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The intent of this paper is to provide an overview of the principal provisions of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (the ‘Act’),1 which became law in the USA on 26th November, 2002, and the practical effects which the Act has had on the state of terrorism insurance coverage as it had evolved between 11th September, 2001 and the passage of the Act. The Act voids some of the exclusions which had made their way into insurance policies (particularly post‐9/11) relating to losses from certain ‘acts of terrorism’ (as defined by the Act) and requires insurers meeting certain criteria to ‘make available’ terrorism insurance coverage to their insureds. The Act also establishes a temporary federal reinsurance programme which provides a system of shared public and private compensation for insured losses resulting from certain certified acts of terrorism. From the standpoint of the average insured, however, the practical impact of the Act has been far less dramatic than may appear on the face of it. As The Department of the Treasury explained in its Final Rule,2 one of the main purposes of the Act was to address market disruptions that resulted in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the USA and to ensure the availability and affordability of property and casualty insurance for certain risks associated with acts of terrorism. In addition, the Act was designed to provide a transitional period for the private insurance markets to stabilise, thereby allowing insurance companies to resume pricing terrorism insurance coverage. The Act also sought to build capacity in the insurance industry to absorb any future losses, while preserving insurance regulation and consumer protections in the individual states.

The US insurance industry has long faced the spectrum of large unexpected losses from natural catastrophes such as hurricanes and earthquakes. However, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack clearly demonstrated a new form of catastrophic risk of man‐made origin. The damages in property and life are now well known as estimates of insured losses deriving from this event range from $40 to $54 billion. The 9/11 terrorist attacks renewed the capacity problem faced the insurance industry in the underwriting of large catastrophic risk. In that regard, this paper explores the feasibility of capital market alternatives to the conventional insurance mechanism, and analyses whether the capital market could provide extra capacity to absorb terrorism risk.

The 11th September terrorist attacks on America continue to affect the corporate real estate industry, and this paper is intended to address a number of those ongoing effects. It first discusses property insurance coverage in general and then proceeds to analyse whether damage from acts of terrorism is covered under pre‐11th September and post‐11th September property insurance polices. It also addresses the current status of proposed US Government intervention as a terrorism insurance backstop. It then describes the strategies which certain clients located within the areas directly affected by the terrorist attacks implemented in order to be able to gain immediate access to alternative space. Finally it examines selected lease clauses to which landlords and tenants should pay closer attention in light of the terrorist attacks, including operating expense provisions, force majeure provisions, waiver of subrogation provisions, use prohibitions and alteration provisions.

Traditionally, terrorism risk has been priced based exclusively on the relationship between supply and demand in the insurance market, with no basis in actuarial principles. This article discusses how the tragic events of September 11, 2001, have irrevocably changed the market for terrorism insurance, since terrorism has become a U.S. catastrophe risk. The author states that since insurers seek to quantify risk distributed over several months (versus a period of only a few days), quantitative assessment of terrorism risk may be achievable. The article proceeds to address the challenge of quantifying terrorism risk, and ultimately suggests that developing quantitative terrorism risk models may provide a foundation for securitizing and trading terrorism risk. The author introduces three examples of potential alternative risk transfer instruments for terrorism risk: 1) a catastrophe bond triggered by workers' compensation claims from extreme terrorism‐related events; 2) a catastrophe bond to cover life insurers from losses related to an attack employing a weapon of mass destruction; and 3) a contingent financing instrument triggered by a terrorism event whose natural buyers are financial short‐sellers.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the current legal framework on money laundering control in the insurance sector. Essentially, this examination is premised on the interrogation of whether it is still appropriate for Mauritius to apply such stringent, opaque and unyielding Anti-Money Laundering/Combating Financing of Terrorism norms and rules on general insurance when developed nations such as the UK and Singapore have done away with them for a more effective combat against money laundering. It would also be assessed why the financial services commission (FSC) is not able to draw inspiration from its British and Singaporean counterparts in fighting money laundering more effectively.

This paper uses the doctrinal legal research methodology which is colloquially described as “black-letter law” approach. It is backed up by a contextual legal analysis that is based on an analysis of relevant legal provisions. It relies ground experience from the insurance industry through the experience of the authors. A comparative approach is used with Singapore and the UK as case studies given that there are significant commonalities to the Mauritian jurisdiction as well as useful differences.

It is observed that a move towards a de-regulation of the legal framework on money laundering in the insurance sector with a more relaxed approach is more effective for the Mauritian insurance sector. Evidence is drawn from the Singaporean and British models. A re-structuring of the FSC of Mauritius is also warranted for such an approach to be adopted.

