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This paper aims to examine how country-level corporate governance structures influence the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in the context of Africa.

Data are collected from the world competitiveness report for the period 2010-2015. To examine the validity of the study’s hypotheses empirically, the authors use ordinary least squares with correlated panel-corrected standards error (PCSE).

This paper offers additional empirical evidence on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in Africa. It highlights that country-level corporate governance structures such as efficacy of corporate boards, strength of investor confidence, regulations of securities exchanges and the operation of the Big 4 accounting firms have significant positive impacts on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.

This paper fails to include all African countries because of non-availability of a report for some African countries. Thus, the findings on the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights in a country are applicable to the countries used in this study.

This paper emphasizes on the relevance of country-level corporate governance structures to ensuring a reasonable level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.

This paper partially fills the gap regarding the absence of an empirical cross-country study on how country-level corporate governance structures influence the level of protection of minority shareholders’ rights.

The purpose of the study is to investigate whether the relationship between financial development/investor protection and corporate commitment to sustainability is related to social contagion, neighborhood effect, and community effect.

The study applies correlation analysis, difference tests, and regression model to a sample comprised of 369 large firms listed on FTSE Global 500 covering 11 industries, located in 31 countries. This paper examines three country‐level variables, financial development index, shareholder rights index, and strength of investor protection, and five corporate commitment to sustainability measures, Carbon Disclosure Leadership Index, Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions (direct, electricity indirect, and other indirect GHG emissions), and the corresponding carbon intensity.

The results support the view that the relationship between financial development/investor protection and corporate commitment to sustainability is associated with social contagion, neighborhood effect, and community effect. Companies are more willing to commit to carbon disclosure for countries with higher financial development. Corporate commitment to sustainability is lower if neighbor countries' financial development or shareholder rights are high. Similarly, companies place less strategic importance on climate change issues if their community countries protect investors better, notwithstanding their relatively low level of other indirect GHG emissions.

Future research may build on this research by supplementing the current data with more variables such as domestic financial sector liberalization or measures, such as business environment, financial stability, and size, depth, and access. The negative relationship between commitment to sustainability and investor rights suggests that investor rights and commitment to sustainability are singing different tunes. Corporate commitment to sustainability does not keep pace with investor rights especially for countries with better shareholder rights or investor protection.

This study provides a new perspective on the relationship between financial development/investor protection and commitment to sustainability. This study contributes to the existing literature by using five measures of corporate commitment to sustainability based on firm‐specific data using a sample of the FTSE Global 500. This paper provides a better understanding of the relationship between country‐level characteristics and commitment to sustainability in an environment where global integration is relatively high.

The optimal contracting view assumes that compensation arrangements should not reward performance upward that is beyond the management's control. Critics to this view assert, however that unearned compensation boom may be suggestive of pay for luck. Hence, the authors ask if CEOs' incentive pay is sensitive to lucky as to purely corporate performance. If such, one could question: Are CEOs rewarded for luck? Do institutional features matter for CEOs pay‐for‐luck? How does systematic incentive effect sensitive to luck's nature? Accepting the premises of both contacting and skimming agency's approaches, this paper aims to answer these questions.

General and separate ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables (IV) estimations have been run to estimate the general sensitivity of CEOs' pay, respectively, to performance and luck. These estimations are based on a sample of 300 publicly traded firms covering four countries from the Anglo‐American and Euro‐Continental corporate governance models for the period 2004 to 2008.

In support of the paper's theorizing, it was found that CEOs pay to be positively related to outside contingencies as well as to shareholders' interests. Positive pay sensitivity to exogenous shocks, which we label systematic incentive effect, shows that management take advantage of lucky external events. Further analyses show, moreover, two stylized facts. First, this effect is asymmetric as executives are rewarded more for good luck than penalized for bad luck. Second, it is less generous under stronger corporate governance, higher investor rights protection, and stricter law enforcement rules. The latter institutional factors seem to be overwhelmingly influential variables in explaining the differences in such effect across countries.

The paper contributes to the CEO compensation research by: showing that a simple contracting view can mislead shareholders about the effective CEOs' skills and efforts; and filling the lack of consensus within the empirical literature as to whether pay for luck depends on institutional features such as the law enforcement level, the degree of investors' right protection, and the corporate governance system's quality.

The paper's findings offer insights to shareholders, pay consultants, and regulators about the effects that unobservable macroeconomic shocks can have towards the design and the efficiency of a CEO pay contract. The findings help, however, academics understanding the international pay gap's causes.

An effective bank resolution regime requires taking action while the bank still has positive net worth and shareholder claims still have economic value. Such actions raise a number of legal issues with respect to the rights of shareholders. This paper aims to consider how to strike a balance between the need to protect the legitimate rights of shareholders and the need for a prompt and rapid action and a failure resolution mechanism that minimizes disruptions to the financial system and preserves market discipline.

The paper examines the nature of the shareholders' rights and the legal protection afforded to them. In the European context, the relevant sources of law are the European Convention on Human Rights and the applicable community legislation. It considers different options for resolution within this framework ranging from a pre‐packaged resolution decided by the shareholders ex ante to the outright divestiture of the shareholders once certain regulatory thresholds are breached while the bank still has positive net worth.

The curtailment of shareholder rights should seek to generate appropriate incentives for shareholders and other stakeholder and achieve broad objectives of enhancing predictability and maintaining public goods, while at the same time providing for due process, proportionality and adequate compensation.

