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In the Netherlands, the ‘Tabaksblat Code’ (the Dutch corporate governance code of December) was a semi-private regulation instigated by the Dutch government, the stock exchange and industry associations to restore trust in the public equity markets. The aim was ‘to put the relationship between listed companies and providers of capital under the microscope’ in order to establish a new balance with a larger role for the shareholders (Tabaksblat, 2003, p. 59).

After the Royal Ahold accounting scandal occurred in 2003, the Dutch government responded by publishing a new Corporate Governance code, often referred to as the “Tabaksblat Code”, updated in 2016. The Code focuses on long-term value creation by emphasizing risk management and accountability and reinforcing the roles and duties of management board, internal audit function, and supervisory board in designing adequate risk management and control systems and in assessing their effectiveness. Differently than the rule-based Anglo-Saxon regulations, the Code is based on best practices provisions and adopts a “comply or explain” approach. Professional bodies are actively supporting their associates in developing skills in current and emerging risk management areas. Despite these efforts, it is worth noting that there are still significant differences on how companies apply the risk management provisions. For instance, in terms of appointing a dedicated manager as Chief Risk Officer (CRO), in the frequency and scope of risk assessment, and in defining the risk appetite of the company.

Previous empirical research interprets results from pay‐performance studies in the light of either agency theory or managerial power theory. This paper aims to directly estimate the relationship between CEO power, and compensation structure, level, and performance‐sensitivity. In doing so, it seeks to test the crucial assumption in managerial power theory according to which more powerful CEOs are able to enjoy higher and less performance‐sensitive compensation.

The hypotheses are tested on a detailed dataset, covering compensation for CEOs in virtually all Dutch stock‐listed companies, for the period 2002‐2006. The paper tests whether the findings are robust against different lag structures and firm size classes.

In general, most of the multi‐dimensional measures of power do not appear to have a strong effect on compensation, with one exception: non‐Dutch CEOs receive more variable compensation, and receive higher and less performance‐sensitive pay than their Dutch colleagues.

This paper contributes to the extant CEO compensation literature, which to date relies on interpretations of findings in pay‐for‐performance studies to argue for either agency or managerial power theory. The direct test of the relationship between power and compensation emphasises the importance of one dimension of a multidimensional power construct. As strong effects of performance of compensation are not found either, the paper suggests that the bipolar debate be extended to include other explanations of compensation arrangements.

Grahl (2006) has commented that current manifestations of institutional shareholder activism are limited by the rise of the shareholder value doctrine in EU member states and the absence of strong legal frameworks restraining corporate practice. Survey studies have pointed to a generally muted response to legislative encouragement that financial institutions engage in reformist activist practices. Several studies have attempted to measure the effect of legislation calling on financial institutions to disclose the extent of their involvement with companies in which they have invested. All such studies have concluded that strong shareholder activism policy would require adjustments to the manner of remuneration of investment managers and intermediaries. For example, a study of pension fund reporting immediately following the introduction of British legislation in 2000 found that most surveyed organisations had disclosed the use of ‘social considerations’ in investment processes (Mathieu, 2000), with little more added by way of elaboration. (The latter observation is also couched a high non-response rate (67 per cent).) More recent studies demonstrate the struggle of pension funds in this regard. Pension funds have tended to follow conservative ‘hands-off’ ownership strategies, whereas activist approaches typically require a very different ‘hands-on’ approach (Johnson & De Graaf, 2009; Eurosif, 2010).

This study aims to investigate the immediate impact of a newly released code of governance on the financial performance of Nigerian companies. Tests are carried out to determine whether firms that comply more with the code experience better performance.

The governance change of Nigerian listed firms after the newly released code is classified into ex ante good governance change or ex ante bad governance change; the differences in performance between the good governance change firms and bad governance change firms are then compared. Since firms in any year can change more than one governance indicator, an index of aggregate governance change is computed and the performance of firms from two extreme governance rankings is compared.

