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This paper aims to reveal the effects of an organisation’s bargaining power on its negotiating behaviours (including integrating, obliging, compromising, dominating and avoiding) in the context of inter-organisational conflict in construction projects and investigate how organisational power distance orientation moderates the relationship between the organisation’s bargaining power and its negotiating behaviours.

The authors conducted a questionnaire survey among practitioners in the Chinese construction industry with the final sample consisting of 219 responses. A structural equation model was used to analyse the data and test the hypotheses.

The results reveal that an organisation’s bargaining power is positively associated with dominating and integrating behaviours but negatively associated with obliging and avoiding behaviours. Additionally, bargaining power is found to be negatively associated with compromising behaviour when the organisation has a high power distance orientation. Finally, a higher degree of power distance orientation strengthens the positive effect bargaining power has on dominating behaviour.

The findings can help practitioners to predict the negotiating behaviours of a counterpart according to its bargaining power and the power distance in its organisational culture. This can then enable practitioners to adjust their strategies accordingly and steer the negotiations towards a win–win outcome.

This study applies the approach-inhibition theory of power to inter-organisational negotiations and empirically tests the relationship between an organisation’s bargaining power and its negotiating behaviours in the context of construction projects. Additionally, this study reveals that organisational power distance orientation moderates this relationship.

The Equal Pay Act 1970 (which came into operation on 29 December 1975) provides for an “equality clause” to be written into all contracts of employment. S.1(2) (a) of the 1970 Act (which has been amended by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975) provides:

We are negotiating all the time: with customers, suppliers, trade unions, our family ‐ indeed, all with whom we come into contact. In business, in particular, negotiation needs management. There are said to be eight stages in negotiation: prepare, argue, signal, propose, present the package, bargain, close and agree. At the proposal stage one must be clear about what one must achieve, what one intends to achieve, and what one would like to achieve. The approach to constructive and competitive negotiation, the role of consultation, how to cope with deadlock and conflict, cross‐cultural negotiation, and the art of compromise are reviewed. The development and use of teams in negotiation is also an important factor, needing careful assessment. Negotiation will nearly always involve conflict, but steps must be taken to ensure that the participants remain on friendly terms.

May 16, 1973 Industrial Relations — Unfair industrial practice — Discrimination — Post Office — Facilities granted to recognised but unregistered union denied to unrecognised but registered union — Whether statutory discrimination — Whether rights given to worker exercising right to belong to union of his choice including right to take part in union activities on employer's premises against will of employer — Distinction between organisational and negotiating facilities — Industrial Relations Act, 1971 (c.72), s.5(1)(a), (c), (2)(b), (5).

Uses the concept of institutional separation to examine changes in the management of industrial relations in an organization studied on two occasions ten years apart. Argues that the concept provides insights into the management of industrial relations, but needs to be modified to take account of the form of institutional separation and the employees and issues under consideration.

This study aims to investigate and compare the propensity of both Arab and Western customers to bargain in marketing exchange situations in the United Arab Emirates.

The Bargaining Propensity Scale (BPS) developed by Schneider et al. was administered, as part of a self‐administered questionnaire, to a sample of 100 Arab customers and 100 Western customers and their responses to the BPS items were analyzed.

Data analysis shows that both segments – Arab and Western customers – display an overall tendency to engage in bargaining activities, although with slightly different PBS distributions.

The sample contained only 15 Arab women as it was very awkward for the male research assistant to talk to women in public places; very few women would risk being seen in public with strangers.

This study addresses an important marketing issue – the comparative behavior of customers. It is the first to do so in the region.

The Employment Act 1980 has repealed Sections 11‐16 of the Employment Protection Act 1975, with the result that statutory union recognition provisions no longer exist in Britain. At the present time there are relatively few people who would mourn the passing of these provisions. From the start many employers were unhappy with what they saw as strongly pro‐union provisions, while the unions became increasingly disenchanged with the lengthy procedural delays in hearing claims, and ACAS itself was unhappy with a number of court rulings that substantially restricted their discretion in hearing and deciding such claims. As a consequence there are likely to be few persons hoping for, much less calling for, the re‐introduction of statutory union recognition provisions, even in a modified form, in the immediate future. Indeed no less an individual than the former Chairman of ACAS himself is on record as saying that:

The purpose of this paper is to describe a classroom negotiation exercise. A case involving controversy over the naming of a sports stadium containing a university football field and track is described. A local municipality, representing veterans groups, negotiates with university officials over a university plan to rename “Veteran's Memorial Stadium” after a recently‐retired football coach.

The negotiation activity is adapted from an actual case. It requires little advance preparation and can be used with either pairs or small groups of participants. “Teaching notes” provide instructions for using the activity.

The “Teaching Notes” examine how this controversy illustrates several concepts related to conflict, integrative bargaining, power and negotiating on behalf of constituents.

The case differs from many published cases in that one side's position is apparently rooted in values and matters of principle whereas the other side's position is interest‐based. The student must grapple with these dynamics, while seeking an integrative solution to the issues.

This article will attempt to argue and demonstrate that the existing and extensive literature on bargaining power in industrial relations focuses almost exclusively on two central aspects of power. Whilst both these approaches throw valuable light on some aspects of power, we shall seek to argue that the predominance of these constrained perspectives has resulted in the relative neglect of other important aspects. Thus we shall identify several lacunae in the literature and seek to raise some hitherto unexamined questions. We shall also argue that, because of the partial nature of the existing literature, there is a need to develop a more coherent and comprehensive model of power which is capable of integrating the multiple facets and incorporating the existing insights.

The main thesis of the chapter is to introduce a new idea to the field of peace negotiations, which will require the development of a new model of negotiations to enforce peace. The existing models of peace negotiations highlight the existence of a positive peace dividend to parties involved in conflicts and peace negotiation. They, hence, usually highlight a gradual and dynamic adjustment, or movement, away from a conflict-ridden outcome towards a peaceful outcome that offers a positive peace dividend to all relevant stakeholders. In comparison with the status quo, peace brings additional economic returns and peace therefore offers a win–win situation. Despite the fact that a win–win situation does not ensure the enforcement of peace, as agents can easily get locked into what is commonly known as the prisoners' dilemma – yet the possibility of Pareto improvement makes negotiations for peace somewhat artificial. At least in the short run all agents involved in active conflicts are apprehensive of peace as they expect immediate (expected) returns from making peace can outweigh the expected returns from conflicts. An important work that sidesteps the win–win situation of peace dividends is by Isard and Azis (1999) who introduced the possibility of an immediate loss of economic returns from the peace process in their conflict management procedure (CMP). However, in the existing work on CMP, the long-run returns from peace outweigh that from conflicts. One therefore presumes that peace brings economic benefits to all. The existing CMPs therefore assume away any possibility of lower economic returns from peace. There are some important models in which peace negotiations are also modelled as a zero-sum game in which the gain of a party represents a loss to others, which is known as win–lose negotiations. In this work we introduce the possibility of bargaining and negotiations against the backdrop of potential immediate losses while peace is favoured simply for its intrinsic value and not for pecuniary returns. In the real world, there is evidence to believe that agents involved in conflicts are painfully aware of two things: first, the decision-making agents who choose between conflicts vis-à-vis peace are the leaders who get rarely affected by economic returns from conflicts or peace. It is usually the foot soldiers who bear the brunt of costly conflicts and can benefit from peace. Secondly, most people value peace for the sake of it as peace has an intrinsic value that ensures the protection of rights and their lives and protection from violence. Thus, peace is a collective good that provides little extra economic returns to actual decision-makers who choose between courses of conflicts or peace.