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This essay is a tribute to Jaroslav Vanek who spent 32 years at Cornell University where he founded the Program on Participation and Labor-Managed Systems (PPLMS) in 1970, which became the home for economic research on these issues in the US. It is a brief intellectual history of a multi-dimensional scholar.

Vanek's seminal work in the American Economic Review in 1969 marked the culmination of a decade of work on labor management inspired by his brother Jan's work on Yugoslavia, considered then to be a worker-managed economic system. In two rapidly following tomes, Vanek laid out the landscape for the development of a new subfield in economics by providing precursors to many of the results to follow. In that previous decade, Vanek produced papers in traditional economic theory, e.g. international trade and economic growth.

Vanek's mindset persists in the interplay between the emerging theory of labor-managed firms and traditional economic literature that takes seriously the role of organizational form. This essay develops that cross-pollination and seeks to identify the remaining questions and issues for future work that the economics profession owes to Jaroslav Vanek.

Connection of strands of literature in the economic theory with the literature on labor-managed firms and worker-managed economies tracing the evolution of the latter to the work of Jaroslav Vanek.

This paper revisits the early-20th-century British blueprint for Guild Socialism and discusses its similarities and differences with labor managed firm (LMF) theory and with the historic Yugoslav system. It finds that the Guild Socialist vision of a corporatist workers’ state based on universal, non-anonymous, multi-party negotiation of incomes, prices, and quantities comes much closer to anticipating the real-world Yugoslav experiment in worker-managed market socialism than the market-syndicalist utopia embodied in the Western economic model of the LMF and economy.

There is now a considerable literature on the Illyrian firm (that is, the firm which is assumed to maximise income per worker), and it has been argued that the analysis may have relevance for the labour‐managed or co‐operative enterprise. Significant contributions to this literature have been made by Domar (1966), Vanek (1970), Meade (1972, 1974) and others but the seminal paper is generally recognised to be that of Ward (1958).

The paper traces the development of employee ownership in the UK since the 1980s. It proposes that employee ownership is a function of macro-level contexts and micro-level decisions, with the latter framed and guided by the former. The macro context comprises the regulatory framework and the provision of incentives to adopt employee ownership. The paper shows how the evolution of these has led to a steep increase in employee ownership in the last eight years.

The paper draws on several sources of empirical data to chart the development of employee ownership in the UK since the 1980s and to identify the current features of employee ownership. Two firm-level surveys conducted in 2015 and 2020/21 are supplemented by qualitative case study data collected in the early 1990s. An annual census of all employee-owned firms facilitates a comprehensive overview of the current state of UK employee ownership.

It is found that there has been a steep increase in the number of UK employee-owned firms since 2014 after several decades of uneven growth. This is attributed to the introduction of new incentives and to refinements of the regulatory framework. Over the period, there has been a shift from hybrid employee ownership, combining direct and indirect forms, to indirect ownership associated with the employee ownership trust model.

The paper provides an original history of employee ownership in the UK using rich and unique data, along with the most comprehensive picture of current employee ownership to date.

Existing theoretical and empirical evidence is inconclusive concerning the comparative performance of labor-managed firms (LMFs) and conventional firms. By assembling and analyzing new data for a sample of 51 conventional firms and 26 producer cooperatives in the Italian construction industry during the period 1981–1989 we provide additional evidence. Except for organizational form, the cooperatives in our sample are fairly comparable to our conventional firms. Based on our production function estimates, and unlike some previous econometric studies, we find no significant productivity advantage of cooperatives over conventional firms. Our ordinary least squares (OLS) point estimates generally indicated that output would be lower in a cooperative than in an otherwise identical conventional firm. The only statistically significant measure of financial and decision-making participation is collective reserves. We conclude by offering some possible explanations for why our results may differ from some previous findings, especially those for Italian producer cooperatives. In particular we suggest that research methods that are new to the study of cooperatives are needed to help to resolve these questions.

This paper will discuss two problems that have plagued the literature on the Ward-Domar-Vanek labor-managed firm (LMF) model, the perverse supply response problem and the horizon problem. The paper also discusses the solution to the horizon problem and the alleged “solution” of a membership market.

This is a conceptual paper so it analyzes the two problems and shows how they can be resolved. It also shows how one alleged “solution” (membership market) is based on several conceptual mistakes about the structure of rights in a democratic firm.

