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Numerous policies are established in Mauritius to attract foreign direct investment, but at the same time, severe concerns were raised concerning the erosion of Mauritian tax base, which is witnessed by the decrease in the percentage of tax revenue to gross domestic product in recent years. To avoid these issues, in 2019, the Mauritian legislator has domesticated the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) BEPS 2013 Action 3 on controlled foreign company (CFC) in its income tax legislation. As such, the purpose of this study is to critically assess the implications of CFC rules of Mauritius to reduce tax avoidance in the light of international tax competition.

To achieve the research objective, this study will adopt a black letter approach by analysing the rules and regulations of various jurisdiction as well as international standards on CFCs and other tax avoidance legal provisions. A comparative analysis will be conducted between Mauritian laws on CFCs and the corresponding legislation of the UK and the USA, which are selected to assess the developed world’s position on strict CFC rules.

A hasty implementation of CFC rules leads to various complexities like interpretation issues and diminishing the competitiveness of the country to multinationals. In this respect, there is the risk of a trade-off between tax collected and foreign direct investment in the country. Consequently, the research recommends that Mauritius reforms its CFC legislation by extending the scope of tax exemptions for intra-group financing income, for the first year of CFC’s operation with the possibility of offsetting foreign taxes and for the Mauritius Revenue Authority to establish detailed guidelines on the determination of CFC income and its attribution for tax purposes in Mauritius.

Existing literature has to a great extent focused on the role of CFC rules as a tax avoidance measure and on the divergence or convergence between domestic CFC legislation against the OECD recommendations (Dourado, 2015; Xu, 2018; Beebeejaun et al., 2023). However, limited literature is available on the evaluation of the purpose of CFC rules enacted by a developing country being Mauritius in the context of the global competitive market, to which this research aims at filling the gap.

This study investigates the impact of different transfer pricing rules on tax-induced profit shifting. Existing studies create different enforcement rankings of countries based on specific transfer pricing provisions on the assumption that larger penalties and more extensive information requirements imply higher tax enforcement. This assumption carries limitations related to the impact of transfer pricing rules in different countries and to the interaction of different tax rules. Instead, the authors propose a nonordered segregation of groups of countries with different transfer pricing rules, and they empirically investigate the impact of these transfer pricing rules on the profit-shifting behavior of firms.

The authors apply the hierarchical clustering method to analyze 57 observable quantitative and qualitative characteristics of transfer pricing rules of each country. This approach allows the creation of groups of countries based on a comprehensive set of regulatory characteristics, to investigate evidence of profit shifting for each of these separate groups. Profit-shifting behavior is measured by the variation in the volume of import and export transactions between local firms and related parties located in other countries.

The results indicate that firms have a higher volume of intrafirm transactions with related parties located in countries with a lower tax rate. This result is consistent with the profit-shifting hypothesis. Moreover, the results show that relevant differences in transfer pricing rules across countries produce different effects on the volume of intrafirm transactions. The authors observe that the existence of domestic transfer pricing rules that override the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines may inhibit profit shifting. In addition, the results suggest that the OECD guidelines may facilitate profit shifting. Overall, it is observed that some transfer pricing rules may be more effective than others in curbing profit shifting and that firms are still able to manipulate transfer prices under some tax rules.

(1) The authors focus on the Brazilian context, which provides a suitable set of profit-shifting incentives for the analysis, since it combines an extreme corporate tax rate, a highly complex tax system, and a unique set of transfer pricing rules. (2) Profit-shifting behavior is captured by the volume of intrafirm transactions. The authors would prefer to observe the transfer price directly; however, this information is not disclosed by firms, for it may represent a limitation to the investigation. Nonetheless, theory shows that the profit-shifting behavior is reflected by the manipulation of both transfer prices and intra-firm outputs.

The authors find that the volume of intrafirm transactions may decrease or increase, depending on the transfer pricing system of the foreign country (including the tax-differential effect). It suggests that some transfer pricing rules are more effective than others in curtailing the profit-shifting behavior and that firms are still able to find vulnerabilities in current rules and take advantage of them in deploying a profit-shifting strategy.

Results provide knowledge about how key differences on transfer pricing rules across countries influence the profit-shifting behavior. The results of the study may have valuable application in solving regulatory mismatches, to eliminate blind spots in transfer pricing rules and thus to contribute to the current review of OECD guidelines and to the global tax reset movement.

Recent studies suggest that if tax-avoidance incentives are somewhat weak, it becomes difficult to observe the shifting behavior of firms. The puzzle is to check whether profit shifting is nonexistent under weak incentives or whether this is a matter of methodological limitations. The authors’ analysis is applied to a complex tax background with strong profit-shifting incentives; thus, it allows the authors to obtain robust evidences of the shifting behavior and the effect of different transfer pricing rules.

The tax advantage of debt is considered an important motivation for highly leveraged transactions. The German government limited the tax deductibility of interest expenses to 30.0 percent of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization (the interest barrier rule) in 2008 to reduce the tax incentives for debt financing. This study aims to evaluate the impact of the introduction of the interest barrier rule.

The paper analyzes the changes in the value of the tax shield for German leveraged buyouts as a result of the promulgation of an interest barrier rule. Tax shields are computed to quantify the wealth transfer from taxpayers to corporations.

Prior to the 2008 tax reform, tax shields contributed 8.4 percent to the transaction price, thereby raising the equity value by 33.0 percent on average. With the introduction of the interest barrier rule, the value of tax shields is reduced by 35.1 percent. Affecting more than 75 percent of buyouts, the rule significantly lessens the tax incentive for high levels of debt. The reduction of the corporate tax rate from 31.7 percent to 26.3 percent further lowers the value creation potential. The limited interest deductibility may therefore reduce the number of leveraged buyouts and hence economic growth, unless other non‐debt forms of financing can fulfill the need for capital.

As the first continental European study, this research concentrates on the impact of the German interest barrier rule on value creation in highly leveraged transactions. Conclusions can be drawn in a broader European context.

The Goods and Services Tax (GST) implementation in Malaysia had raised various responses from many parties involved when the new tax was introduced in 2015 until its abolishment in 2018. GST complexity has been stated as part of the reasons for its resistance and abolishment. The purpose of this paper is to identify causes of GST complexities during its implementation in Malaysia.

This paper draws on causes of tax complexity from previous studies and conducted semi-structured interviews with tax experts. The respondents comprised of subject matter experts in GST and the findings are based on their numerous years of experiences handling clients with diverse backgrounds.

Findings from this study are categorised into legal complexity and declarative complexities. Almost all the causes of complexities from prior studies were encountered by Malaysian businesses. This study concluded that the most likely reasons for the abolishment of GST in Malaysia are: numerous rules and exception to the rules (e.g. 35 tax codes, gifts rules, 21-day rules), frequent changes of GST rulings and guidelines, GST computations that were too difficult for mixed supply and process of GST refund that were onerous and lengthy.

Limitations of this paper include reliance on the respondents’ ability to accurately and honestly recall details of their experiences, circumstances, thoughts or behaviours that are being asked.

Despite the abolishment of the GST in Malaysia, it is pertinent to identify the causes of GST complexities that can be learnt by the relevant authorities. Measures can be formulated to mitigate the identified GST complexities to ensure high compliance among businesses with other existing taxes or new taxes (if any) to be introduced in the future. This includes addressing the competency of RMCD officers and businesses on the rules and regulations, minimal rules and exception to the rules, a simplified GST computations for mixed supply and a systematic refund process.

The research method used is a flexible and powerful tool to capture the voices and the ways respondents make meaning of their experience dealing with the GST matters. The findings reveal a deep understanding of the issues from the views of the experts in the field.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the Regulated Investment Company Modernization Act of 2010, P.L. 111‐325, signed into law on December 22, 2010.

