Search results

Corporate governance research suggests that board structure can impact organizational outcomes such as financial performance and executive remuneration. Agency theory posits that a board composed of independent directors and chaired by an independent chairperson can provide effective control over agency costs, while stewardship theory suggests that effective decision-making is facilitated when the board is chaired by the CEO and majority of directors are from the executive team. Empirical research into the association between board structure and performance in Jordan has provided mixed results, with no consensus supporting either theory. This study takes a different approach to researching the assumed association between board structure and performance by surveying directors’ perspectives on such assumed relationship between financial performance and four of boards’ characteristics (i.e., board independence, CEO duality, board size, and female ratio on board). Findings of this research indicate that Jordanian directors perceive a medium to strong association between financial performance and each of board independence, independent chair of board, and female ratio on board. However, directors of Jordanian boards perceive no association between financial performance and board size.

The aim of our study is to explore the nexus between the gender composition of board and firm financial performance. We use the data of 114 listed banks from 10 Asian emerging economies. Data were extracted from the DataStream for the year 2012–2021. We apply fixed effect model to analyze the data. In addition, we use generalized method of moments (GMM) to verify our main findings. We find that both proxies of board gender composition which are the proportion of female board members and the percentage of female executives on the board have a significant impact on banks' financial performance. Findings suggest that female representation on board provides more insights of monitoring and optimal advisory capabilities and, therefore, gender-diversified board enhances firm performance. Females are more active in business matters and take more interests to fulfill their responsibilities. The results of our study provide useful signals for corporate and regulatory policymakers. Board gender disparities between enterprises should be better understood by all stakeholders to have the optimal combination of board members that ultimately lead to better performance of the firm.

Drawing on new insights from the perspectives and experiences of board members, the purpose of this study is to determine the board attributes that influence board roles in improving the integration of corporate social responsibility (CSR) into corporate governance structures. In total, 10 in-depth semi-structured interviews were conducted with directors of listed Jordanian companies to explore their perceptions of the effect of board of directors' composition on CSR and CSR disclosure (CSRD). The key findings show that boards with a diverse range of directors is essential independent/nonexecutive members, directors with business and/or accounting backgrounds, and foreign members to determine if they aim to better manage their CSR. To take CSR to the next level in the Arab region, we need to strengthen corporate governance mechanisms, and put more pressures on companies to make changes in board composition. For example, we suggest that companies that appoint business-educated and foreign members to their boards tend to engage in more impactful social and environmental-related activities and reflect their sustainable development more effectively. The study responds to calls for further research adopting qualitative methods, such as case studies and interviews in order to obtain a complete and in-depth understanding of the influence of board composition on CSR/CSRD. The findings provide useful insights for practice, policymakers, and future research.

The aim of the study is to examine the influence of remuneration committee (RC) characteristics, namely separation, size, independence, meetings, and female directors, on firm performance (FP) by using return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and earnings per shares (EPS). The study covers all firms being listed in Bahrain Bourse for two years which are 2020 and 2021. The results of the study show that having more directors in RC would significantly increase firm performance “ROE and EPS.” Further, having more females in RC would significantly increase firm performance “ROA.” In addition, having separate RC would significantly decrease firm performance “ROA and EPS.” Moreover, the independence of directors in RC and its frequent meetings has no significant impact on the firm’s performance. The results show that there is a need to re-evaluate the role of the RC and strengthen its effectiveness, as some of the variables examined by this study have an insignificant impact on a firm’s performance. Further, there is a need to allocate additional efforts and policies in developing corporate governance and RCs as well.

Businesses are now under more pressure from society, legislatures, and other stakeholders to act responsibly since there is a deeper understanding of how businesses affect society globally. Whether a company environmental policy is actively pursued or passively approved, boards are ultimately in charge of it. Hence, the aim of the study is to investigate the influence of the board of directors’ characteristics, namely board size, meetings, independence, gender diversity, and qualification, on environmental disclosure. The study covers all listed manufacturing companies in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain for the years 2018–2022. The study expects that the board of directors’ characteristics should have a significant impact on enhancing the environmental disclosure. The finding of the study will add a vital contribution to the literature as it is the first study to be conducted in a developing country, such as Bahrain, where no study has yet been conducted there. The finding will help different parties, for example, policy makers, regulators, and shareholders as well as managers on the effect of the board of directors on the level of high quality in environmental disclosure that will build a good reputation for companies.