This paper is among the first academic contribution that proposes a de-regulation and the adoption of a relaxed approach of and by the Mauritian Insurance Industry for a more effective combat against money laundering. It serves as a legal foundational basis for further research in this direction.

An overview of the economic challenges impacting businesses in the aftermath of September 11. What is the insurance coverage for property damage, dislocation of operation, and businesses interruption?

Based on a literature review of terrorism and global business literature, this paper addresses those conditions that may lead to new considerations about risk and its management at policy and the MNE (multinational enterprise) level. How do MNEs adapt to the 09/11 ‐ type risk in strategic management that shapes choices made for internationalization and for international business operations? It is observed that MNEs increasingly enlarge the notion of political risk. We suggest the development of a strategic risk assessment that incorporates terrorism which in its threat, event and aftermath does not remain local or national, but influences investment, location, logistics, supply‐chain and other performance‐ linked decisions of the international value chain through an enlarged risk‐return evaluation. Using the OLI‐paradigm as a typology, we extend Dunning’s work by incorporating the terrorism dimension. We do so mainly through the analysis and distinction of the most vulnerable links in firms’ value chain in which adjustments need to be made in the face of terrorism threat, act and aftermath. This paper attempts to improve the understanding of international management in an era of global risk and uncertainty.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how international tourists’ cosmopolitan values change due to the restraining fear of terrorism, and how this change affects their worldview, destination perception and travel preferences.

In-depth interviews were conducted with international travellers from all five continents to pinpoint the universal shifts in cosmopolitan values, specifically regarding risk perception in the face of terrorism.

Tourists’ personal values are changing due to the increased risk of terrorism (or the perception of it), which prompts international travellers to act less on their desire for stimulation and more for their need for security when travelling. Just as any change in values tends to be relatively permanent, this value shift might have long-term consequences for the entire tourism industry.

Terrorism risk perception and its retraining effect regarding willingness to travel were established to be significant and universal. However, this study suggests that the strength of the travellers’ cosmopolitan orientation influences the extent terrorism risk is acted upon. Results indicate that the higher the travellers’ cosmopolitan conviction is, the less significantly they seem to be affected by the fear of terrorism.

The study offers cues on how managers and policy makers can enhance destination image that keeps up with the current realities of global tourism in the face of terrorism, and highlights a promising market segment, strongly cosmopolitan travellers who are less concerned with potential travel risks and react less negatively in troubled times.

Most of the previous studies considered tourists’ cosmopolitanism as a stable orientation rather than a context-specific state. This study addresses this gap by exploring how resilient the tourists’ cosmopolitan desire for openness and freedom is under the risk perception of terrorism, and what effect the fear of terrorism has on their travel habits.

The paper seeks to draw lessons for effective policy and regulatory responses to protect financial systems in the face of terrorist attacks.

The paper presents data on the reaction of financial markets to the terrorist attacks in New York (2001) and Madrid (2004). It describes the authorities' crisis management responses and analyses their effectiveness. The paper describes the subsequent regulatory responses to protect the financial systems from abuse by terrorists.

Diversified, liquid, and sound financial markets were efficient in absorbing the shocks of terrorist attacks when supported by well organized crisis management responses.

The paper is limited in its coverage to the reaction of the financial markets to the 11 September 2001, terrorist attacks in New York, and 11 March 2004, attacks in Madrid.

The paper highlights the importance of effective contingency planning by the authorities and financial firms in mitigating the risks of disruption from terrorist attacks.

This paper provides an overview of the issues, challenges and responses in dealing with the risks posed by terrorism to financial systems. It combines empirical evidence with an institutional perspective, and notes some of the regulatory challenges in combating terrorist finance.

The attack of September 11, 2001, demonstrated that terrorism is capable of inflicting damage and loss of life with a severity that is many multiples of the most extreme U.S. natural perils. This article addresses the need for a mathematical model for evaluating terrorism risk. The author compares and contrasts terrorism risk with other forms of catastrophe risk, and identifies human intelligence and intent as the distinguishing features. The author proceeds to propose that analytical techniques developed and applied within the discipline of wartime operations research (e.g., game theory, search theory), along with specialized statistical techniques, may be adopted to practically model the risk of terrorism. The article proceeds to demonstrate how even a highly simplified model can offer useful insights to the insurance industry with regard to this risk, although access to terrorism expertise is crucial.