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This paper addresses the issue of granularity. The authors argue that in routine dynamics research granularity can be usefully defined by the number of actors, the variety of places/contexts, and the amount of time it takes to successfully accomplish an action. This is an important but often overlooked aspect of studying routines. It is important because different granularities imply different challenges and opportunities for performing and patterning. The authors propose a framework to distinguish between fine-, medium-, and coarse-grained actions, illustrate how different granularities have been used in existing routine dynamics studies, and discuss the implications for understanding routine dynamics. The authors conclude that granularity is a key construct that needs to be taken seriously and suggest a four-step procedure to help researchers establish and report on the granularity of actions in their research process.

In this chapter, the author explores and discusses the transformation of management from the perspective of complex systems, systems change and the Taoist yin-yang theory. Modern complex organizations require innovative management practices that move beyond traditional approaches. Consequently, many organizations are experiencing a management shift towards more holistic and sustainable methods. This shift encompasses changes in organizational structures and modes of inquiry. Organizations are transitioning from rigid hierarchies to more collaborative and agile configurations while adopting a systemic approach to management that acknowledges the interconnectedness and interdependence of all organizational aspects. Simultaneously, there is a paradigm shift in management thinking, replacing the conventional focus on ego-action with eco-action, which emphasizes the integration of diverse perspectives and the cultivation of self-awareness and introspection. This shift in mindset is embodied in the yin-yang paradigm, highlighting the importance of balance and harmony between contrasting forces.

This chapter argues that the concept of ‘mass supervision’, and indeed the concept of ‘mass incarceration’ from which it derives, is both quantitatively and qualitatively indeterminate when applied outside of the context of the US. However, the qualitative indeterminacy of mass supervision only holds so long as one treats the word ‘mass’ as being an analogy to mass consumption. This chapter therefore considers an alternative construction of ‘mass’ punishment in terms of mass production. Comparing the philosophies of production associated with Henry Ford and William Morris with the scholarship of Michel Foucault and Fergus McNeill reveals that mass supervision can authentically claim to be qualitatively ‘massive’, given the bespoke and one-on-one nature of traditional supervision. It is thus possible to speak coherently of ‘mass supervision’ in an international context, although this negative conception of a problem invites questions about the best solution that it generally leaves open.

This chapter on animal ethics, animal rights, and animal welfare is a logical sequence to and ontological consequence of the arguments in earlier chapters. By respecting Mother Nature in all her ecosystems and biodiversity levels, especially by recognizing animal rights and their uniqueness, autonomy, and intrinsicality, we actively contribute to natural sustainability and animal welfare. Our anthropocentric economic models that are profoundly insensitive to the complex interdependencies between human and nonhuman behavior systems and their irreversible environmental challenges endanger both animal rights and global sustainability. Philosophically, we confront epistemological and anthropocentric structures that uncritically privilege humans disproportionately to nonhumans and unwittingly rationalize, moralize, and commodify meat production and consumption such that animal rights and welfare get seriously compromised. To achieve animal welfare, however, we need to seriously rescale Nature's hierarchies first by dethroning ourselves from self-appointed and self-serving, uncontested and critically unexamined presumed human superiority over the nonhuman world and restoring global equality of being an opportunity for all.

Previous research on routine dynamics has most commonly incorporated consideration of power, politics, and conflict by using the notion of “truce.” In this paper, the authors propose a novel approach to integrating theories of power and politics with those of routine dynamics, and illustrate it by drawing on an in-depth study of operating room routines in a general hospital. The authors show how the dynamic interaction among groups’ sources of power, interests, and strategies is linked to the performance and patterning of routines. The approach opens up the originally rather static notion of “truce” to an inherently more dynamic and processual view of the micropolitics underpinning routines. The authors contribute to the routine dynamics literature by showing how and why the micropolitical context may influence, undermine, or reproduce the patterning and performing of organizational routines following a change initiative, and more broadly by illustrating an approach to integrating political considerations into the theory of routine dynamics.

How can large international financial firms go green in authentic ways? What enhances ‘Net Zero action’? Changes in global banks, fund managers, and insurance firms are at the heart of green finance. External change pressures – combined with problematic firm predispositions – exacerbate barriers to change and promote scepticism about authentic Net Zero change. Field research reveals main elements, connections, and interactions of this question by considering financial firms as complex socio-technical systems (Mitleton-Kelly, 2003). An interdisciplinary/holistic narrative approach (De Bakker et al., 2019) is adopted to design a conceptual framework that can support a green ‘behavioural theory of the financial firm’ (green BTFF). The BTFF presents an international version (Peng, 2001) of the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney, 1991; Hart, 1995; Teece et al., 1997).

The approach of this chapter is aimed at closing knowledge gaps and realign values in financial markets and society. By raising awareness about organised hypocrisy and facades (Brunsson, 1993; Cho et al., 2015; Schoeneborn et al., 2020) in financial firms the chapter aims at overcoming the gap between ‘talking’ and ‘walking’ in the financial sector. The chapter defines testable firm-level hypotheses for ‘Green Finance’ (Poterba, 2021) as well as – by implication – tests for ‘greenwashing’.

The American agricultural economist Marion Clawson advised the Israeli government during 1953–1955. Clawson, a protégé of John D. Black and Mordecai Ezekiel, criticized the government for ignoring economic considerations, and stated that Israel’s national goals – defense, Negev Desert irrigation, immigrant absorption via new agricultural settlements, and economic independence – were mutually contradictory. His major recommendations were to improve the realism of Israel’s agricultural plan; end expensive Negev irrigation; enlarge irrigated farms eightfold; freeze new settlements until the number of semi-developed settlements falls from 300 to 100; and limit new Negev settlements to 10 over 5–7 years. Thus, Clawson ignored political feasibility and made value judgments. Minister of Finance Levi Eshkol and Minister of Agriculture Peretz Naphtali rejected Clawson’s recommendations because they ignored Israel’s national goals. By September 1954, Clawson shifted towards greater pragmatism: He acknowledged that foreign advisors should not question the national goals or make value judgments, and sought common ground with the Ministry of Agriculture. At his initiative, he wrote Israel Agriculture 1953/54 in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture. Israel Agriculture was a consensus document: Clawson eschewed recommendations and accepted that the government might prioritize non-economic goals. In proposing Israel Agriculture, Clawson made a pragmatic decision to relinquish some independence for (potentially) greater influence. Ultimately, Clawson was largely unsuccessful as an advisor. Clawson’s failure was part of a general pattern: Over 1950–1985, the Israeli government always rejected foreign advisors’ recommendations unless it was facing a severe crisis.