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Two types of opportunism, managerial and competitive, are described. Contractual covenants that control these types of opportunism are used when they are likely to occur, i.e., when there are obstacles to monitoring management behavior and when returns to starting new firms are large. These ideas are subjected to empirical test. The relationship between managers in new firms and venture capitalists is receiving increased attention in the literature (Norton and Tenenbaum 1990; Sahlman, 1988). The determinants and implications of several attributes of these relationships have been examined, including the percentage of a new firm's equity held by venture capitalists, the number of seats on the board controlled by venture capitalists, and the post‐funding activities of venture capitalists (e.g., helping the new firm raise additional capital, contacting customers, replacing management) (Barney, Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel, 1989). While our understanding of the relationship between managers in new firms and venture capitalists is growing, one particularly important component of that relationship has yet to receive significant attention in the literature: the details of the formal contractual arrangement between managers in a new firm and venture capitalists. Often called the “terms and conditions” of the relationship between managers and venture capitalists, these contractual details specify the rights and obligations of both managers and venture capitalists throughout their entire relationship in a series of covenants (Fiet, 1991). Among other items, contractual covenants can specify limits on capital expenditures, limits on managerial salaries, limitations on raising additional outside capital, technology non‐disclosure agreements, and conditions for forcing a change in managing and liquidating the deal. The purpose of this paper is to understand the determinants of the formal contractual arrangements between managers in new firms and venture capitalists.

Policymakers have long supported the development of venture capital markets on the basis that venture capital fills a perceived gap in the availability of early stage seed capital funding for new technology-based firms (NTBFs).¹ Support from policymakers, however, has not been matched by academic research on NTBF financing. This is a major concern because NTBF financing is not well understood. The theoretical focus of this chapter is the life cycle or stage model of financing, which has proved the dominate paradigm in the analysis of financing in NTBFs. It is particularly relevant to this study, as the stage model is explicitly endorsed by venture capitalists who structure deals in phases in order to effectively monitor the investee firm's progress (Sahlman, 1990).

The purpose of this paper is to examine how entrepreneurship culture affects start-up and venture capital co-evolution during the early evolution of an entrepreneurial ecosystem (EE) and its ability to foster the emergence of ambitious entrepreneurship as an outcome of its activity. Unlike studies that capture entrepreneurship culture at the national level, this study focusses specifically on the culture of venture capital-financed entrepreneurship and understanding its implications to the development of venture capital markets and successful firm-level outcomes within ecosystems.

Relying on EE and organisational imprinting theory, this study specifies characteristics of venture capital-financed entrepreneurship of Silicon Valley to illustrate the American way of building start-ups and examine whether they have as imprints affected to the entrepreneurship culture and start-up and venture capital co-evolution in Finland during the early evolution of its EE between 1980 and 1997.

The results illustrate venture capital-financed entrepreneurship culture as a specific example of entrepreneurship culture beneath the national level that can vary across geographies like the findings concerning Finland demonstrate. The findings show that this specific culture matters through having an impact on the structural evolution and performance of EEs and on the ways how they deliver or fail to deliver benefits to entrepreneurs.

The results show that venture capital-financed entrepreneurship and the emergence of success stories as outcomes of start-up and venture capital co-evolution within an EE are connected to a specific type of entrepreneurship culture. This paper also contributes to the literature by connecting the fundamentals of organisational imprinting to EE research.

The purpose of this article is to investigate how ownership structure, especially family and/or venture‐capital involvement, as well as entrepreneurial activities, defined as strategic change and renewal, help explain the involvement of independent members on boards of directors. The CEOs of 2,455 small and medium‐sized, private enterprises from practically all industries were contacted in a telephone survey, resulting in an exceptionally high response rate. The findings reveal that family firms are more reluctant to involve independent directors on their boards than non‐family firms, that presence of venture capitalists increases the frequency of independent board members and that ownership has an impact on board roles. The results do not support the hypothesised relationship that independent directors enhance entrepreneurial activities. One implication of our study is that the often‐argued‐for strategic contribution of outsiders to the boards in family firms may be overemphasised. Another implication is that family firms that choose to acquire additional capital should be aware that this could result in a change in the board composition and the loss of control of the business. However, new and external owners' inclusion on the board seems to be negotiable since there are also venture capitalists that do not insist on board representation.