The perverse supply response is based on the assumption that the members of a democratic firm can expel for no cause some members when it would benefit the remaining members. It is shown that the same perverse behavior happens conceptually and historically in a conventional firm under the same assumptions. The horizon problem is resolved by the system of internal capital accounts (ICAs) that has been independently invented at least four times.

The idea of a democratic firm is quite often dismissed by conventional economists: “At first it seems like a good idea but unfortunately it is plagued by structural problems such as the perverse supply response and the horizon problem.” Hence it is important to see that the first is not a problem under ordinary assumptions and that the second is a solved problem.

The perverse supply response problem can be reproduced in a conventional firm under similar assumptions, and the horizon problem is real problem for social or common ownership firms but is solved in the Mondragon-type worker cooperatives by the system of ICAs. This has been known and published since the early 1980s, but conventional economists ignore the solution and still cite it as an inherent structure problem of a democratic firm.

It has not been previously shown in the LMF literature that the perverse supply response can be reproduced in a conventional corporation under similar assumptions since the maximand for the conventional firm is not total market value but that value per current shareholder. The solution to the horizon problem using ICAs has long been “known” but never acknowledged in the conventional literature as if it was a necessary feature of workplace democracy. The idea of a membership market is analyzed and criticized.

Collectivist organizations like worker cooperatives are known for requiring high levels of participation, striving toward community, and making space for affective relationships among their members. The emotional intensity of such organizations has long been considered both an asset and a burden: while personal relationships may generate solidarity and sustain commitment, interpersonal interactions can be emotionally intense and, if left unmanaged, can even lead to organizational demise. How do collectivist-democratic organizations manage emotions to create and sustain member commitment? This study draws on long-term ethnographic fieldwork in a worker-run, worker-recuperated business in Argentina to analyze the emotional dynamics of a democratic workplace. First, the author shows how members of the cooperative engage in emotional labor not only in their customer service, but also through their participation in lateral management and democratic governance. An analysis of individual feeling management, however, provides only a partial picture of emotional dynamics. Drawing on the theory of interaction ritual chains, the author argues that workplace practices like meetings and events can produce collective emotions that are critical to maintaining members’ commitment to the group. Finally, the author shows how interaction ritual chains operate in the BAUEN Cooperative, tracing how symbols of shared affiliation circulate through interactions and are reactivated through the confrontation of a common threat. The author concludes by reflecting on implications for future research on emotions in collectivist organizations and participatory workplaces more broadly.

When radical new approaches to entrepreneurship are sought, they almost invariably return to the origin point of conventional firms. This chapter, however, will show that radical entrepreneurship, far from being the purview of capitalist enterprises, can be found in abundance in the cooperative sector. Cooperatives, which are democratic economic enterprises owned by members on a one person, one-vote basis, are a hotbed of new economic thinking. The ways in which cooperatives use advances in technology to create more democratic, decentralized, and egalitarian economic relationships stands in stark contrast to the monopolizing and centralizing tendencies of conventional firms. This chapter will show that cooperatives are both a worthy adversary, and potential ally of, conventional capitalist businesses in moving the field of entrepreneurship into areas that will be of greatest benefit to humanity.

This paper reviews the evolution, current state and ongoing trends of the empirical literature on employee-owned firms (EOFs).

Using a structured literature review methodology, I analyze 280 empirical publications on EOFs published in English peer-reviewed academic journals over the 1970–2019 period.

Two generations (before and after 2001) of the EOF empirical literature are identified and characterized in terms of authors, journals, topics, methods, targets, relations to theoretical modeling and countries studied. Two research trends are structuring the current generation: one investigating diverse research questions engaging EOFs as emblematic forms of social economy, and the other comparing EOFs to conventional firms to offer insights mainly into the seminal question of the EOF relative rarity.

The sample studied does not take into account articles written in languages other than English and does not include books.

This article displays the first structured literature review of the EOF empirical literature.

The idea that worker co‐operatives offer the possibility of increasing productivity without sacrificing workers' safety and health is investigated. Ten worker co‐operatives and four conventional capitalist firms in the Pacific Northwest plywood industry are studied. Co‐operatives have worse productivity and safety records than conventional firms. Lower productivity is due to the unexpected behaviour that emerges in co‐operatives relying heavily on hired labour. Higher levels of accidents are due to different reporting practices arising from different social relations in production. Co‐operatives tend to over‐report their accidents whereas conventional firms under‐report accidents.