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The purpose of this paper is to explore the impact of supply capacity constraint, water delivery loss and fairness concern on the operational decisions/efficiency of the IBWT supply chain under the random precipitation.

Two game-theoretic decision models for the IBWT supply chain coordination considering water delivery loss without/with fairness concern under the supply capacity constraint and random precipitation are developed, analyzed and compared. On this basis, the corresponding numerical analyses are conducted and compared to derive the corresponding management insights and policy implications.

The research results indicate that the two-part tariff contract could effectively coordinate the IBWT supply chain and achieve operational performance improvement; the binding supply capacity constraint makes the water capacity to be allocated among IBWT distributors in accordance with fair shortage allocation rule and reduces the profit (or utility) of the IBWT supply chain and its members; the existence of fairness concern reduces the utility of the IBWT supply chain and its members; a lower precipitation utilization factor in the case with non-binding capacity constraint is beneficial for improving the profit/utility of the IBWT supply chain while a higher precipitation utilization factor in the case with binding capacity constraint is beneficial for improving the profit/utility of the IBWT supply chain; and reducing the water delivery loss rate, the mainline transfer cost, the branch-line transfer cost, the holding cost and the shortage cost and setting a higher retail price are beneficial for improving the profit/utility of the IBWT supply chain.

Two innovative coordination decision models under random precipitation are developed, analyzed and compared through game-theoretic approaches to investigate the impact of supply capacity constraint, water delivery loss and fairness concern on the operational decisions/efficiency of the IBWT supply chain, which have enhanced the optimization decision theory for the operations management of IBWT projects and provided a better decision support for the IBWT stakeholders to make better operations strategies.

Although the impact of carbon emissions regulations is evident to upstream automakers, their influence on downstream B2C car-sharing platforms remains unclear. This article reveals the influence of carbon emission regulations on the performance of supply chain members. In particular, we focused on the decision of B2C car-sharing platforms.

We develop a three-stage dynamic game model consisting of an automaker, a B2C car-sharing platform and consumers.

The carbon emission cap has a critical threshold. Above this threshold, the regulation is ineffective for the platform’s operating model. Below it, the regulation affects the platform, moderated by customers' green awareness. The threshold initially decreases (weakly) and then increases in awareness. Effective caps reduce profits for the manufacturer, B2C car-sharing platform and supply chain, while ineffective caps see higher profits with increased awareness.

Firstly, this paper explores the impact of carbon emission caps on the operational strategies of B2C car-sharing platforms within the sharing economy, complementing existing research. Secondly, it identifies conditions where stricter caps prompt B2C car-sharing platforms to adjust their operational models and offers fresh insights for managers and departments responsible for carbon emission policy formulation. Thirdly, the study uncovers how carbon emission caps affect the performance of supply chain members, providing crucial managerial insights for sustainable operations.

This study aims to investigate whether the contract manufacturer (CM) should take the first-mover advantage in the end-product without supplying core components to the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) immediately, or should fully squeeze the benefit of the learning effect through an amplified production quantity by letting the OEM enter the end-product market early.

The authors propose a two-period model for a supply chain consisting of a CM and an OEM where the CM has four alternative entry strategies concerning it competition to the OEM in the end-product market. For each strategy, the authors derive the equilibrium solutions of the two firms using a backward approach. Comparison leads to the CM’s final choices among the four strategies.

For both CM and OEM, the monopoly and the first-entry strategies will be dominated by either the post-entry or the simultaneous-entry strategy, and thus, their preferred strategy is chosen from the latter two. Regarding the two firms choices between the post- and simultaneous-entry strategy, the CM prefers the post-entry strategy when the OEMs brand premium is at a moderate level, whereas the OEM prefers the post-entry strategy when its brand premium is low, and the learning effect can amplify the interval for the CMs adopting the post-entry strategy as well as changes the interval for the OEMs preference related to the two strategies.

This paper is the first one to explore the optimal strategy for a CM to maximize its profit in a co-opetitive supply chain situation with a CM and an OEM. The authors believe that our paper contributes to both literature and the market.

We show that, even with flexible domestic wages, international outsourcing may worsen the welfare of the home country and reduce the profits of all firms. If wages are rigid, outsourcing is welfare-improving if and only if the sum of the “trade creation” effect and the “exploitation effect” exceeds the “trade diversion” effect. A wage subsidy may improve welfare. We also extend the model to a two-period framework. Delaying outsourcing can be gainful because the fixed cost of outsourcing may fall over time. A social planner would choose a different speed of outsourcing than that achieved under laissez-faire.

Embedded options can create asymmetries in information impounded by cash and futures markets, causing errors in price discovery estimation. This paper aims to investigate the impact of embedded location options on measures of price discovery.

Various price discovery metrics are computed using observed futures prices that contain embedded location options and cash prices for Chana. Prices of a futures contract that contains no options using observed futures prices and estimates of location option value are synthesized. The price discovery measures are recomputed using synthetic option-adjusted futures contract prices and cash prices, and changes in these measures are attributed to the impact of the embedded location option.

If the presence of the location option is ignored, futures appear to dominate price discovery. Once the location option is adjusted for, cash markets are found to dominate price discovery.

The lack of complete time-series data from the exchange for multiple commodities allows only limited empirical evidence for generalizing conclusions.

This paper highlights that regulators, exchanges and policymakers in India need to revisit delivery specifications of agricultural commodity futures contracts to enhance their utility from a price discovery perspective.

This work shows that ignoring the presence of embedded options can cause significant errors in price discovery assessment of agricultural futures contracts, particularly in heterogenous cash markets.

