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My study examines the pay-for-performance relationship surrounding executive compensation in higher education. There has been much criticism of the rising levels of university presidential pay, particularly in the public sector, citing it is pay without performance. Public colleges and universities are funded by taxpayers; therefore, their expenditures are even more heavily scrutinized than private institutions. Many feel that university executives are overpaid and are not delivering a return in the form of enhanced institutional performance to their investors, the public. Growing student debt only adds intensity to the outcry against heightened compensation. Proponents of the increasing pay levels contend that the ever-changing role of the university president and competition in the marketplace for talent warrants such compensation. Using data obtained from The Chronicle of Higher Education and Integrated Postsecondary Education System websites, I find a highly significant and positive relationship between compensation for executives at four-year public institutions and both the levels of university endowment and enrollment. These results support the pay-for-performance debate. In contrast, results for other performance measures, scholarships and graduation rates, do not support the debate. My study contributes to the literature examining pay-for-performance in higher education with an empirical analysis examining the institutional determinants of executive compensation for public colleges and universities.

In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.

Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions.

Introduction Consider a hi‐fi loudspeaker manufacturing company acquired on the brink of insolvency by an American multinational. The new owners discover with growing concern that the product range is obsolete, that manufacturing facilities are totally inadequate and that there is a complete absence of any real management substance or structure. They decide on the need to relocate urgently so as to provide continuity of supply at the very high — a market about to shrink at a rate unprecedented in its history.

“GIVE a dog a bad name and hang him,” is an aphorism which has been accepted for many years. But, like many other household words, it is not always true. Even if it were, the dog to be operated upon would probably prefer a gala day at his Tyburn Tree to being executed in an obscure back yard.

Nobody concerned with political economy can neglect the history of economic doctrines. Structural changes in the economy and society influence economic thinking and, conversely, innovative thought structures and attitudes have almost always forced economic institutions and modes of behaviour to adjust. We learn from the history of economic doctrines how a particular theory emerged and whether, and in which environment, it could take root. We can see how a school evolves out of a common methodological perception and similar techniques of analysis, and how it has to establish itself. The interaction between unresolved problems on the one hand, and the search for better solutions or explanations on the other, leads to a change in paradigma and to the formation of new lines of reasoning. As long as the real world is subject to progress and change scientific search for explanation must out of necessity continue.