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Sustainable development and the enhancement of justice and security globally are predicated on the existence of sufficient and appropriately deployed assets. Mindful of this, and of the misuse of both public and private wealth, UN Sustainable Development Goal 16.4 (SDG 16.4) seeks to ‘…significantly reduce illicit financial … flows’. This chapter critiques how this aim of SDG 16.4 has been operationalised. We argue that the choice and placement of the term ‘illicit’ is crucial: it can relate to the finances, the flows, or both, as well as to the people involved, as facilitators or protagonists, and is expansive enough to encompass criminal, unlawful and ostensibly legal but illegitimate or harmful assets, acts and actors. Moreover, this chapter explores why the movement of assets is significant, within and between jurisdictions, and how these transfers and transactions impact on sustainable development and can worsen inequalities. Our attention is on the conceptualisation, measurement and operationalisation of illicit financial flows (IFFs) in particular and the corresponding implications for available policy responses in the form of situational interventions as a more plausible route to understanding and reducing IFFs in the context of promoting SDG 16.4.

Concentrated ownership implies greater alignment between ownership and control, mitigating the agency problem. However, it may also engender governance challenges such as funds appropriation through related party transactions and the oppression of minority shareholders, especially in the context of weak legal systems. We draw from legal theory (the tradeoff controlling shareholder model and private benefits of control) and from organization theory (socioemotional wealth), to suggest that concentrated ownership can be beneficial in both robust and weak legal systems for different reasons. We advance theory on the effects of controlling shareholders and suggest that the longer-term outlook associated with engaged concentrated ownership can aid the shift of the corporation toward Berle and Means' (1932, p. 355) “third possibility” of corporations serving the interests of not just the stockholders or management but also of society.

We examine the influence of ownership structure on a blockholder’s power in a firm. We first describe the presence and ownership stakes of blockholders in a comprehensive sample of US firms. We develop a measure of the influence of the ownership structure on a blockholder’s power and show that an average blockholder loses 12% of her potential power due to the presence and size of the ownership stakes of other blockholders. Further, the influence of ownership structure varies systematically with a blockholder’s rank and identity, with the second and nonfamily manager blockholders experiencing the largest loss of power.

This paper looks at the research to date on the future of broadly granted stock options (options granted to at least half the full-time employees of a company). In the U.S., granting options broadly became popular in the late 1990s, but has lost some of its appeal in the wake of stock market declines, accounting changes, and increased shareholder concerns about dilution. The data indicate a significant minority of companies will change their plans, but a substantial majority will keep them. The data also indicate changes in accounting rules will not affect stock prices and that broadly granted options are better for corporate performance than narrowly granted options.

This chapter and case study examine how and which structured elements of an employee-owned business contribute to building the economic security and asset wealth of the lowest-wage and skilled employees of the firm. It paves the way for greater understanding about how intentionally structured workplaces can address wealth inequality and economic security through income and non-income opportunity systems.

The study draws upon qualitative interviews with four members of management, two plant managers, and 12 low-income employee-owners. Company documents and confidential employee data were provided for direct research analysis. Interviews took place at company locations, and covered employees from all shifts.

Employee ownership structures provide an important tool for advancing policy support and management practices to rebuild the wealth building benefits of work for low-income workers.

To ensure confidentiality, the study is anonymized and does not directly draw on the worker-owner interviews. This limits the opportunity to demonstrate the effect of structure on workforce; nonetheless, the empirical data tell an important story.

Expanding wealth inequality and economic precarity among low- and moderate-income workers has raised broad debates about how shifts in the structure of work, through new business, capital, and ownership structures, may be contributing to these social problems.

The employee benefits of employee ownership are not fully studied. This case contributes to understanding how employee ownership may reduce gender and racial wealth gaps, build family well-being, and become a model for structuring opportunity for those traditionally left out of the economic mainstream.

We find that: (i) substantial insider ownership persists, though majority ownership by non-managerial employees is eroding fast; (ii) flexible pay systems and state-mandated forms of employee representation are becoming more common; and (iii) while increased employee influence is sometimes apparent, privatization often does not produce fundamental changes in inherited patterns of corporate governance.The evidence of the impact upon enterprise productivity indicates: (i) no persuasive evidence that a single form of private ownership is most efficient or that the key obstacle to enhanced performance is employee participation in economic returns; (ii) some evidence that employee participation enhances business productivity; (iii) limited evidence that employee participation boosts the effect of employee ownership and employee participation in profits; and (iv) a role for ownership dynamics as well as changes in patterns of influence in accounting for the determinants of differences in labor productivity. Thus it appears that widely differing ownership structures may be most appropriate when institutional contexts vary.

We examine the market valuation of targets with multiple large shareholders (MLS) and single large shareholder (SLS) structures, in an international sample of M&A announcement in 19 countries outside North America. We find that the presence and power of MLS in these firms are negatively associated with abnormal returns and first-bid-to-merger-completion returns, suggesting that MLS mitigate agency problems in the target, and hence their acquisition is perceived as “a loss of good governance.” The negative association between MLS targets and returns is stronger in widely held firms suggesting that MLS indeed curb expropriation of minority shareholders. By contrast, when the second largest shareholder in the MLS structure of the target is a family, we find positive cumulative abnormal returns at the merger announcement, suggesting exacerbated agency problems in these firms that should benefit from the “acquisition of good governance.” Our evidence is robust to a battery of tests and to addressing potential endogeneity.

This chapter examines the acquisition of assets (real estate) and companies in the Chinese real estate industry. We propose a nuanced view of state ownership (beyond state being the largest shareholder) and argue that firms with a combination of state and private ownership may be in a unique position to acquire real assets. We conduct an analysis of the growth and funding of the industry for the period and also analyze the successful acquisitions in the industry over 2004–2007. Our analysis is supportive of the nuanced view about state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and their advantageous position for acquiring real estate assets from the government. Our analysis also sheds light on the two-stage marketization process in the Chinese real estate industry where SOEs endowed with real estate assets are sold to non-SOEs.

Sukuk restructuring primarily aims at offering a debtor more latitude, in form and time, to settle his obligations. To meet Shari’ah requirements of transferring assets to Sukuk holders in asset-based Sukuk, the originator usually transfers the beneficial ownership to the issuer special purpose vehicles (SPV). However, in asset-backed Sukuk, the originator sells the underlying asset to an SPV and Sukuk holders do not have recourse to the originator in the event of defaults. Among some key unresolved Shari’ah issues in this regard is whether a change of contract necessitates entering a new contract. Other related issues that conflict with the tenets of Shari’ah are: (1) Sukuk structuring on tangible assets and debts; (2) receiving the full title by the Sukuk holders to the underlying assets in the event of default in case of securities that are publicized as asset backed; (3) Sukuk’s similarity with interest bearing conventional bonds: (a) capital guarantee by the originator or third party, (b) the originators’ promise to repurchase Sukuk at face value upon their redemption, and (c) providing internal and external credit enhancement. The Shari’ah-compliance of the above-mentioned clauses and structures of Sukuk remain debated among the Shari’ah scholars. Based on some specific cases, this study examines the Shari’ah viewpoint on sukuk restructuring and potential solutions to these unresolved Shari’ah issues in light of the past and recent declaration of some Sukuk defaults as non-Shari’ah complaints. Undoubtedly, resolution of these and other unresolved issues pertaining to Sukuk defaults can help strengthen the confidence of investors in Islamic capital market structures.