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This paper aims to raise awareness of a potential planning pitfall and provide recommendations on how to assess and improve upon current practices. In potential conflict areas, such as the Korean Theater of Operations (KTO), military forces are required to store a portion of their ammunition combat load within depots and ammunition supply points under the control of a servicing ammunition company. This necessitates a lengthy retrieval process, as the ammunition company does not have enough resources to serve all customers simultaneously.

The stored combat load (SCL) retrieval process is modeled as a parallel machine scheduling problem and simulated using synthetic requirements. The current system of retrieval is contrasted against a proposed alternate system through a series of simulations scaled across three factors: number of ammunition company Soldiers, number of customer units and number of magazines.

The proposed alternate system demonstrates a significant potential for reducing the makespan of the SCL retrieval process when more than half of the magazines store SCL for multiple customers and there are more than five customers per Soldier.

Transitioning military units from a peacetime standing to full combat readiness as quickly as possible is of immense value within the KTO and other hostile areas with established troops not actively engaged in combat.

The paper provides a detailed historical account of Douglass C. North's early intellectual contributions and analytical developments in pursuing a Grand Theory for why some countries are rich and others poor.

The author approaches the discussion using a theoretical and historical reconstruction based on published and unpublished materials.

The systematic, continuous and profound attempt to answer the Smithian social coordination problem shaped North's journey from being a young serious Marxist to becoming one of the founders of New Institutional Economics. In the process, he was converted in the early 1950s into a rigid neoclassical economist, being one of the leaders in promoting New Economic History. The success of the cliometric revolution exposed the frailties of the movement itself, namely, the limitations of neoclassical economic theory to explain economic growth and social change. Incorporating transaction costs, the institutional framework in which property rights and contracts are measured, defined and enforced assumes a prominent role in explaining economic performance.

In the early 1970s, North adopted a naive theory of institutions and property rights still grounded in neoclassical assumptions. Institutional and organizational analysis is modeled as a social maximizing efficient equilibrium outcome. However, the increasing tension between the neoclassical theoretical apparatus and its failure to account for contrasting political and institutional structures, diverging economic paths and social change propelled the modification of its assumptions and progressive conceptual innovation. In the later 1970s and early 1980s, North abandoned the efficiency view and gradually became more critical of the objective rationality postulate. In this intellectual movement, North's avant-garde research program contributed significantly to the creation of New Institutional Economics.