The existing literature on venture capitalists’ (VCs’) exits provides insufficient evidence regarding factors affecting the exit decision. This study aims to identify these factors and examine how VC firms do ranking or prioritize these factors.

The study is based on primary data. The qualitative analysis was done to develop the survey instrument. Fuzzy analytical hierarchical process, which is a popular method of multi-criteria decision modeling, is used to identify or rank the determinants of exit strategy by venture capital firms in India.

Broadly, eight determinants of exit strategy are ranked by VCs. A total of 33 statements describe these eight determinants. The results are analyzed on the basis of four measures of VCs’ profile, i.e. age of VC firm, number of start-ups in portfolios, type of investment and amount of investment.

The survey instrument needs to be validated with a larger sample size and other financial backers than VCs.

The study has direct managerial implication for VC firms as it provides useful information regarding the determinants of exit strategy by VC firms in India. These findings can provide necessary information to other financial backers too, viz., angel investors, banks, non-banking financial institutions and other individual and syndicated set-ups providing funding to start-ups.

The current research is unique as no prior study has explored the determinants of VCs exit strategy and prioritizing these determinants.

This study explores the potential benefits and costs of bank entry into venture capital investing. Data are obtained from a survey of banking organizations regarding their perceptions of the effects of such venture capital investing. Also, evidence on the portfolio diversification effects of such investments is provided using stock price data. These data are consistent with the existence of net benefits from bank entry into this industry. The implications for entrepreneurs are also discussed. Venture capital firms (professionally managed organizational investors) and business angels (private individual investors) invest in new and growing businesses. Their aim is to maximize their risk‐adjusted return on investment through the ex ante assessment of risk and the ex post monitoring of their client entrepreneurs. Because they invest in businesses that are inherently newer and smaller, often without substantial collateral, their deals are riskier than the loan packages that are funded by commercial banks. However, by investing in risk‐ reducing information and sharing it among coinvestors, these venture capitalists often generate returns that are the envy of many bankers. Many venture capitalists expect to earn more than 30% annually on their investments. At a time when banks have been experiencing earning problems, particularly those located in the West and Southwest, there are at least four possible benefits that could come to them and also to entrepreneurs from the entrance of banking organizations into venture capital financing. First, if banks were able to manage the increased risk, they might be successful in improving their earnings. The increased earnings would contribute to the elimination of the capital deficiency facing the banking industry. Second, if they funded entrepreneurs, the total supply of venture capital would increase and it could become much easier to locate seed money. Third, participation by banks would also contribute to the elimination of the widely reported capital gap that may exist for funding new ventures. Fourth, in the long run, if they provided venture capital, they might find that they were providing start‐up financing for future customers, customers that would not otherwise exist. This study contemplates a future role for commercial banks as a potentially huge source of funding for new ventures. It explores the possibility that under certain conditions commercial banks may be able to effectively manage the greater risk associated with venture capital investing. It concentrates on the potential effects of bank entry into venture financing on the risk of failure of the bank, a concern that underlies the existing prohibition for U.S. banks. The proposal to allow U.S. commercial banking organizations to enter the arena of venture capital investments may seem somewhat questionable in a period of massive numbers of bank failures. Yet there are reasons to believe that the potential effects of these activities may not be risk‐increasing as often argued and may, under certain circumstances, even be risk‐reducing. To understand this view, consider the reaction of commercial banks to the changes in their external environment that accompanied financial deregulation during the 1980's. The elimination of deposit rate ceilings that accompanied deregulation increased sharply the cost of bank funds. Banking organizations reacted to that increase in costs by reaching for higher‐risk loans. But, in the United States, these banks were unable through regulatory and market constraints to obtain complete compensation for the increased risk. If these banks had been able to take equity positions in venture capital investments, the upside potential from these commitments of funds to more risky undertakings could be realized, a potential that is impossible with the conventional loan contract. If commercial banks become major players in the market for venture capital, it seems likely that they will rely upon different strategies for controlling risk than those used by venture capital firms and business angels. Basic differences in their approaches to risk management could be a reflection of their costs of access to risk‐reducing information, their visibility in the community, and their tendencies to coinvest with similar types of investors. This study examines the possibility that the size of a bank will largely determine whether it views venture capital investing as a prudent means of doing business. This expectation is based on the assumption that the larger a bank, the more likely it will be to hold a portfolio of diversified venture capital investment. Thus, we would expect to find greater enthusiasm for venture capital investing among large banks than among small banks. If commercial banks were to be permitted to make venture capital investments in the United States, such a move could be so influential that no entity that depends upon this market for its survival would be unaffected. Business angels and venture capital firms could be overshadowed by the resources that banks would have at their disposal, while entrepreneurs and public policy makers would find it difficult to ever again suggest that there was insufficient capital available to fund deserving ventures. This study reviews the roles of venture capital firms and business angels and compares them to the role that could be played by banks. It also compares the perceptions of large bankers (assets >$1 billion) and small bankers (assets <$1 billion) regarding their institution's competence in managing different types of risk. This research will first examine how venture capital firms and business angels emphasize managing different types of risk. Hypotheses related to bank strategies for reducing venture capital risk will be proposed and tested. Finally, implications for entrepreneurs and public policy makers will be discussed.

