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The employee-organization relationship (EOR) has increasingly become a focal point for researchers in organizational behavior, human resource management, and industrial relations. Literature on the EOR has developed at both the individual – (e.g. psychological contracts) and the group and organizational-levels of analysis (e.g. employment relationships). Both sets of literatures are reviewed, and we argue for the need to integrate these literatures as a means for improving understanding of the EOR. Mechanisms for integrating these literatures are suggested. A subsequent discussion of contextual effects on the EOR follows in which we suggest that researchers develop models that explicitly incorporate context. We then examine a number of theoretical lenses to explain various attributes of the EOR such as the dynamism and fairness of the exchange, and new ways of understanding the exchange including positive functional relationships and integrative negotiations. The article concludes with a discussion of future research needed on the EOR.

This chapter discusses the influence of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) 10 Principles on multinational mining companies’ (mining multinational enterprise (MNE)) corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities and strategies.

Business ethics, mining management, CSR, stakeholder, and social contracting literatures are integrated with case vignettes to examine the UNGC’s role in motivating efficacious, benevolent CSR in mining.

Mining industry groups and some mining MNEs have adopted and fully implemented UNGC principles while other mining MNEs have not. The variation manifests as a gap between CSR form and CSR substance. Mining industry bodies such as International Council for Mining and Minerals, stakeholders, and private monitors have increased pressure to narrow this gap. The UNGC acts as a catalyst to create and codify valid hypernorms and to build trust and managerial buy-in in mining MNEs’ CSR.

Reliance on selected cases and extant literature indicates, but does not fully support, conclusions.

Mining MNEs are advised to pursue CSR activities which integrate social contracting and precepts of the UNGC. The results would be happier, less antagonistic to stakeholder communities, and less questioning of mining MNEs’ legitimacy.

This chapter integrates above-mentioned literature and cases to advise academics, governance officials and private monitors, and mining MNE managers on effective integration of the UNGC into mining through social contracting.

On-going change in relation to the management of public services has led to the development of many initiatives in the control of day-to-day resources as the New Public Management¹ (Hood, 1991, 1995) continues its reforms. In this context debates about control of capital expenditure have taken a less visible role despite some earlier and influential comment on the area (Perrin, 1978 for example). Perhaps as the flow of ideas for reform in the management of day-to-day activity have waned, recent attention has turned more systematically to the efficient use of capital resources or infrastructure. This has been accompanied by recognition of the poor state of some of the public sector infrastructure. This chapter is concerned with the implications of the changing approaches to the provision of infrastructure is the U.K. National Health Service (NHS). Its particular focus in the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and the contractual implications this brings into infrastructure development.

Policymakers worldwide have proposed a new contract – the ‘social impact bond’ (SIB) – which they claim can allay the underperformance afflicting not-for-profits, by tying the private returns of (social) investors to the success of social programs. We investigate experimentally how SIBs perform in a first-best world, where investors are rational and able to obtain hard information on not-for-profits’ performance. Using a principal-agent multitasking framework, we compare SIBs to inputs-based contracts (IBs) and performance-based contracts (PBs). IBs are based on a piece-rate mechanism, PBs on a non-binding bonus mechanism, and SIBs on a mechanism that, due to the presence of an investor, offers full enforceability. Although SIBs can perfectly enforce good behaviour, they also require the principal (i.e., government) to relinquish control over the agent’s (i.e., not-for-profit’s) payoff to a self-regarding investor, which prevents the principal and agent from being reciprocal. In spite of these drawbacks, in our experiment SIBs outperformed IBs and PBs. We therefore conclude that, at least in our laboratory test-bed, SIBs can allay the underperformance of not-for-profits.

Interfirm contracts are a ubiquitous economic institution in market economies. In this study, we examine the determinants of one important aspect of interfirm contracts – contract duration. We begin with Joskow's (1987) study that demonstrated that contract duration is governed by mechanisms that economize transaction costs. Our study extends Joskow's study in several ways: First, while Joskow's study focuses on one particular area of extreme resource dependence, between the coal mine and the power company, we examine patterns of contract duration and their determinants across broader economic sectors, thereby providing a more general test of the key ideas in transaction cost economics. Second, we investigate the role of social institutions as a distinct mechanism underlying the design of contract duration, especially in terms of mitigating risks and transaction costs. Finally, by situating our study in China, we extend the research context beyond industrialized market societies to a transitional economy where interfirm contracts are an emerging economic institution. The empirical study is based on the analyses of information on 877 contracts from 620 firms collected in two Chinese cities, Beijing and Guangzhou, in 2000.

In this chapter, we explore to what extent psychological contracts occur between the crowdfunded and the crowdfunders. First argument: fundamentals of finance imply a psychological dimension in financial transactions, which are at the same time contractual. Second arguments: some concrete cases of crowdfunding scandals pertain to contractual violation, which provides evidence for the importance of psychological contracts in crowdfunding projects and processes. This leads to two contributions: (1) a systematic review of the concepts related to psychological contracts theory and the assessment of their transferability to crowdfunding and (2) a list of questions and operational recommendations for every crowdfunding project developer.

This article has two objectives: to clarify the organizational and managerial differences between social entrepreneurship and social enterprises and to investigate the role of social enterprises and their impacts on the welfare systems of European countries. The authors describe social entrepreneurship as a trend across all forms of enterprises and social enterprise as the institutionalization of a new typology that is distinguished by specific features from its inception. By relying on a theoretical analysis, the article supports the interpretation of social enterprise as an innovative institutional tool that can have a role in supporting growth and welfare. The essential features of social enterprise, which justify their competitiveness vis-à-vis public and for-profit organizations in the production and delivery of general-interest services, are thoroughly investigated. The article sheds light on the contribution of social enterprises to reforming and democratizing the traditional European welfare systems, which – since the 1980s – have revealed their inability to distribute welfare services inclusively and cope with the growing phenomena of poverty and inequalities.