Search results

Questions whether the planned European Monetary Union is capable of solving the social economic challenges of our time. Examines the economic and financial history of modern times; explains the formulation of the impossibility theorem in practice, suggesting the equation of unified knowledge as a solution to the problem of economic calculation; and constructs a plan for a free and stable European Monetary and Economic Union. Looks at the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) questioning its ability to solve the basic problems of the member states of the European Union. Addresses a number of issues contained within the Treaty: acceptable socially beneficial goals; unacceptable socially harmful, adverse anti‐equilibrium means, policies, reforms and regulations; and the phenomenon of physics’ ‘chain reaction’ within economics. Gives a synopsis of anti‐equilibrium elements and forces in the Treaty of Maastricht, debating what needs to be done to ensure that European Monetary and Economic Union can become an immediate and lasting success.

The Maastricht process sets up economic and fiscal criteria that member states of the European Union are expected to meet in the preparation for and when having joined the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). According to EMU rules, the Commission monitors the fiscal behavior of the participants but member states themselves-as members of the Council of Ministers-finally vote on the Commission recommendations. It is therefore questionable whether these criteria actually constrain member states from running excessive deficits. This paper adopts a constitutionalist perspective to address this question by asking how member states will interpret or even change the fiscal rules of the EMU in the future. Council decision-making in the area of EMU politics is analyzed using data on the fiscal positions of old and new member states of the European Union. The findings suggest that the recent enlargement will shift policy outcomes, but, if compared to the situation at the time of the signing of the Maastricht treaty, the effect is rather marginal.

Most recent publications on lobbying at the European Union (EU) level question the position and the role of established Euro‐groups or interest groups which represent business interests. These publications are based on the situation at the time of the Maastricht Treaty. This paper underlines the changing environment since Maastricht. Focusing on the significant changes in the Treaty of Amsterdam, a case is presented for undertaking EU lobbying in a different manner.

This paper aims to investigate the ideological discourse in the EU's self-presentation, which will provide a new standpoint for scholars interested in analyzing the EU's foreign policy.

To understand how the EU perceives itself, the research investigates the Preamble of the Treaty of the European Union (Maastricht Treaty 1992) and its consolidated versions of 1997, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2010 and 2016. Investigation of the consolidated versions of the Maastricht treaty is important to understand how the Union came to develop the image of the Self throughout time and how the international context had affected EU’s self-image. The preambles are analyzed using the socio-cognitive approach to critical discourse analysis to examine the ideological discourse of self-presentation.

It can be concluded that the discourse used in the preamble reflects an ideological discourse used by the EU to present itself in positive ways. Such an ideological discourse emphasizes the differentiation between the in-group and out-group identification. Thus, it can suggest some implications that the EU holds a negative portray of the “Other” who do not hold the same characteristics, activities, goals, norms and values.

Understanding the possibility of such an ideological discourse can help researchers to adopt a new standpoint to analyze the EU’s foreign policy, which can help in providing new perspective for academic scholarly work.

EU social policy is perhaps the most controversial aspect of European integration yet, despite all the political clashes on the matter, concepts like “social Europe” or “social dimension” remain ill‐defined and imprecise terms. Intends to outline and clarify in detail the debate about whether or not the European Union should have competence with regard to labour market affairs. A key message is that social policy has been controversial because it has become embroiled in the debate about the future political direction of the EU. In particular, three contrasting political models –symbiotic integration, integrative federalism and neo‐liberalism – have been put forward as organizing principles for the EU and each has a coherent view of what form social policy should take at the European level. It is the clash between these three models that has caused EU social policy to be so contestable and intractable.

Financial sustainability requires governments to run sufficiently large primary surpluses going forward to cover the cost of servicing its debt budgets to balance in the long run. In democracies, politicians who strive for reelection often tend to systematically violate this tenet. This paper discusses two types of “anchors” that may be used to cope with this problem by limiting the room for new and excessive public debt. First, we analyze national constitutional safeguards on the basis of the “debt brake” in Switzerland and Germany. Second, we discuss international institutions to maintain financial discipline, referring to the Maastricht-criteria. These anchors are designed to allow policymakers to commit to policies that provide long term financial stability and sustainability of public finances. However, as the recent crises have shown, the problem of time inconsistency in policy making remains, especially when anchors are weak. Therefore, the paper discusses the circumstances under which institutional anchors may help to restrict politician behavior to promote sustainability of public finances. We conclude by indentifying three conditions required for the proper functioning of collective anchors in the context of public finances.

Discusses the difficulties that lie in the way of moves towards monetary union in the European Community: convergence criteria, attitudes towards various forms of possible political union, German unification, the location and independence of an independent European Central Bank, “cohesion” provisions in the Maastricht Treaty, and the Delors Budget.

The paper aims to examine favor and non‐regression clauses, appearing ‐ in several occasions jointly ‐ in European Community social directives, in order to underline the differences in their nature, function and effects on Member States’ legislation, also considering that the favour clause is now present in the article 137 of the Treaty.

Outlines social dialogue by providing a definition and background to its introduction and covers its progress to date. Critically examines the social dialogue resulting in the European collective agreement, the instrument for implementing directives. Concludes with the Collective agreement’s place in formulating European Law. Suggests the integration of the Maastricht Treaty into the body of the Treaty of Amsterdam forms a basis for solid advances in social policy.