are proposed. The Pearson correlation is calculated to examine the inter-correlation among various measures of performance and compensation variables. The Ordinary Least Square (OLS) Regression was conducted to test the hypotheses.

The results show that in the pre-SOX period CEO compensation is strongly related to market-based performance measures while in the post-SOX period accounting-based performance measures showed a significant positive relationship with CEO compensation. The results confirm the impact of the SOX Act where it requires stronger internal control systems and reliable financial reporting. The board relies heavily on accounting-based performance measures in determining top executive compensation in the post-SOX period.

This paper shows the composition and level of CEO compensation have changed following the SOX Act and provide important evidence in explaining changes in the relationship between top executive compensation and firm performance expectation in the post-SOX period.

Based on dual information asymmetry, the two-stage segmented compensation mechanism for technological innovation of civilian enterprises’ participation in military (CEPIM) has been discussed.

On the basis of the traditional principal-agent problems, the incentive compatibility condition is introduced as well as the hybrid incentive compensation model is established, to solve optimal solution of the compensation parameters under the dynamic contract condition and the validity is verified by numerical simulation.

The results show that: (1) The two-stage segmented compensation mechanism has the functions of “self-selection” and “stimulus to the strong”, (2) It promotes the civilian enterprises to obtain more innovation benefit compensation through the second stage, (3) There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between government compensation effectiveness and the innovation ability of compensation objects and (4) The “compensable threshold” and “optimal compensation threshold” should be set, respectively, to assess the applicability and priority of compensation.

In this paper, through numerical simulation, the optimal solution for two-stage segmented compensation, segmented compensation coefficient, expected returns for all parties and excess expected returns have been verified under various information asymmetry. The results show that the mechanism of two-stage segmented compensation can improve the expected returns for both civilian enterprises and the government. However, under dual information asymmetry, for innovation ability of the intended compensation candidates, a “compensation threshold” should be set to determine whether the compensation should be carried out, furthermore an “optimal compensation threshold” should be set to determine the compensation priority.

We investigate the impact of the creation of a new incentive structure for CEOs resulting from firms introducing equity-based compensation (EBC) as a means of paying top executives on policy decisions. Contrasting a firm’s stock and operating performance in the period the CEO is compensated with EBC (EBC period) and the period when EBC is not a component of the same executive’s pay (No EBC period) leads us to conclude that awarding stock options and restricted shares to executives is not associated with improved firm performance. However, firms initiate EBC after superior performance suggesting that CEOs are awarded compensation in this form as a reward for past performance. Firms have higher unsystematic and total risk levels in the EBC period suggesting EBC influences CEOs’ risk-taking behavior and reduces agency costs arising from managerial risk aversion. While there is no change in R&D expenses and cash ratios there is a decrease in capital expenditures in the EBC period, which is consistent with reduced overinvestment agency costs. Finally, leverage and payout ratios are similar in both periods implying that firms’ financing policy is not influenced by changes in CEOs’ compensation structure.

Internal Revenue Code §162(m), which applies to public corporations, was designed to reduce executive compensation and strengthen its relation to performance. This article examines the effectiveness of the code section. While the results reflect a continual increase in the compensation of a group of key executives for the years reviewed, evidence is found in support of the performance-based objectives of §162(m). Findings indicate a shift away from salary and toward bonus payments over the time period examined. Further, the link between compensation and performance appears to have strengthened slightly after the enactment of §162(m).

In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.

Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions.