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The aim of this paper was to trace the development of the banking sector from post independence (1962) Jamaica to 2002 when the last major revisions were made to banking legislation.

The paper focuses mainly on the banking crisis that the financial sector suffered from 1992 to 1997. It examines the legislative and regulatory framework that existed during that period and the shortcomings that the financial crisis revealed. The impact of the financial crisis on the development of the legislative and regulatory framework and the resultant changes are also examined. The paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the regulatory and legislative framework existing in the banking sector in Jamaica. Investigative research was done through interviews, newspaper articles and reviewing papers written on this area in conjunction with the analysis of the banking legislation during this period.

The present banking and regulatory framework in Jamaica developed in response to the financial crisis and not in a structured and planned way. This conclusion is drawn from the fact that there were three amendments to the banking legislation in five years crisis primarily to close the loopholes and weaknesses the financial crisis revealed that the regulators did not have the legislative power to remedy.

While papers have been written examining the financial crisis from an economic perspective this paper provides a comprehensive legal analysis of the banking and regulatory framework in Jamaica. This paper will be of interest to regulators and the legal community.

In this chapter we study the intra-group transactions between the parent bank and its foreign subsidiaries in European Union (EU) countries during the crisis. We use hand-collected data from annual statements on related party transaction and find that they may create a serious problem for the stability of the foreign banks’ subsidiaries. Moreover, as some of those subsidiary banks were large by assets in some of the member states the related party transactions with the parent bank created a serious threat to the host countries’ financial system stability. We attribute this transaction to the weak governance in foreign subsidiaries. We suggest improvements in governance as well as greater disclosure of related party transactions in bank holding companies in Europe.

This article reviews the history of international coordination in the supervision of financial institutions noting why cooperation developed first and has been most extensive in oversight of banks relative to securities firms and insurance companies. It also poses the question of whether the extent of international coordination can be sustained or may even diminish.

The history of international coordination is used to illustrate the hypotheses that cooperation is more likely: the broader the international consensus on policy objectives and the potential gains from cooperation, the wider the international consensus on policy objectives and the potential gains from cooperation, the deeper the international agreement on the probable consequences of policy alternatives, the stronger the international institutional infrastructure for decision-making and the greater the domestic influence of experts who share a common understanding of a problem and its solutions.

All five of these factors that have enabled deepening and broadening of international cooperation have diminished in strength so that international cooperation is not likely to expand and may even be in retreat.

This article clarifies the factors that facilitate international cooperation and highlights the key obstacles to sustaining international cooperation.

This is the second of a two‐part paper, the first part of which was published in The International Journal of Regulatory Law & Practice Volume 1 Number 2, pp. 170–184. This part considers some of the multinational initiatives that have been undertaken for the supervision of international banks both within the EC and outside it. Deficiencies in the international arrangements for bank supervision are noted before some suggestions for reform are set out. The author concludes with a timetable of events outlining BCCI's history.

This book is a policy proposal aimed at the democratic left. It is concerned with gradual but radical reform of the socio‐economic system. An integrated policy of industrial and economic democracy, which centres around the establishment of a new sector of employee‐controlled enterprises, is presented. The proposal would retain the mix‐ed economy, but transform it into a much better “mixture”, with increased employee‐power in all sectors. While there is much of enduring value in our liberal western way of life, gross inequalities of wealth and power persist in our society.

Cryptoassets have recently attracted the attention of national and international financial regulators. Since the mid-2010s blockchains have increasingly been adapted to automate and replace many aspects of financial intermediation, and by 2015 Ethereum had created the smart contract language that underpins the digitization of real assets as asset-backed tokens (ABTs). Those were initially issued by FinTech companies, but more recently banks active on international capital and financial markets, and even central banks, for example, the Bank of Thailand, have developed their own digital platforms and blockchains. A wide variety of real and financial assets underpins ABTs, viz., real-estate, art, corporate and sovereign bonds, and equity. Consequently, owing to the significant market capitalization of cryptocurrencies, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) published two consultative papers delineating its approach on cryptoasset regulation. In this study, the authors analyze the mechanics of ABTs and their potential risks, relying on case studies of recent issuance of tokens in equity, real-estate, and debt markets, to highlight their main characteristics. The authors also investigate the consequences of the increasingly oligopolistic structure of blockchain mining pools and Bitcoin exchanges for the integrity and security of unregulated distributed ledgers. Finally, the authors analyze the BCBS’ regulatory proposals, and discuss the reaction of international financial institutions and cryptocurrency interest groups. The main findings are, firstly, that most ABTs are akin to asset-backed securities. Secondly, nearly all ABTs are “off-chain/on-chain,” that is, the underlying is a traditional asset that exists off-chain and is subsequently digitized. The main exception is the World Bank’s bond-i that is genuinely native to the blockchain created by the Commonwealth Bank of Australia, and has no existence outside it. Thirdly, all ABTs are issued on permissioned blockchains, where anti-money laundering/anti-terrorist funding and know-your-customer regulations are enforced. From a prudential regulatory perspective, ABTs do not appear to pose serious systemic risks to international financial markets. This may account for the often negative reactions of banks, banking associations, and cryptocurrency interest groups to the BCBS’ 2021 proposals for risk-weighted capital provisions for cryptoassets, which are viewed as excessive. Finally, we found that issuance of ABTS and other smart contracts on permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum could potentially generate financial instability. A precedent involving Ethereum and The DAO in 2016 shows that (i) there is a significant accountability gap in permissionless blockchains, and (ii) the core developers of blockchains and smart contract technology, and Bitcoin mining pools, exercise an unexpectedly high- and completely unregulated-amount of power in what is supposedly a decentralized network.

Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

This paper aims to discuss some of the operational Islamic banking features considered in ethical banking as the aspects of Rastin Banking. Ethical banking is a branch of “ethic economics” and a narrow expression of a number of Islamic banking aspects.

These features are often involved in the discussions under the topic of internal control and describe the operational characteristics of ethical banking within the framework of Rastin Banking.

This study refers to the principles of Rastin Banking, including operational, financial, economic, ethical, social, legal, international and organizational principles. Additionally, it takes into account some of the internal control systems.

Converting ethical codes into executable laws and regulations needs sophistication, and the art of codification in this subject can be observed in the present paper.

As far as the ethical behaviour of the assessor and trustee is concerned, the necessities of honesty, belief, virtuosity, rectitude and compliance with moral values, as well as reward and punishment mechanisms, are operationally examined. Transparency, governance and disclosure of information are the other components. The methods of auditing, accounting, inspection and preservation of Rastin Banking achievements are amongst the other matters of concern.

An assiduous attention to the operational details of each of the above-said discussions revealed that the Islamic banking components are capable of covering the topics and discussions beyond ethical banking.

This paper fulfils an identified need to solve the practical ethical problem in operational banking.

Despite significant changes to the governing institutional framework and to operational procedures, a number of serious doubts remain concerning the cost‐effectiveness of banking regulation and supervision in Japan. This paper duly highlights these lingering doubts focusing, in particular, on failure resolution policy and the authorities’ handling of the banks’ bad debt problems. The paper concludes by making suggestions as to how the Japanese authorities might improve the situation, to the mutual benefit of Japan and the world economy. (This paper represents a revised and updated version of a presentation given at the London Financial Regulation Group’s Conference on ‘The Institutional Organisation of Banking Supervision’ held at the London School of Economics on 7‐8th December, 2001.)