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The chapter is devoted to the analysis of industrial development in Russia since 2005. Characteristic features of the Russian industry are considered. It is shown that the Russian industry is specific both by its structure and its high heterogeneity. The mining and quarrying sector and related manufacturing industries play a significant role in the Russian economy and major role in industrial production. In the foreseeable future, these sectors can strengthen their leading positions.

Considerable attention is paid to the analysis of the industrial policy of the Russian government, which has traditionally been one of the leading actors of industrial development. The main directions of industrial policy are singled out: compensation of negative changes, catching-up, and advance development. It is noted that the role of the government is ambivalent: on the one hand, it seeks to develop high-performing companies, including new and fast-growing ones, and on the other hand, it often supports large, low-performing enterprises. With the declared continuous emphasis of industrial policy on innovation and modernization, low innovativeness of Russian companies remains. Based on the analysis of modern conditions, as well as new objects and instruments of industrial policy, some prospects for future industrial development have been revealed.

China's defense industry is analyzed by comparing the technical level of the military and civilian products manufactured by China's nuclear, space, aviation, shipbuilding, ordnance, and electronics industries with their advanced counterparts. Generally, China's defense industry is about 20 years behind the global leaders. Thus, it is inappropriate to declare China's emergence as the world’s second military power. However, if it continues on its current development trajectory, it will attain that status in the near future.

How did Japan rise to challenge the U.S. economic supremacy? We argue that the foundation of Japan's rise from a defeated nation in 1945 to an economic powerhouse is the raw materials that Japanese firms have turned into cars, ships, consumer electronics, and of other industrial products. A small island nation that lacked adequate domestic supplies of virtually all the raw materials essential to industrial production became a world leader in the production of steel and of products which required millions of tons per year of raw materials. Japanese firms and the Japanese state turned an apparent material and economic disadvantage, the need to import large volumes of raw materials, into a competitive advantage over the U.S., Europe, and the rest of the world economy by driving down the cost of importing raw materials over long distances. We argue that the strategies of Japanese firms and the Japanese state to resolve the problems of procuring bulk cheaply and reliably from multiple distant locales drove the technical and organizational innovations that underlay Japan's rapid industrial development and restructured the world economy in support of Japan's development. Contrary to claims that globalization supercedes the national state, we find that the actions of the Japanese state, in coordination with firms and industry sectors, were crucial in developing and applying these strategies. The linchpin of these strategies were the MIDAs (Maritime Industrial Development Areas) built on land reclaimed by the Japanese state. This economic success in Japan was also critically dependent on the extraction of billions of dollars of wealth from its raw materials peripheries, most notably Australia, Brazil, and Canada.

This paper presents the second-generation estimates for the Italian engineering industry in 1911, a year documented both by the customary demographic census, and the first industrial census. The first part of this paper uses the census data to estimate the industry’s value added, sector by sector; the second further disaggregates each sector by activity, and estimates the value added, employment, physical product, and metal consumption of each one. A third, concluding section dwells on the dependence of cross-section estimates on time-series evidence. Three appendices detail the specific algorithms that generate the present estimates; a fourth, a useful sample of firm-specific data.

Global businesses base their sourcing operations and manufacturing decisions primarily on financial principles and metrics. What is often disregarded is the strategic value of domestic locations and contextual tacit knowledge. However, recent empirical work on knowledge flows shows that proximity is crucial. The risk of losing knowledge and important competencies developed through generations within companies and value chains needs to be considered when developing a global sourcing strategy. This chapter sheds light on how global shift-backs, through backshoring are seen to affect organizations that are located in a high-cost country. Based on interviews with managers and key personnel within a specific industry, we explore how companies preserve innovative capabilities when considering closing down (captive) offshore centers or when embarking on a backshoring strategy. The implications derived from the case offers valuable insights into how organizational capabilities could be restored when companies bring manufacturing back.

The North East of England has entered the global bazaar in which its landscape, once pock marked by the scars of industries like coalmining, shipbuilding and steelmaking, has been cleaned up, beautified, and it has now entered the global competition between post-industrial places for inward investment and the spoils of the ever-expanding UK tourism industry. With this, the North East’s visitor economy now generates around £3.6 billion of expenditure each year, supporting some 54,600 jobs in 2018. The visitor economy is not only important as a stand-alone sector in the North East, but is integral to the whole North East economy, and needs to be a major driver of social change and diversification within it. As the Newcastle Gateshead Initiative says: the twenty first century North East is a place of vibrancy, with a quality of life that makes it a great place to visit, live and work, study and invest – which is a strapline narrative that clearly signals how tourism is indeed both an essential and integrated part of North East life. Brexit may provide the North East tourism industry with a stronger global stage.

This chapter charts the logic of that development and asks: is it a good thing, who benefits and who loses from the sectors development. It asks whose North East are we talking about as we prepare to enter what is anticipated to be a difficult and an uncertain third decade of the twenty-first century?

Resource reconfiguration enables firms to adapt in dynamic environments by supplementing, removing, recombining, or redeploying resources. Whereas prior research has underscored the merits of resource reconfiguration and the modes for implementing it, little is known about the antecedents of this practice. According to prior research, under given industry conditions, resource reconfiguration is prompted by a firm’s corporate strategy and by characteristics of its knowledge assets. We complement this research by identifying learning from performance feedback as a fundamental driver of resource reconfiguration. We claim that performance decline relative to aspiration motivates the firm’s investment in knowledge reconfiguration, and that this investment is reinforced by the munificence of complementary resources in its industry, although uncertainty about the availability of such resources limits that investment. Testing our conjectures with a sample of 248 electronics firms during the period 1993–2001, we reveal a clear distinction between exploitative reconfiguration, which combines existing knowledge elements, and exploratory reconfiguration, which incorporates new knowledge elements. We demonstrate that performance decline relative to aspiration motivates a shift from exploitative reconfiguration to exploratory reconfiguration. Moreover, munificence of complementary resources mitigates the tradeoff between exploratory and exploitative reconfigurations, whereas uncertainty weakens the motivation to engage in both types of reconfiguration, despite the performance gap. Nevertheless, codeployment, which extends the deployment of knowledge assets to additional domains, is more susceptible to uncertainty than redeployment, which withdraws those assets from their original domain and reallocates them to new domains. Our study contributes to emerging research on resource reconfiguration, extends the literature on learning from performance feedback, and advances research on balancing exploration and exploitation.