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Investigates the differences in protocols between arbitral tribunals and courts, with particular emphasis on US, Greek and English law. Gives examples of each country and its way of using the law in specific circumstances, and shows the variations therein. Sums up that arbitration is much the better way to gok as it avoids delays and expenses, plus the vexation/frustration of normal litigation. Concludes that the US and Greek constitutions and common law tradition in England appear to allow involved parties to choose their own judge, who can thus be an arbitrator. Discusses e‐commerce and speculates on this for the future.

This paper provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of statutes of limitations for accident cases. The theoretical model formalizes the tradeoff underlying a finite statute of limitations; while a shorter statute limits injurers' exposure to liability, thereby curbing incentives for care, it also limits costly litigation associated with legal error. The model yields several comparative static results that are tested using cross-state variation in statutes of limitations for personal injury cases and accidental damages to property. In order to minimize the impact of historical inertia in the statutes, we used census data from 1910 and statute lengths from 1916. This represents the earliest period when there were both adequate census data to construct the explanatory variables, and a convenient survey of the statutes for the forty-seven states. Despite difficulties in constructing the data, the empirical model performs reasonably well in explaining variation in the statute lengths.

To explain the Supreme Court’s ruling in its recent Kokesh v. SEC decision and its impact on the SEC’s ability to recover disgorgement of ill-gotten gains beyond the five-year statute of limitations.

This article discusses the Supreme Court’s recent decision and the immediate effects it will have on the SEC’s approach to a variety of cases in which a significant portion of the recovery may now be outside the statute of limitations.

The article concludes that the recent Supreme Court decision will have an immediate effect of preventing the SEC from reaching back beyond five years for disgorgement; however, the SEC may be able to comply with Kokesh and modify its procedures so that its financial recoveries from those that violate securities laws may be categorized as an equitable remedy (like restitution) rather than as a penalty (like forfeiture) which is subject to a five-year statute of limitations.

The article provides practical guidance from experienced securities litigation and white collar crime lawyers. It explains and analyzes the Supreme Court decision that severely limits the ability of the SEC to seek disgorgement by limiting the SEC’s use of disgorgement to a five-year statute of limitations.

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the US Supreme Court's April 27 decision in Merck & Co. v. Reynolds as it affects the statute of limitations defense in securities fraud cases.

The paper explains the background of the Merck opinion, including the limitations period under 28 USC §1658(b)(1) for private securities fraud cases, a District Court dismissal of the original complaint, and a Third Circuit reversal; outlines three principles articulated by the US Supreme Court for applying §1658(b)(1) to securities fraud claims; and discusses what the Merck decision means for private securities fraud litigation.

The Merck decision is likely to affect private securities fraud litigation in several ways, most of which will benefit plaintiffs, who will argue that their claims are not time‐barred because the two‐year statute‐of‐limitations clock begins to run later.

The paper provides practical guidance by experienced securities lawyers.

Schedule UTP requires that firms disclose to the IRS the uncertain tax positions that comprise the federal portion of the tax reserve disclosed on their financial statements. To investigate whether Schedule UTP has been an effective audit tool to the IRS, we use financial statement disclosures of reductions in reserves due to a lapse in the statute of limitations (Lapse). We find that the probability of a Lapse is 3.4 percent lower after Schedule UTP. However, this result is driven by domestic firms; we do not find evidence that Schedule UTP has been effective in the audit of multinational firms.

The purpose of this paper is to explain the changes to the US federal money laundering and criminal fraud statutes contained in the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”)

The paper explains how FERA extends the definition of “proceeds” under the statute to include gross receipts of illegal activity, how the definition of a financial institution is revised to include a mortgage lending business, and how the federal securities fraud statute is expanded to apply to frauds involving commodity futures and options.