Running an organization in a rapidly changing world is no easy task. Members of supervisory or executive boards must take the interests of all stakeholders into account. From shareholders, employees and suppliers, to customers, and beyond. Yet reaching the boardroom is equivalent to running a Spartan marathon. At a time when complexity is increasing and technological developments are hard to keep up with, the stakes for organizations and candidates are high. In this chapter, we explore the context of executive search: major trends, the profile of the executive search sector and the types of firms that operate in it. We de-mystify the process: the selection, search, presentation and accompaniment of candidates, looking at the responsibilities of the key players and the accompanying performance pressure and stress. Finally, we propose a vision for the future of executive search and potentially re-think about a professional code of conduct.

An earlier form of this chapter by the author was published in Dutch in “Bestemming Boardroom: over zoeken en gevonden worden” (Boom, Amsterdam, 2018) and in English (online) by the Amrop Partnership (2021) as “Destination Boardroom 1: Three Trends Redefining the Executive Talent Domain.”

This chapter addresses one of the most crucial areas for critical thinking: the morality of turbulent markets around the world. All of us are overwhelmed by such turbulent markets. Following Nassim Nicholas Taleb (2004, 2010), we distinguish between nonscalable industries (ordinary professions where income grows linearly, piecemeal or by marginal jumps) and scalable industries (extraordinary risk-prone professions where income grows in a nonlinear fashion, and by exponential jumps and fractures). Nonscalable industries generate tame and predictable markets of goods and services, while scalable industries regularly explode into behemoth virulent markets where rewards are disproportionately large compared to effort, and they are the major causes of turbulent financial markets that rock our world causing ever-widening inequities and inequalities. Part I describes both scalable and nonscalable markets in sufficient detail, including propensity of scalable industries to randomness, and the turbulent markets they create. Part II seeks understanding of moral responsibility of turbulent markets and discusses who should appropriate moral responsibility for turbulent markets and under what conditions. Part III synthesizes various theories of necessary and sufficient conditions for accepting or assigning moral responsibility. We also analyze the necessary and sufficient conditions for attribution of moral responsibility such as rationality, intentionality, autonomy or freedom, causality, accountability, and avoidability of various actors as moral agents or as moral persons. By grouping these conditions, we then derive some useful models for assigning moral responsibility to various entities such as individual executives, corporations, or joint bodies. We discuss the challenges and limitations of such models.

For a successful search, all members of the client–headhunter–candidate trio need to step up to the plate. How can clients better prepare for and engage in the search process? What are the current limits of client engagement and their rights vis-á-vis the headhunter? We explain why headhunting is different from recruitment, and why procuring executive search is as serious as other assets. We reveal the depth of questioning and bias management that it takes to reveal and attract the right candidate. We propose five points to build into the profile of the leader of the future. We next take a look at the clients of executive search firms – who come in all shapes and sizes. Van Eijck distinguishes four groups: multinationals, family businesses, private equity firms and public institutions. A tour signals points of attention for each group regarding a search process and some key points that apply across the spectrum – for example, how wildcard candidates can compromise a search process, the persistent problem of “no pay no cure” and why an appointment doesn’t always guarantee success. Finally, we move to the world of the executive candidate. Many make errors (also of judgment) when building their CVs. A seasoned headhunter can easily spot these. We present the keys to forging a robust story, working effectively with an executive search consultant and conclude with the features of the modern educational and work environment that can get in the way of a career.

An earlier form of this chapter by the author was published in Dutch in “Bestemming Boardroom: over zoeken en gevonden worden” (Boom, Amsterdam, 2018).

This chapter analyzes how the internal environment determines corporate dividend decisions. First, dividend policy is influenced by strategic and financial issues. Corporate strategies are developed by top managers to achieve firms' missions, visions, and long-term goals while business strategies are designed by middle managers to maintain firms' competitive advantages. These strategies affect corporate dividend decisions through corporate performance and business operations. In addition, many financial characteristics are important determinants of dividend policy. Financial characteristics are classified into three groups, namely performance-related issues (e.g., firm profitability, free cash flow, and stock liquidity), leverage-related issues (e.g., debt ratio, asset tangibility, business risk, and firm size), and investment-related issues (e.g., investment opportunities and firm maturity). Firms with high profitability, free cash flow tends to pay more dividends. Stock liquidity may have a positive effect on dividend payments through lowering costs of equity; however, it may also have a negative effect through weakening the signaling motive. Moreover, firms with high debt ratio, low asset tangibility, high business risk, and small size face higher costs of external financing. Therefore, they have low incentives to pay dividends. When firms have more investment opportunities, they are more likely to restrict dividends and save cash for their investment projects and vice versa. Second, internal stakeholders may influence corporate dividend policy since their benefits are closely related to dividend decisions. Shareholders, directors, the chief executive officer, and employees have different characteristics, positions, and hold various proportions of shares. Therefore, they create pressures on dividend decisions to protect their wealth.