The purpose of this paper is to identify the key characteristics of the post‐investment relationship between the venture capital firm and its investee companies.

The research is a case study of a major UK venture capital firm using qualitative research to determine the key characteristics of the post‐investment relationship. The study is based on interviews with parties on both sides of the relationship.

While the results reflect the findings of the entrepreneurship and venture capital literature they also point to the importance of network growth and development for organizational learning in the venture capital industry, professionalization of investee firms and as a context in which the selection of the entrepreneur and the post investment relationship are set.

The research has the limitation of most case studies that the results cannot readily be generalized, in this case to the wider population of venture capital firms. Confidentiality issues also limited the extent to which a longitudinal study could be conducted.

A better understanding of the post‐investment relationship can inform entrepreneurs in their pitch for funds and in their anticipation of the post investment relationship. This understanding can also assist venture capital firms in the management of this relationship.

The case study uses data from rare access to a venture capital firm. It also differs by interviewing both parties to the post‐investment relationship, that is venture capitalist and investee firm.

The purpose of this paper is to focus on the investigation of the venture capital investment process in the emerging markets of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), including Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, and Russia. The study aims to describe the mechanics by which venture capital firms operating in the CEE region process deals.

The paper is based on a two‐phase interview interaction process with venture capitalists operating in the CEE region. In the first semi‐structured (exploratory) phase of the study, 14 venture capitalists agreed to participate in one‐hour interview and aimed at discussing their venture capital process. In the second phase of the study (confirmatory), 24 venture capital firms commented on the actual fit of the proposed nine‐stage model into their past investments.

The study has two conclusions. Firstly, the study confirms the existence of a nine‐stage venture capital investment model, comprised of deal origination, initial screening, feedback from the investment committee and due diligence Phase I, feedback from the investment committee (due diligence Phase I), pre‐approval completions, formal approvals and due diligence Phase II, deal completion, monitoring, and exit. Secondly, the proposed model defines the venture capital process in terms of three channels of activity: document channel, information channel, and decision channel.

The study is important for at least four reasons. Firstly, the study focuses on the investigation of the entire venture capital process. Previous research in the area focuses on some specific facets of the venture capital process. Secondly, the paper investigates the connection between decision‐making, information gathering and written communication within a venture capital fund. Thirdly, the study focuses on the most recent period of development of the CEE industry. Many venture capital firms only recently crystallized their venture capital process. Lastly, the study proposes areas of further research for academics and makes suggestions for practitioners.

This study seeks to examine the peculiarities of the venture capital market in China and seeks to compare it with Western markets.

The paper provides insights based on both the practitioner and academic literature in the field.

It is noted that different cultural norms, corporate governance structures, a lack of appropriate exit strategies, and governmental intervention are important factors that set the markets apart and should be taken into consideration when making venture capital investments in China.

The paper should be of interest to practitioners considering investing in China and to academics doing research in this area.

The paper is to the best of the authors' knowledge the first to provide a detailed and comprehensive review of the Chinese venture capital market.