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Cyber threats present constantly evolving and unique challenges to national security professionals at all levels of government. Public and private sector entities also face a constant stream of cyberattacks through varied methods by actors with myriad motivations. These threats are not expected to diminish in the near future. As a result, homeland security and national security professionals at all levels of government must understand the unique motivations and capabilities of malicious cyber actors in order to better protect against and respond to cyberattacks. This chapter outlines the most common cyberattacks; explains the motivations behind these attacks; and describes the federal, state, and local efforts to address these threats.

Sustainable development and the enhancement of justice and security globally are predicated on the existence of sufficient and appropriately deployed assets. Mindful of this, and of the misuse of both public and private wealth, UN Sustainable Development Goal 16.4 (SDG 16.4) seeks to ‘…significantly reduce illicit financial … flows’. This chapter critiques how this aim of SDG 16.4 has been operationalised. We argue that the choice and placement of the term ‘illicit’ is crucial: it can relate to the finances, the flows, or both, as well as to the people involved, as facilitators or protagonists, and is expansive enough to encompass criminal, unlawful and ostensibly legal but illegitimate or harmful assets, acts and actors. Moreover, this chapter explores why the movement of assets is significant, within and between jurisdictions, and how these transfers and transactions impact on sustainable development and can worsen inequalities. Our attention is on the conceptualisation, measurement and operationalisation of illicit financial flows (IFFs) in particular and the corresponding implications for available policy responses in the form of situational interventions as a more plausible route to understanding and reducing IFFs in the context of promoting SDG 16.4.

The global Islamic financial landscape is changing with rapid advances in technology. The increasingly tech-savvy demography is presenting both opportunities and challenges to the industry. With the advances in e-finance and mobile technologies, financial technology (Fintech) innovations emerged by combining the e-finance, Internet, social networking services, social media, artificial intelligence (AI) and big data analytics. Fintech promises to reshape the Islamic financial landscape by improving processes’ efficiencies, cost-effectiveness, increased distribution, Sharīʿah compliance and financial inclusion. As far as the Islamic fund management industry is concerned, AI seems to be the keyword. Islamic fund managers have recently started to incorporate AI and big data analytics into their strategy in the process of making accurate decisions based on facts and figures, which eliminates any biases and personal intuition. This disruption in status quo is raising new issues, new concerns and new exciting opportunities. While disruption may carry negative connotations, the industry players have been embracing the innovation and potential revolution the technology could offer. Thus, the objective of this chapter is to discuss legal aspects of Fintech and its impact on the Islamic fund management industry in Malaysia. This chapter introduces a historical overview of Fintech and its evolution in the Islamic fund management industry. This chapter further provides an overview of the legal and regulatory aspects of Fintech with regards to the industry. Finally, legal issues and challenges are identified and discussed. Being a legal research, this chapter adopts a qualitative method by analysing the relevant literatures on the subject. This chapter is expected to provide an insight into the application of Fintech and its impact on the Islamic fund management industry in Malaysia.

There is an evolving literature on criminal entrepreneurship which situates it as a sub-topic of the organised crime literature and either mythologies and elevates the criminal entrepreneur to Mafioso status or ascribes it to being an activity carried out by criminal cartels; or else it trivialises and minimises it as being ‘White-Collar Criminality’. In reality, entrepreneurship pervades everyday criminal life as it pervades the everyday practices of policing. In this chapter, the author acknowledges the existence of a ‘Crimino-Entrepreneurial Interface’ populated by a cast of criminal actors including the ubiquitous ‘Businessman Gangster’. These criminally entrepreneurial actors operate within a specific milieu or ‘Enterprise Model of Crime’ and operate alongside the legitimate ‘Entrepreneurial Business Community’. Within the two conjoined systems, there is a routine exchange of interactions either parasitical or symbiotic and these coalesce to form an ecosystem of enterprise crime in which it is not only the ubiquitous criminal entrepreneur who is present but a veritable cast of entrepreneurially motivated criminal actors. As well as the established business community there is a parallel, alternative community which is situated in the so-called ‘Criminal Areas’ where the traditional criminal fraternity carry out their nefarious entrepreneurial activities. Within such areas, an underclass exists which provides the criminal workforce for organised crime. The traditional criminal ecosystem is the natural habitat for the police, and it is around this activity that police are traditionally organised. A perpetual cycle of crime is set up which requires policing, but this leaves an unpoliced void which the entrepreneurial criminals exploit. It is necessary to understand the criminal places and spaces exploited by Organised Crime and what roles other criminal actors and facilitators play in the enterprise model. It is also necessary to understand the so-called ‘Perverse Model of Policing’ which distorts and magnifies the true scale of the problem and to appreciate how Serious and Organised Crime corrupt and infiltrate the legitimate ‘upperworld’ before one can understand the true scale of entrepreneurialism in policing and criminal contexts.

This chapter discusses the special case of extractive industries in relation to susceptibility to corruption, especially in states with weak institutional and governance structures. The systemic nature of this corruption is shown in a vicious cycle of extractive resource dependency and corruption which reinforce each other. The chapter then concentrates on the supply side of corruption, and the role of the private sector with domestic and foreign natural resources companies feeding into systemic corruption. Corruption is underpinned by a high demand, high prices for extractive resources scenario, and mitigated by a low demand, low prices scenario. Transparency oriented, anticorruption measures may not be effective in their own right, but a low demand, low prices scenario could provide an opening for such measures to take root, with accompanying benefits to the citizens of resource rich states and their environment. This suggests taking a contingency approach to dealing with corruption.

This chapter evaluates the effectiveness of the implementation or enforcement of the Anticorruption Law 1971 of the authoritarian New Order regime in combating corruption in the public sector. Thus, the central research question that will be investigated and answered in this chapter is to what extent and for what reasons had the implementation or enforcement of the Anticorruption Law 1971 failed or been ineffective, to some degree, in achieving its legally mandated objective?

This chapter analyzes the early post-transition privatization and enterprise reform efforts of three major countries: Poland, Czechoslovakia (subsequently the Czech Republic), and the Soviet Union (subsequently Russia). For each, it discusses the prevailing ideologies of key decision makers and their external advisors prior to and during the transition process, the initial conditions faced by reformers and advisors, the policy frameworks that evolved, the results achieved, the mistakes made, and the opportunities missed. The ultimate conclusion is that while privatization could have and probably should have been done better, it nonetheless had to be done. The Czech Republic and Russia, and others in the region, are better off after the flawed privatizations they carried out than they would have been had they avoided or delayed divestiture. Poland, which did quite well at first in the absence of mass and rapid privatization, now finds itself burdened with a number of expensive and unproductive state firms. This chapter shows how and why these outcomes came about, and discusses the role of external advisors in the process.