It is found that in the immediate period after the release of the code, Nigerian firms reorganised their governance mechanism, and this sometimes involved substitution among mechanisms. However, the performance increase accrued to any firm with reorganisation towards a good mechanism could have been eroded when the same firm instituted a change towards another mechanism that matches the definition of bad change. This therefore makes an attempt to differentiate performance based on governance change (pre‐ and post‐new code) difficult and insignificant.

This study contributes to the scarce literature on corporate governance and firm performance in developing countries. Specifically, it can be regarded as the first study to test the immediate impact of a new code of governance on Nigerian firms. Equally, the adopted methodology makes it the first study to compute and test an aggregate index of governance change for Nigeria.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate differences in the degree of usage and compliance with the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) International Standards for the Professional Practices of Internal Auditing (Standards) by organizations' internal audit activities (IAA) located in the USA and a sample of European countries which have affiliates with the IIA. This paper shows the differences among Belgium, Italy, The Netherlands, the UK and Ireland, and the USA with respect to the level of use of the Standards and compliance with the Standards by respondents' IAAs.

Survey results from questionnaires sent to IIA members in September 2006 about various topics relating to internal auditing are summarized in the Common Body of Knowledge 2006 database. These results are compared among Belgium, Italy, The Netherlands, the UK and Ireland, and the USA.

This paper shows the differences among Belgium, Italy, The Netherlands, the UK and Ireland, and the USA with respect to the level of use of the Standards and compliance with the Standards by respondents' IAAs. There are significant levels of variation in responses by country. For Standards 1300, Quality Assurance and Improvement Program, and 2600, Resolution of Management's Acceptance of Risks, respondents indicate high levels of non‐compliance.

This study compares the status of the use of the IIA Standards in five countries to determine if there is any difference in application in different parts of the world.

Advice for senior management and board members on how to properly assess the future value creation potential of the company through strategic plans and initiatives. The number and variety of complex strategic maneuvers – such as, outsourcing, off‐shoring, supply chain pooling, contract manufacturing, co‐developing, co‐branding, co‐marketing, licensing and joint ventures – strains the existing strategic corporate governance processes at most firms. The risks of these long‐term initiatives cannot be captured in quarterly performance data. Corporate governance would be made more effective by defining explicit ways the board could use to evaluate new strategic opportunities and new sources of business risk. An innovative but practical solution is to create a strategic reference framework for the businesses segments. Executives and boards would turn to the framework to quickly evaluate strategic initiatives and assess strategic business risk in much the same way as they use financial reference frameworks to evaluate financial performance.

This paper elucidates female underrepresentation on executive boards in the Dutch hotel industry through a “feminist” stakeholder perspective, which persists despite public opinion and government initiatives to resolve this enigma. It contributes to this discussion by examining Rhenish governance structures through a “feminist” stakeholder-focused rationale, complementing prevailing Anglo-Saxon shareholder-focused governance research.

Eleven in-depth, semi-structured interviews were conducted with hotel executive board representatives and five with sublevel management representatives. Saturation was achieved by interviewing all females on Dutch hotel corporate boards regarding their career experiences compared with those of female general managers and male counterparts.

This paper finds a prevailing “masculinist” perspective of an idealized shareholder-orientated executive and a “feminist” perspective of a humanized stakeholder-orientated executive expressed within the interviews. While the former sacrifices family for their career, the latter balances their family with their career. The former fosters presupposed gender norms, with females commonly sacrificing their careers while males sacrifice their families. Notably, most executives predominantly supported the humanized stakeholder-orientated executive, while recognizing that micro-, meso- and macro-structural barriers remain.

This paper addresses a lacuna in the ethical literature in exploring female executive representation in Rhenish stakeholder-focused governance structures, as opposed to Anglo-Saxon shareholder-focused ones. It found a “masculinist” perspective of an idealized shareholder-focused executive archetype and a “feminist” perspective of a humanized stakeholder-focused executive archetype. Notably, contrary to perceived business norms, several interviewees rejected the former as it is incompatible with family and work, instead seeking the latter which balances between family and work.