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Firms can benefit from designing sales promotion based on the analysis of consumers' physical exercise and purchase data. This study aims to study mobile exercise app data to explore how purchasing a promoted or nonpromoted product affects exercisers’ subsequent exercise and purchase behaviors.

Drawing from the theoretical framework of overjustification effect, this study empirically examines the effects of the purchase of promoted – monetary and nonmonetary – or nonpromoted products on relationships (1) between past and subsequent exercise behaviors and (2) between past exercise and subsequent purchase behaviors. Novel data of one million exercise activities and purchase transactions created by 7,517 mobile exercise app users were collected.

The results reveal that monetary and nonmonetary promotions have a negative effect on overall consumers’ amount of physical exercise but increase heavy exercisers’ exercise amount. In addition, nonmonetary (monetary) promotion has a positive (negative) effect on consumers’ purchase expenditure but has no moderating effect on the exercise–expenditure relationship.

This study provides a theoretical framework explaining how to mitigate the dark side of sales promotions while targeting right exercise consumer segments with the right promotion campaigns.

Trade promotions are manufacturer incentives directed to retailers rather than to consumers, aiming at influencing retailer's sales, prices and merchandising practices. Although they are a growing element in the promotional mix of food manufacturers worldwide, trade promotions often raise concerns about their impacts on performance and coordination in the food supply chain, which in turn affect retail food prices. This paper aims to measure the influence of market power on the outcomes of trade promotions negotiated between food manufacturers and supermarkets.

The paper employs Rangan's conceptual model to develop hypotheses about the links between three dimensions of market power (size, brand and institutional power) and trade promotion budgets and their allocation between discount‐ and performance‐based types. The paper employs trade promotion data collected from 36 supermarkets in the USA to statistically test these links.

The results suggest that brand, size, and institutional power of food manufacturers and retailers affect trade promotion budgets and their allocation among discount‐ and performance‐based types. Food manufacturers have relatively more control over their trade promotion budgets whereas retailers may have more influence on the allocation decisions.

The findings can help food manufacturers and retailers identify institutional, brand and size variables that may help them leverage trade promotion negotiations. The results are relevant to policymakers, in particular for the study of antitrust and performance issues in the food distribution system.