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The intent of this paper is to provide an overview of the principal provisions of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (the ‘Act’),1 which became law in the USA on 26th November, 2002, and the practical effects which the Act has had on the state of terrorism insurance coverage as it had evolved between 11th September, 2001 and the passage of the Act. The Act voids some of the exclusions which had made their way into insurance policies (particularly post‐9/11) relating to losses from certain ‘acts of terrorism’ (as defined by the Act) and requires insurers meeting certain criteria to ‘make available’ terrorism insurance coverage to their insureds. The Act also establishes a temporary federal reinsurance programme which provides a system of shared public and private compensation for insured losses resulting from certain certified acts of terrorism. From the standpoint of the average insured, however, the practical impact of the Act has been far less dramatic than may appear on the face of it. As The Department of the Treasury explained in its Final Rule,2 one of the main purposes of the Act was to address market disruptions that resulted in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks on the USA and to ensure the availability and affordability of property and casualty insurance for certain risks associated with acts of terrorism. In addition, the Act was designed to provide a transitional period for the private insurance markets to stabilise, thereby allowing insurance companies to resume pricing terrorism insurance coverage. The Act also sought to build capacity in the insurance industry to absorb any future losses, while preserving insurance regulation and consumer protections in the individual states.

The US insurance industry has long faced the spectrum of large unexpected losses from natural catastrophes such as hurricanes and earthquakes. However, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack clearly demonstrated a new form of catastrophic risk of man‐made origin. The damages in property and life are now well known as estimates of insured losses deriving from this event range from $40 to $54 billion. The 9/11 terrorist attacks renewed the capacity problem faced the insurance industry in the underwriting of large catastrophic risk. In that regard, this paper explores the feasibility of capital market alternatives to the conventional insurance mechanism, and analyses whether the capital market could provide extra capacity to absorb terrorism risk.

The 11th September terrorist attacks on America continue to affect the corporate real estate industry, and this paper is intended to address a number of those ongoing effects. It first discusses property insurance coverage in general and then proceeds to analyse whether damage from acts of terrorism is covered under pre‐11th September and post‐11th September property insurance polices. It also addresses the current status of proposed US Government intervention as a terrorism insurance backstop. It then describes the strategies which certain clients located within the areas directly affected by the terrorist attacks implemented in order to be able to gain immediate access to alternative space. Finally it examines selected lease clauses to which landlords and tenants should pay closer attention in light of the terrorist attacks, including operating expense provisions, force majeure provisions, waiver of subrogation provisions, use prohibitions and alteration provisions.

Traditionally, terrorism risk has been priced based exclusively on the relationship between supply and demand in the insurance market, with no basis in actuarial principles. This article discusses how the tragic events of September 11, 2001, have irrevocably changed the market for terrorism insurance, since terrorism has become a U.S. catastrophe risk. The author states that since insurers seek to quantify risk distributed over several months (versus a period of only a few days), quantitative assessment of terrorism risk may be achievable. The article proceeds to address the challenge of quantifying terrorism risk, and ultimately suggests that developing quantitative terrorism risk models may provide a foundation for securitizing and trading terrorism risk. The author introduces three examples of potential alternative risk transfer instruments for terrorism risk: 1) a catastrophe bond triggered by workers' compensation claims from extreme terrorism‐related events; 2) a catastrophe bond to cover life insurers from losses related to an attack employing a weapon of mass destruction; and 3) a contingent financing instrument triggered by a terrorism event whose natural buyers are financial short‐sellers.

An overview of the economic challenges impacting businesses in the aftermath of September 11. What is the insurance coverage for property damage, dislocation of operation, and businesses interruption?

Based on a literature review of terrorism and global business literature, this paper addresses those conditions that may lead to new considerations about risk and its management at policy and the MNE (multinational enterprise) level. How do MNEs adapt to the 09/11 ‐ type risk in strategic management that shapes choices made for internationalization and for international business operations? It is observed that MNEs increasingly enlarge the notion of political risk. We suggest the development of a strategic risk assessment that incorporates terrorism which in its threat, event and aftermath does not remain local or national, but influences investment, location, logistics, supply‐chain and other performance‐ linked decisions of the international value chain through an enlarged risk‐return evaluation. Using the OLI‐paradigm as a typology, we extend Dunning’s work by incorporating the terrorism dimension. We do so mainly through the analysis and distinction of the most vulnerable links in firms’ value chain in which adjustments need to be made in the face of terrorism threat, act and aftermath. This paper attempts to improve the understanding of international management in an era of global risk and uncertainty.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate how international tourists’ cosmopolitan values change due to the restraining fear of terrorism, and how this change affects their worldview, destination perception and travel preferences.

In-depth interviews were conducted with international travellers from all five continents to pinpoint the universal shifts in cosmopolitan values, specifically regarding risk perception in the face of terrorism.

Tourists’ personal values are changing due to the increased risk of terrorism (or the perception of it), which prompts international travellers to act less on their desire for stimulation and more for their need for security when travelling. Just as any change in values tends to be relatively permanent, this value shift might have long-term consequences for the entire tourism industry.

Terrorism risk perception and its retraining effect regarding willingness to travel were established to be significant and universal. However, this study suggests that the strength of the travellers’ cosmopolitan orientation influences the extent terrorism risk is acted upon. Results indicate that the higher the travellers’ cosmopolitan conviction is, the less significantly they seem to be affected by the fear of terrorism.

The study offers cues on how managers and policy makers can enhance destination image that keeps up with the current realities of global tourism in the face of terrorism, and highlights a promising market segment, strongly cosmopolitan travellers who are less concerned with potential travel risks and react less negatively in troubled times.

Most of the previous studies considered tourists’ cosmopolitanism as a stable orientation rather than a context-specific state. This study addresses this gap by exploring how resilient the tourists’ cosmopolitan desire for openness and freedom is under the risk perception of terrorism, and what effect the fear of terrorism has on their travel habits.

During the period 1962-2001 (9/11), the author identified 25 terrorist acts in the English-speaking Caribbean. Apart from US action in Grenada in 1983, the extra-regional response to these acts was minimal. However, in the aftermath of 9/11, the US has introduced a number of counter-terrorist measures into the region from Washington through such agencies as Southcom, the FBI, the DEA, and the Department of Homeland Security, now including the Coast Guard, to forestall future acts of terrorism. Also the UN, the OAS, and the CARICOM, at the instigation of the US, have encouraged Caribbean nations to adopt resolutions and pass anti-terrorist legislation at the local level in the fight against terrorism. US policy toward the region is based on its own self-interest since it considers the Caribbean its “Third Border,” one that is difficult to close to security threats. In all of this, the Caribbean nations welcome the security, more so because of the incidental protection it offers to their fragile tourist-dependent economies that are sensitive to political and other threats. This coincidence of interest has seen the US merge drug-trafficking and terrorism into one consolidated threat. Traditionally, the Caribbean region has not allocated a large part of its budget to security concerns, but with external assistance, particularly from the US, the region's police and military forces have been called upon to adapt to the global threats of the post-9/11 era by strengthening operational capacity, mission readiness, and intensify regional cooperation. This new thrust also includes making border tightening security measures more comprehensive and robust as well as the sharing of information, including intelligence. As long as the US perceives the terrorist threat a priority, Caribbean security policy will continue apace.