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The intent of this paper is to provide an overview of the principal provisions of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (the ‘Act’),1 which became law in the USA on 26th November, 2002, and the practical effects which the Act has had on the state of terrorism insurance coverage as it had evolved between 11th September, 2001 and the passage of the Act. The Act voids some of the exclusions which had made their way into insurance policies (particularly post‐9/11) relating to losses from certain ‘acts of terrorism’ (as defined by the Act) and requires insurers meeting certain criteria to ‘make available’ terrorism insurance coverage to their insureds. The Act also establishes a temporary federal reinsurance programme which provides a system of shared public and private compensation for insured losses resulting from certain certified acts of terrorism. From the standpoint of the average insured, however, the practical impact of the Act has been far less dramatic than may appear on the face of it. As The Department of the Treasury explained in its Final Rule,2 one of the main purposes of the Act was to address market disruptions that resulted in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the USA and to ensure the availability and affordability of property and casualty insurance for certain risks associated with acts of terrorism. In addition, the Act was designed to provide a transitional period for the private insurance markets to stabilise, thereby allowing insurance companies to resume pricing terrorism insurance coverage. The Act also sought to build capacity in the insurance industry to absorb any future losses, while preserving insurance regulation and consumer protections in the individual states.

The purpose of this paper is to examine whether the counter-terrorism financing regime provides a solid platform for a better understanding of who should be considered terrorists or what forms terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist groups, the financing of which is the subject matter. In the absence of an internationally agreed definition of terrorism, the question which needs to be posed is whether there is a clear and common understanding of what constitutes terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist groups, the financing of which needs to be stopped. That is, from a criminal law perspective, whether the Terrorist Financing Convention, as the backbone of the counter-terrorist financing regime, clarifies what types of conduct, by who, in what circumstances and when, against whom (targets or victims) and with what intention or motivation should be considered terrorism?

It will be explained how and why it has been difficult to reach an agreement on the definition of terrorism. The endeavour of the drafters of the Terrorist Financing Convention and others involved in countering terrorist financing to establish a general definition of terrorism will be examined.

The record of attempts to define the elements of terrorism proves that it is hardly possible to reach an agreement on a generic definition of terrorism because the concept of terrorism is elusive and subject to various understandings. Even the definition provided by the Terrorist Financing Convention, is not convincing.

With regard to the findings, this paper calls for further research on the legal consequences of the implementation of the terrorist financing-counter measures, while the scope of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist organizations have been left vague.

Modern society has found its nemesis in the terrorist, fundamentalist criminals attempting to halt progress and force society back into the Dark Ages. This article aims to build on the work of Pech, arguing that many acts of terrorism are rooted in mimicry of acts of violence.

The article argues that the number of terrorist copying behaviours can be reduced through the concept of memetic engineering, which is the altering of the message that motivates terrorists and the copying of their violent activities. A model is developed for identifying and re‐engineering vulnerable constructs within the terrorist's causal algorithm.

This terrorist algorithm can be modified by: eliminating media portrayal of terrorists as freedom fighters and heroes; minimising potential causes of disinhibition; editing the terrorist's script that initiates and engenders empathy with violent acts; reconstructing the religious, cultural, and environmental support for violence as an acceptable means of communication, protest, and negotiation; reducing factors that facilitate susceptibility to the terror meme, identifying and moderating influences that initiate a state of cognitive priming for violence, and weaken the appeal of the terror meme. Introduces a diagnostic model for assessing key elements responsible for creating and sustaining terror memes.

The article describes an original and radically different approach to responding to terrorism. Essentially this means re‐engineering toxic scripts, using the mass media to moderate fundamentalist messages, re‐engineering of scaffolds that maintain some societies in cultural empathy with acts of violence, and the removal of environmental factors that enable terrorism to emerge.

The paper aims to examine business and community-based organizations’ efforts to increase engagement in building resilience to violent acts of terrorism in the community. Businesses and community-based organizations are now being called upon to join the wider preparedness, response and recovery efforts in response to terrorist violence.

A qualitative approach is used to explore the study. Data collection includes observation, analysis and interviews with practitioners and local stakeholders to document lessons learnt from all perspectives. Further to understand the role of private sector business and NGOs in building resilience to violent acts of terrorism in the community, 21 businesses were selected in the two cities of Shikarpur and Sukkur in the province of Sindh in Pakistan, during a period of high stress from terrorist violence between November and December 2020.

