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We show that, even with flexible domestic wages, international outsourcing may worsen the welfare of the home country and reduce the profits of all firms. If wages are rigid, outsourcing is welfare-improving if and only if the sum of the “trade creation” effect and the “exploitation effect” exceeds the “trade diversion” effect. A wage subsidy may improve welfare. We also extend the model to a two-period framework. Delaying outsourcing can be gainful because the fixed cost of outsourcing may fall over time. A social planner would choose a different speed of outsourcing than that achieved under laissez-faire.

Improving food security at the household level is very crucial in India as here many people are suffering from persistent hunger and malnutrition. In India, mounting pressure of population, adverse threats of climate change, fragmented land holding, high input cost etc. are very important which prevent to ensure food security. In India, there is malnutrition in all age groups, especially among children. Problem of low birth weight due to undernutrition of mother during pregnancy and underweight of children is very common in the country. The purchasing power of certain section of the society is so low that they cannot access food at the market price. They need the safety net of food subsidy. In India, food problem in the normative sense still continues to exist as millions of poor suffer from persistent hunger and malnutrition. This is the task to which food security system must address itself in future. There are some important factors which can increase yield growth and domestic supply of food substantially. Among these factors education and knowledge regarding improving farm efficiency, provision of an improved agricultural technology to the farmers, delivery of modern farm inputs, technical know-how, institutional credit to the farmers, and crop diversification are very essential to build a huge stock of food grains in India. Educated and trained people can acquire new skills and technologies required for growing agricultural output to meet the domestic demand.

Purpose – This paper investigates competitive bank behaviour in Africa for the period 1999–2008 and further examines the impact of institutional quality and political atmosphere on competitive bank behaviour.

Design/methodology/approach – This study used panel data methodology based on the Panzar–Rosse (1987) design.

Findings – The findings of the study indicates that the nature of banking system in Africa can best be described as monopolistically competitive. Also, our findings endorse the importance of institutional quality and political stability in fostering competitive banking sector. In particular, the rule of law shows positive and significant relationship with competitive bank behaviour. Additionally, the quality of regulations suggests positive association with bank competitive behaviour. With respect to political environment, stable political atmosphere is conducive for promoting competitive banking sector. Improved regulatory quality coupled with reduced level of perception about corruption fosters competitive bank behaviour.

Originality/value – This paper provides useful information relevant to policy makers in the banking sector about the nature of bank competitive behaviour in Africa and the drivers behind the competitive behaviour.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.