The paper summarizes the Act and provides a detailed explanation and analysis of each of the provisions in the Act.

An investment company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 may elect to be taxed as a Regulated Investment Company (RIC) under the Internal Revenue Code. A RIC that satisfies certain additional minimum distribution requirements is generally allowed to deduct the amount of dividends paid to its shareholders in computing the RIC's taxable income and gains, with the result that the RIC's distributed net income and gains can be passed through to its shareholders free of tax at the RIC level. The Act makes a number of changes to the provisions in the Code related to RICs.

The paper provides practical guidance from experienced financial services lawyers.

This chapter examines how public attitudes and judgments about tax fairness reflect distributive justice rules about proportionality/contributions, needs, and equality; fairness issues that influence voluntary tax compliance (Hofmann, Hoelzl, & Kirchler, 2008; Spicer & Lundstedt, 1976). Most public polls and some prior research indicate the general public considers progressive income tax rates as fairer than flat tax rates, a reflection of the Needs rule of distributive justice theory; our 1,138 participants respond similarly. However, two-thirds of our politically representative sample of the American public actually assign “fair shares” of income taxes consistently with fairness-as-proportionality above an exempt amount of income, consistent with the Contributions rule of Equity Theory. We argue experimental assignments of fair shares of income taxes can best be understood as a combination of the Needs rule, applied by exempting incomes below the poverty line from income taxation (via current standard deductions) and taxing incomes above this exempt amount at a single tax rate (i.e., a flat-rate tax) consistent with the Proportionality/Contributions rule. Viewed in combination, these two distributive justice rules explain the tax fairness judgments of 89% of our sample and indicate surprising general agreement about what constitutes a fair share of income taxes that should be paid by US citizens from the 5th percentile to the 95th percentile of the income distribution. The joint application of these fairness rules indicates how seemingly competing, partisan distributive justice concerns can inform our understanding of social attitudes about tax fairness across income classes.

We examine whether variations in the most fundamental aspects of state corporate income tax regimes affect state economic activity as measured by personal income, gross state product, and total non-farm employment. We focus on a variety of statutory components of state corporate income taxes that apply broadly in most U.S. states and for most multi-state corporate taxpayers. Our econometric strategy consists of a series of fixed effects panel regressions using state-level data from 1996 through 2010. Our results reveal important interaction effects of tax rates and policies, suggesting that policy makers should avoid making decisions about tax rates in isolation. The results demonstrate a relatively consistent negative economic response to the combination of high tax rates with throwback rules and heavy sales factor weights. Combined reporting has no discernible effect on personal income, GSP, or employment after controlling for tax rates, apportionment, and throwback rules. In an effort to gauge the relative impacts of tax policies on the location of economic activity, we also estimate alternative models in which each state’s economic activity is measured as a share of the national economic activity in each year. Statistically significant effects for tax rates, apportionment formulas, and throwback rules in the shares models suggest that at least some of their impact involves the movement of activity across state lines, thereby leaving open the possibility of a zero-sum game among the states.

Although tax relief on pensions is a controversial area of government expenditure, this is the first study of the tax effects for a real-world defined benefit pension scheme. First, we estimate the tax and national insurance contribution (NIC) effects of the scheme's change from final salary to career average revalued earnings (CARE) in 2011 on the gross and net wealth of the sponsor, government, and 16 age cohorts of members, deferred pensioners, and pensioners. Second, we measure the size of the twelve income tax and NIC payments and reliefs for new members and the sponsor, before and after the rule changes. We find the total subsidy split is roughly 40% income tax subsidy and 60% NIC subsidy. If lower tax rates in retirement and the risk premium effect of the exempt-exempt-taxed (EET) system are not viewed as a tax subsidy, the tax subsidy to members largely disappears. Any remaining subsidy drops, as a proportion of pension benefits, for high earners, as does that for NICs.