Community-based organizations in study areas contribute to resilience to violent acts of terrorism through making financial or material donations to local resilience to violent acts of terrorism programmes and by contributing supplies to affected people. Findings indicate that the implementation of a wide spectrum of community engagement initiatives has increased awareness of terrorist violence amongst various segments of societies.

The study provides a combination of practical data along with review of literature. A practical approach to the data collection from organizations operating in terrorist-ridden areas and consequently developing and implementing strategies to resilience to violent acts of terrorism in the community.

Terrorism is the new normal for tourism destinations, as the acts of terror that are performed in tourism zones ensure maximum international media coverage for such acts of terror. The frequency of acts of terror has led to the development of crisis resistant tourists, a segment of tourists that continue tourism consumption even when acts of terrorism occur. The tourism industry is negatively impacted by crises, but it has proved to be resilient, bouncing back from a temporary decline. Crisis resistant tourists have increased the robustness of tourist destinations, as almost all destinations have jumped on the tourism bandwagon. Increasingly, countries depend on the tourism industry for economic growth, economic diversification, labour-intensive jobs and attracting foreign exchange, and therefore acts of terrorism can be regarded as economic espionage. African countries still receive less than 10% of international tourism receipts, as the majority of tourism occurs between developed countries in the West. As a consequence, developing countries benefit disproportionally less from tourism. The growth rate for African tourism has exceeded global growth averages and has been included in economic development policies in many African countries.

Terrorism in Kenya's tourism industry has had an adverse impact on tourism numbers and perception about destination Kenya. Several acts of terrorism have capacitated Kenya with institutional memory on how to handle acts of terrorism on Kenya's tourism industry. Kenya is arguably one of the leading countries in tourism in the African continent alongside South Africa, Egypt and Mauritius. In addition, Kenya Airways has used the national airport in Nairobi as a growing aviation hub connecting Africa with the world. As one of Africa's top tourist destinations, Kenya has to address the issue of terrorism. The perceptions of foreign tourists, including Kenyans, are that the country is not safe anymore. As recent as early 2019, another terrorism attack took place in Kenya. This continued to strain an industry that is already under siege. It needs to be borne in mind that a country of Kenya's calibre cannot afford to lose tourists. This is because tourism plays a significant role in enhancing the livelihood of ordinary Kenyans. Additionally, it plays a pivotal role in the country's economy. Kenya provides an example of a destination country which has been able to mitigate the effects of terrorism in the tourism industry. The Atlantic Island of St. Helena, a British Overseas territory, recently constructed an airport in Jamestown to boost trade and specifically tourism to the island, to alleviate financial support from Britain to the island. The island is an unexploited dark tourism destination, as the site of freed slaves after the abolition of the Atlantic Slave trade, the exile site for Napoleon and Zulu Royalty Dinuzulu kaCetshwayo and an overseas concentration camp for the Boers after the Anglo-Boer War. The opening of the airport has created the necessary infrastructure to attract tourists to the island, and the unique selling point of the island is that it is the last outpost of British Imperialism. The island would need to exploit its dark tourism potential by appealing to the British, the South Africans and specifically heritage tourists, due to its unique offering.

During the period 1962-2001 (9/11), the author identified 25 terrorist acts in the English-speaking Caribbean. Apart from US action in Grenada in 1983, the extra-regional response to these acts was minimal. However, in the aftermath of 9/11, the US has introduced a number of counter-terrorist measures into the region from Washington through such agencies as Southcom, the FBI, the DEA, and the Department of Homeland Security, now including the Coast Guard, to forestall future acts of terrorism. Also the UN, the OAS, and the CARICOM, at the instigation of the US, have encouraged Caribbean nations to adopt resolutions and pass anti-terrorist legislation at the local level in the fight against terrorism. US policy toward the region is based on its own self-interest since it considers the Caribbean its “Third Border,” one that is difficult to close to security threats. In all of this, the Caribbean nations welcome the security, more so because of the incidental protection it offers to their fragile tourist-dependent economies that are sensitive to political and other threats. This coincidence of interest has seen the US merge drug-trafficking and terrorism into one consolidated threat. Traditionally, the Caribbean region has not allocated a large part of its budget to security concerns, but with external assistance, particularly from the US, the region's police and military forces have been called upon to adapt to the global threats of the post-9/11 era by strengthening operational capacity, mission readiness, and intensify regional cooperation. This new thrust also includes making border tightening security measures more comprehensive and robust as well as the sharing of information, including intelligence. As long as the US perceives the terrorist threat a priority, Caribbean security policy will continue apace.

