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This chapter examines the current state of crypto exchange-traded funds (ETFs). It focuses on issues preventing wider implementation and specific products. ETFs have become a popular investment vehicle that investors use to help achieve their long-term goals. A recurring theme is that regulators protect individual investors from direct exposure to cryptocurrency, which many view as highly speculative investments. Pressure from institutions and investors for a bitcoin-based ETF made progress in 2021 when Proshares, an ETF specialized investment company, debuted the first-ever bitcoin futures ETF in the United States. This event is the first-time investors could buy a fund on the New York Stock Exchange that tracks derivative futures contracts of bitcoin. This occurrence pushed this digital asset’s spot price to all-time highs, serving as a breakthrough in cryptocurrency history.

Many jurisdictions fine illegal cartels using penalty guidelines that presume an arbitrary 10% overcharge. This article surveys more than 700 published economic studies and judicial decisions that contain 2,041 quantitative estimates of overcharges of hard-core cartels. The primary findings are: (1) the median average long-run overcharge for all types of cartels over all time periods is 23.0%; (2) the mean average is at least 49%; (3) overcharges reached their zenith in 1891–1945 and have trended downward ever since; (4) 6% of the cartel episodes are zero; (5) median overcharges of international-membership cartels are 38% higher than those of domestic cartels; (6) convicted cartels are on average 19% more effective at raising prices as unpunished cartels; (7) bid-rigging conduct displays 25% lower markups than price-fixing cartels; (8) contemporary cartels targeted by class actions have higher overcharges; and (9) when cartels operate at peak effectiveness, price changes are 60–80% higher than the whole episode. Historical penalty guidelines aimed at optimally deterring cartels are likely to be too low.

After the end of World War II, Switzerland became a key hub for international commodity traders, even though most of the commodities they were dealing in were sourced from outside of Switzerland and were not meant for Swiss producers, refiners or consumers. The main aim of this chapter is to analyze why Switzerland became the centre for international commodity trading in the Western world. The chapter will especially focus on the period from the 1950s to the end of the 1980s. Given that commodity trading companies throughout history have been notoriously closed to external scrutiny, the chapter by need is mainly based on publicly available material. The chapter utilizes the concept of collective entrepreneurship as an analytical framework to situate the development.