Any prior ambiguity as to the meaning of “proceeds” has now been unequivocally resolved; alleged money launderers will no longer be able to defend themselves by arguing that they committed unprofitable criminal activities. The classification as a “financial institution” matters because a number of federal criminal statutes either only apply to financial institutions or set out different penalties or statutes when a financial institution is affected by a generally applicable crime. Under FERA, henceforth frauds involving options and futures in commodities will violate the securities fraud statute.

The paper presents practical guidance by an experienced white‐collar criminal defense lawyer.

To analyze the impact of recent legislation that amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to expressly empower the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to seek disgorgement in federal district court proceedings and to codify applicable statutes of limitations.

This article provides an overview of the authors’ prior work analyzing courts’ treatment of SEC disgorgement and summarizes how the scope of the remedy has evolved since Kokesh v. SEC (2017). Then, the article analyzes the changes to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 contained in Section 6501 the 2021 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which statutorily empowered the SEC to seek and obtain disgorgement in federal court actions. Finally, the authors discuss the impact of the legislation on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Kokesh and Liu v. SEC (2020).

The availability and appropriateness of SEC disgorgement have been the subject of vigorous debate. Just as courts began to iron out the contours of SEC disgorgement in the wake of Kokesh and Liu, Congress intervened by granting to the SEC explicit statutory authority to seek a remedy traditionally obtained at equity. In passing this legislation, Congress answered some questions that remained after Liu but also raised many new ones. These new questions will likely take years to resolve through subsequent litigation and potentially additional legislation.

Original, practical analysis and guidance from experienced lawyers in financial services regulatory and enforcement practices, many of whom have previously worked in the SEC’s Division of Enforcement.

In the midst of one of the most challenging periods in decades, the securities industry is relearning the meaning of the ancient Chinese curse – “may you live in interesting times”. The end of the 90’s bull market, September 11th and corporate wrongdoing have given rise to new rules and far‐reaching new statutes. At the same time, technological change and global consolidation of markets and regulations also continue to drive change, as they did throughout the 1990s. The authors highlight some of the crucial regulatory and legislative developments that will have significant consequences for the securities industry. Legislative proposals in response to the recent corporate scandals, analyst independence, anti‐money laundering rules, and the effectiveness of the Gramm‐Leach‐Bliley Act are among the issues examined.

The purpose of this paper is to consider the rationale behind the approaches to organised crime in criminal law to understand the basis of the law on conspiracy in England and Wales and why this country has refused to amend conspiracy in favour of a membership offence or a criminal enterprise model, similar to the USA’s offences.

The analysis is based on a legal comparison between the law of conspiracy in England and Wales and the USA’s Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statute, as example of best practice targeting criminal enterprises. The legal comparison is also substantiated by case law examples and interviewees with prosecutors and lawyers collected both in London and in New York City.

After briefly describing how the two systems (English and American) are intended to work, the paper will develop a discussion on the difficulties and advantages of introducing a RICO-style legislation in England and Wales and shall conclude that it is the way organised crime is socially perceived in the English/British scenario that justifies the choice to remain on the level of conspiracy and not move towards membership/enterprise offences.

This study shall be primarily intended as an opportunity to assess the criminal law tools in the fight against organised crime available in England and Wales. The comparative side of this research, the RICO statute, would require more attention which this paper cannot give for reasons of brevity. Therefore, the study is a preliminary study in comparative criminal law.

The central idea of this work is to suggest that differences in criminal law are based on different perceptions of the wrongfulness of the offending. For the law to change in favour of a criminal enterprise offence in England and Wales, there is a need to reshape the wrongfulness of organised crime. A study into the wrongfulness of organised crime as a criminal offence, with a comparative outlook, has never been conducted before in England and Wales.

May 26, 1971. Limitation of action — Asbestosis — Workmen contracting progressive and insidious disease over number of years due to employers' breaches of statutory duty — Actions commenced pursuant to leave in extended time — Whether workmen entitled to bring action outside satisfactory three‐year period — Limitation Act c.47, 1963, ss. 1 and 7.