Over the last 40 years or so, the concepts of terror and terrorism have permeated and infused political, social, and economic thought and lexicon. Given the symbolism and obvious ways in which the terms become socially constructed, terror and terrorism appear as ripened enough concepts for interactionist scrutiny. In general, interactionists have stressed that concepts applied to terrorism become useful to elites for promoting a master narrative along the lines that “free nations” must coordinate efforts and spend resources to defend against terrorist threats. We wish to extend this interactionist analysis in the following pages to provide a perspective on terrorist threats as evolving and emergent concepts, sensitive to historical and social changes. Drawing from a small number of Government and commercial print and online sources in order to identify patterns that emerge from the language, we reference terrorism handbooks starting from the 1970s to current, post “9/11” handbooks. We propose evolutionary timeframes demarcated by substantive events and changes in how we define, understand, and respond to an abstract threat made tangible and concrete. In effect, we suggest that such publications provide insight into how the dynamics of credibility associated with government, media, and “expert” assertions have framed public understandings of threat and danger. These handbooks serve as a heuristic model to draw general patterns and themes that demarcate significant time periods in our understanding of terrorism and responses to terrorism.

This article seeks to examine approaches to combating the “scourge of international terrorism” by targeting the financial resources of terrorist organizations and their supporters.

The article begins with the disputed issue of how to define a “terrorist”, “terrorism”, “terrorist organizations” and “acts of terrorism”. In a global financial system, differences between the definitions of those terms could have significant implications because terrorists have the means and will to operate their financing infrastructure from the least effectively regulated jurisdictions. There are many methods by which terrorists finance both their organizations and specific attacks. By concentrating on three examples of recent terrorist activity, namely the 9/11 attacks in New York, the 7/7 bombings in London, and the transfer of funds from the “Union of Good” to Hamas to fund terrorist attacks in Israel by means of a certain charitable association, the article illustrates the problems facing legal regimes seeking to limit terrorist funding.

The article notes a broad convergence in the methods of those jurisdictions when combating the financing of terrorism.

The paper provides a discussion of financial resources of terrorism from a legal professional in an area where terrorism is a real danger.

This paper seeks to examine certain important aspects of the domestic laws of Nigeria, the UK, the USA and Canada with a view to pointing out the remarkable differences capable of affecting adversely the war on terror.

Analyses the domestic laws of all four countries with a view to pointing out the remarkable differences capable of affecting adversely the war on terror.

Despite the obvious zeal and commitment with which nations and states of the world have set out to wage a legal war on terrorism, particularly the aspect of financing it, and despite the existence of a convention of which they are members, serious disparity exists in the legal frameworks adopted for the war. Even amongst such countries as the UK, the USA and Canada, uniformity of laws and approach is still a far‐fetched idea, a situation that is capable of hurting the international collaboration against terror. There is an urgent need for closer affinity between the laws of such countries while even countries like Nigeria that may not presently consider themselves as serious targets of terrorism need to urgently shirk themselves of such impressions and reform their laws.

The paper makes suggestions as to how the differences in the laws of the four countries may be corrected or down played, and how the international objectives of uniformity of laws may be achieved.

This article aims to develop and explore diagnostic frameworks to enhance one's understanding of the religiously‐inspired terrorist. It seeks to examine the relationship between the culture and conditions from which terrorists are recruited, as well as the psychological impact of fundamentalist religious teachings upon the minds of susceptible people.

This paper synthesises the theories of memetics with structuration to create a diagnostic framework facilitating greater understanding of terrorism and its appeal to those being recruited to its cause. This diagnostic framework assesses the influence and power of selective religious teachings when combined with a culture and history of violence, and their impact on susceptible minds in a fractured society.

By combining the theory of memetics with structuration theory it is possible to develop a diagnostic framework that examines psychological, cultural, and religiously‐inspired factors driving the phenomenon that has been labelled as terrorism. Memetic theory assesses culture and communication of beliefs, ideas, and thoughts. Structuration theory identifies motives and drives.

The authors conclude that the current terrorism problem bears little relationship to US foreign policy. The concept of a free society will never be fully enacted until the religious and cultural scaffoldings that support terrorism have been dismantled.