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In this paper, the authors study the production and pricing decisions of a remanufacturing supply chain composed of a supplier, an assembler and a remanufacturer, in which the remanufacturing of components requires patent licensing from the supplier.

The authors consider three different models with government subsidy for remanufacturing: (1) no government subsidies; (2) the government subsidizes the remanufacturing behavior of the supplier and (3) the government subsidizes the remanufacturing behavior of the remanufacturer and use the Stackelberg game model to solve and analyze the equilibrium wholesale prices of components and the equilibrium outputs of new and remanufactured products under three subsidy modes.

The results show that the equilibrium wholesale prices of two kinds of components decrease with the unit patent licensing fee and the unit government subsidy, and the equilibrium quantity of the remanufactured products under the three modes is obviously higher than that of the new products.

Finally through numerical simulation, it is found that the equilibrium profits of the supplier, the manufacturer and the supply chain increase monotonously in relation to the unit government subsidy, while the optimal profit of the assembler in relation to the unit government subsidy tends to decrease first and then increase.

Grounded in paradox theory, and with the objective of structuring and extending existing knowledge of conflicts of interest (e.g. trade-offs) in packaging logistics, the purpose of this paper is to identify categories of paradoxical tensions in packaging systems used in supply chains, and to develop a conceptual framework that describes these categories.

This research uses a theory building approach. It develops a conceptual framework of paradoxical tensions for packed products in supply chains. It revises and extends current knowledge in this domain by applying paradox theory from organisational research.

The paper develops a generic, conceptual framework that identifies, categorises and describes packed product paradoxes on two system levels: supply chain and company levels. The categories of paradoxes refer to performing, organising, belonging and learning.

The framework provides a new theoretical explanation of conflicts of interest in packaging logistics in terms of paradoxical tensions related to packed products in supply chains. It structures and increases general understanding of such tensions within and between actors in a supply chain. The paper also discusses differences in terminology between tensions which are possible to settle and those which lead to paradoxes.

The framework provides a structure for analysing the organisational impact of strategic packaging decisions. It can help highlight different stakeholders' organisational constraints related to packaging.

The framework's systematic categorisation of four types of paradoxical tensions, with thorough descriptions of the meaning of packed product paradoxes of each type, offers an expanded and in-depth explanation of the organisational impacts of packed products in supply chains.

As corporate sustainability is systemic, it cannot be achieved without effective involvement of suppliers. This study aims to examine the drivers of supplier companies’ resource allocation to a sustainability issue that affects customer companies and society at large.

Supplier companies’ resource allocation for a sustainability issue is explained from variables at the levels of the institutional, supply chain and internal environments of a supplier company. The framework is tested with a moderated regression model on 102 supplier companies in animal-based supply chains, focussing on their resource allocation for farm animal welfare.

The findings show that supply chain factors have the strongest influence on suppliers’ resource allocation, including a strong effect of investment specificity and a U-shaped effect of chain integration. Also, significant effects from institutional variables, namely, the pressure on consumer companies, and an inverted U-shaped effect of sustainability competition are found. The innovativeness, referring to the internal environment of supplier companies, appears as another important factor for the allocation of resources to animal welfare, as a sustainability issue.

The results have implications for consumer market companies to deal with sustainability issues that require involvement of their suppliers, for supplier companies to increase their competitive positions and strengthen their relationships within the supply chain, and for policymakers seeking solutions for sustainability issues in the market domain.

While existing literature focusses mostly on the corporate sustainability of highly visible and large consumer companies, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, this study is the first to examine the drivers of supplier companies’ resource allocation for a sustainability issue, namely, animal welfare. It provides insights on what drives supplier companies, usually operating outside the spotlight, to become part of a sustainability transition.

Contemporary supply chain relationships inherently rely on delegation of work between organizations and, thus, are subject to agency problems for which a wide range of governance mechanisms exist. This review of agency theory (AT), across four distinct fields, explains the connection between governance mechanisms and supply chain relationship types.

The study uses a systematic literature review (SLR) of articles using AT in a supply chain context from the operations and supply chain management, general management, marketing, and economics fields.

The authors categorize the governance mechanisms identified to create a typology of agency relationships in supply chains.

The developed typology provides parsimonious theory on different forms of supply chain agency relationships and takes a step towards a “supply chain-oriented agency theory” explaining and predicting relationship types and governance in supply chains. Furthermore, a future research agenda calls for more accurate measuring of agency costs, to examine residual gains alongside residual losses, to take a dual-sided perspective of agency relations and to adopt AT to examine more complex supply networks.

The review provides a menu of governance mechanisms and describes situations under which these mechanisms could be deployed to guide managers when developing their supply chain relationships.

The first review to combine and elaborate views from four major disciplines using AT as a lens to supply chain relationships. Expanding the traditional set of governance mechanisms provides academics and practitioners with a bigger “menu” of options to consider.

The purpose of this research is to investigate how to introduce a financing scheme to tackle the manufacturer's capital constraint problem, discuss the effects of data-driven marketing (DDM) quality, cross-channel-return (CCR) rate and financing interest rate on the members' pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions and optimal performances, and analyzes `how to achieve the coordination within a dual-channel supply chain (DSC) by contract coordination.

This work establishes a DSC model with DDM, and the offline retailer can provide internal financing to the capital-constrained online manufacturer. The demand under the price is determined based on DDM quality, customer channel preference and delivery lead time. Then, combined with the Stackelberg game, the optimal pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions are discussed under the inconsistent and consistent pricing strategies with decentralized and centralized systems. Furthermore, it designs a manufacturer-revenue sharing contract to coordinate the members under the two pricing strategies.

(1) The increase of DDM quality will reduce the delivery-lead-time under the inconsistent or consistent pricing strategy and will push the selling prices; (2) The growth of the CCR rate will raise selling prices and extend the delivery-lead-time under the decentralized decision; (3) Under price competition, the offline selling price is higher than the online selling price when customers prefer the offline channel and vice versa; (4) The retailer and the manufacturer can achieve a win-win situation through a manufacturer-revenue sharing contract.

This paper contributes to the studies related to DSC by investigating pricing and delivery-lead-time decisions based on DDM, CCR, internal financing and supply chain contract and proposes some managerial implications.

From the quantum game perspective, this paper aims to study a green product optimal pricing problem of the dual-channel supply chain under the cooperation of the retailer and manufacturer to reduce carbon emissions.

The decentralized and centralized decision-making optimal prices and profits are obtained by establishing the classical and quantum game models. Then the classical game and quantum game are compared.

When the quantum entanglement is greater than 0, the selling prices of the quantum model are higher than the classical model. Through theoretical research and numerical analysis results, centralized decision-making is more economical and efficient than decentralized decision-making. Publicity and education on carbon emission reduction for consumers will help consumers accept carbon emission reduction products with slightly higher prices. When the emission reduction increases too fast, the cost of emission reduction will form a significant burden and affect the profits of manufacturers and supply chain systems.

From the perspective of the quantum game, the author explores the optimal prices of green product and compares them with the classical game.