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This chapter examines the current state of crypto exchange-traded funds (ETFs). It focuses on issues preventing wider implementation and specific products. ETFs have become a…
Abstract
This chapter examines the current state of crypto exchange-traded funds (ETFs). It focuses on issues preventing wider implementation and specific products. ETFs have become a popular investment vehicle that investors use to help achieve their long-term goals. A recurring theme is that regulators protect individual investors from direct exposure to cryptocurrency, which many view as highly speculative investments. Pressure from institutions and investors for a bitcoin-based ETF made progress in 2021 when Proshares, an ETF specialized investment company, debuted the first-ever bitcoin futures ETF in the United States. This event is the first-time investors could buy a fund on the New York Stock Exchange that tracks derivative futures contracts of bitcoin. This occurrence pushed this digital asset’s spot price to all-time highs, serving as a breakthrough in cryptocurrency history.
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Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and…
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Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.
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