Contract Manufacturers (CM, factory) can cultivate factory brand products by imitating Original Equipment Manufacturers' (OEM, brand owner) National Brand products, and compete with OEM through the online retailer, that is, factory encroachment. In practice, few consumers can identify the quality of those two products in the online market. Implementing blockchain technology (BTI) can help all consumers identify product quality but may change the operation decisions and incur implementation costs. This study aims to explore how will the BTI strategies affect participants' operation performance under the factory encroachment and delve into the decisions regarding NB product quality and CM encroachment.

This study constructs a three-level outsourcing supply chain comprising one contract manufacturer (CM, factory), one original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and one online retailer. By utilizing the Stackelberg game, the authors first compared the results between two strategic decisions of BTI and no-BTI by online retailers under the factory encroachment scenario. Then, the NB product quality decision and the CM's encroachment decision are also investigated.

BTI strategy can benefit all participants (triple win), which both occurs in exogenous and endogenous quality cases, and the triple win area will expand (shrink) as the BTI cost decreases (increases). In addition, the OEM will improve product quality to confront competition from the CM, and the OEM may not always benefit from the BTI, it depends on the maturity of the market. Interestingly, BTI could improve the consumer surplus when the proportion of novice consumers is low. Finally, this study also investigates the extended case that CM always encroaches into the market whether the online retailer choose BTI or not, which hurts OEM's profit and decreases the product quality.

This study sheds light on the strategic decisions of online retailers' BTI regarding supply chain members' profits, consumer surplus and social welfare under factory encroachment. It also demonstrates that the BTI strategy, under different quality decisions (endogenous and exogenous), can be more profitable for chain members and consumers.

Improving food security at the household level is very crucial in India as here many people are suffering from persistent hunger and malnutrition. In India, mounting pressure of population, adverse threats of climate change, fragmented land holding, high input cost etc. are very important which prevent to ensure food security. In India, there is malnutrition in all age groups, especially among children. Problem of low birth weight due to undernutrition of mother during pregnancy and underweight of children is very common in the country. The purchasing power of certain section of the society is so low that they cannot access food at the market price. They need the safety net of food subsidy. In India, food problem in the normative sense still continues to exist as millions of poor suffer from persistent hunger and malnutrition. This is the task to which food security system must address itself in future. There are some important factors which can increase yield growth and domestic supply of food substantially. Among these factors education and knowledge regarding improving farm efficiency, provision of an improved agricultural technology to the farmers, delivery of modern farm inputs, technical know-how, institutional credit to the farmers, and crop diversification are very essential to build a huge stock of food grains in India. Educated and trained people can acquire new skills and technologies required for growing agricultural output to meet the domestic demand.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of fairness concerns of the retailer on the pricing policies of the supply chain partners, their individual profits, and the overall performance of a dual-channel supply chain composed of one manufacturer and one retailer. First, the authors model the dual-channel supply chain under retailer’s fairness concern. Second, the authors derive the optimal pricing policies of the channel members. Third, the authors analyze the effects of retailer’s fairness and bargaining power on the pricing strategies and profit functions of the dual-channel supply chain system.

The authors adopt the manufacturer-led Stackelberg game theoretic framework, where the dominant manufacturer’s pricing decisions are based on the retailer’s pricing decision. The paper considers Nash bargaining solution as the fairness reference point to formulate the utility function of the fair-retailer. The paper uses this approach because it endogenously accounts for the competitive power and cooperative contribution of the channel members when they interact.

The authors find that the retailer’s fairness concerns are not always beneficial for its better performance. If the retailer is moderately sensitive towards its fairness, it will positively influence its performance. However, if the fairness concern becomes too high then it will negatively impact the retailer’s performance because it results in customers’ migration towards direct online channel for buying the products. In addition, if the retailer’s fairness concerns are mild, the manufacturer’s prices will decrease in retailer’s bargaining power, which is opposite otherwise.

The authors use Nash bargaining solution model as the fairness reference in the context of dual-channel supply chain, which is comparatively a recent approach and has been used independently from dual-channel supply chain system.

With the global spread of environmental education, environmental awareness is becoming increasingly important in daily life and economic activities. Sustainable development, as the most effective development approach to address global climate change, has gradually become a research hotspot in countries around the world. The authors combine sustainable development with supply chain management and incorporate into the study the objective issue of corporate fairness preferences in real society to explore the pricing and product greenness decision problem of a secondary sustainable supply chain consisting of a manufacturer producing green products and a retailer selling green products. In particular, the authors explore how supply chain decisions change when both the manufacturer and the retailer focus on fairness and how this fairness behavior affects pricing and product greenness decisions in sustainable supply chains.

The authors consider that the manufacturers' greening efforts lead to expanded demand at the retail end. Upstream and downstream firms in the supply chain have preferences for the fairness of transactions. The impact of the fairness behavior of upstream and downstream firms in the supply chain on supply chain decisions is explored by building a Stackelberg game model.

The results of this study show that the fairness concern behavior of manufacturers and retailers in the supply chain has an impact on product greenness, product pricing and corporate profits.

This study on the fairness concern behavior of supply chain firms integrates behavioral economics and supply chain management. First, the authors consider the equilibrium problem of supply chain members in the centralized channel when there are no fairness preferences. Second, the decision problem of firms in the decentralized channel when fairness is considered and when fairness preferences are not considered is explored. The authors compare these three cases to derive the corresponding propositions. Finally, the authors verify the previous conclusions and draw other conclusions using arithmetic analysis.

This special “Anbar Abstracts” issue of the Journal of Product & Brand Management is split into ten sections covering abstracts under the following headings: Marketing strategy; Customer service; Pricing; Promotion; Marketing research; Product management; Channel management; Logistics and distribution; New product development; Purchasing.