The paper presents options on how to reform existing frameworks in order to facilitate bank restructurings in a crisis.

The paper discusses key elements that policy makers need to consider in the design of a regulatory framework for early intervention and resolution.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the role of institutional, macroeconomic, industry, and firm characteristics on the adjustment speed of corporate capital structure within the context of developing countries.

The authors considers a sample of 986 firms drawn from nine developing countries in Africa over a period of ten years (1999-2008). The study develops dynamic partial adjustment models that link capital structure adjustment speed and institutional, macroeconomic, and firm characteristics. The analysis is carried out using system Generalized Method of Moments procedure which is robust to data heterogeneity and endogeneity problems.

The paper finds that firms in developing countries do temporarily deviate from (and partially adjust to) their target capital structures. Our results also indicate that: more profitable firms tend to rapidly adjust their capital structures than less profitable firms; the effects of firm size, growth opportunities, and the gap between observed and target leverage ratios on adjustment speed are functions of how one measures capital structure; and adjustment speed tends to be faster for firms in industries that have relatively higher risk and countries with common law tradition, less developed stock markets, lower income, and weaker creditor rights protection.

Future research should focus on examination of the adjustment speed of debt maturity structure. Identification of industry-specific characteristics that affect the pace with which firms adjust their capital structure to the optimum is another possible avenue for future research.

Our findings have practical implications for corporate managers, governments, legislators, and policymakers.

The study focuses on firms in developing countries for which the literature on adjustment speed of capital structure is virtually non-existent. Furthermore, unlike previous works on capital structure, it explicitly models industry variable as one of the determinants of adjustment speed. Therefore, it contributes to the literature on capital structure and adjustment speed in general and to the literature on developing countries in particular.

The study aims to investigate the role of institutions, macroeconomic conditions, industry and firm characteristics on firm's capital structure decision within the context of nine African countries.

A sample of 986 firms over the period 1999-2008 were analysed using a series of models that link institutional, macroeconomic, industry and firm-specific characteristics, on the one hand, and measures of capital structure, on the other. The paper used system generalized method of moments and seemingly unrelated regression which are robust to data heterogeneity and endogeneity problems to estimate the relationships between variables. Furthermore, the paper checked the robustness of findings using various estimation procedures.

The paper found evidence that the legal and financial institutions, income level of the country in which a firm operates, growth rate of the economy and inflation matter in capital structure choices of firms in the sample countries. Furthermore, capital structure choice of firms in the sample countries was affected by industry and firm-specific characteristics. These findings signify the role that probability of bankruptcy, agency costs, transaction costs, tax issues, information asymmetry problems, access to finance and market timing play in capital structure decisions of firms in Africa.

As in most empirical studies, this study focused on listed firms. Nonetheless, future studies that focus on non-listed firms could add additional insights to the extant literature.

The findings have practical implications for corporate managers, governments, legislators and policymakers in the African continent.

The study focuses on firms in African countries for which cross-country studies such as this are rare. It also explicitly models industry variable as one of the determinants of capital structure, a marked departure from previous studies on capital structure decision of firms.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether ownership structure affects earnings management in the banking industry of emerging markets.

The empirical study is conducted using a sample of 134 banks from 12 Middle Eastern and North African countries. Econometrically speaking, the study used a panel data regression analysis.

The authors found convincing evidence that banks with more concentrated ownership use discretionary loan loss provisions to manage their earnings. The authors also found that state and institutional owners encourage earnings management, while family owners reduce this practice.

The findings would be valuable for investors since they should take into account ownership structure in order to reach a better investment decision. Moreover, regulatory reforms in emerging markets should push for more transparency about ownership structure, high levels of supervision, and external audit quality.

This study presents international evidence on the prominent role of owners in earnings management in emerging markets with weak shareholder rights protection.

The purpose of this paper is to ask the following question: is there a link between being politically connected, the quality of governance and the company’s ownership structure?

The author then examined Canadian companies from the S&P/TSX index for the year 2015.

Political connectedness is significantly associated with lower quality of governance in relation to shareholders’ rights; ownership concentration is associated with lower quality of governance in relation to the overall governance, board of directors, shareholders’ rights and compensation structure indices; ownership structure does not mediate the relationship between political connections and quality of governance; and number of political connections through the executive is associated with less risky governance practices in relation to compensation structure; in other words, when members of the executive are politically connected, the firm adopts better compensation practices.

The time limitation is the main weakness of this study and probably the cause of observed mitigated results.

The author hope that the results will inform regulators on the need not only to further regulate the business-politics relationship, but also to consider the specific traits of concentrated ownership companies and the most critical aspects of corporate governance in politically connected firms, such as shareholders’ rights, particularly those of minority shareholders. For example, an intriguing case to investigate in the Canadian context would be Pierre Karl Péladeau’s foray into Quebec politics and the controversy ignited by his political bid in light of his position as majority shareholder (75 percent) in communications giant Quebecor Inc.

In fact, the results shown that concentrated ownership firms have lower governance quality than non-concentrated ones. Furthermore, in a concentrated ownership context, the minority shareholders’ rights could be threatened. In this sense, the results also shown that shareholders’ rights seem to be the most critical governance issue for the politically connected Canadian firms. These results are therefore the indication that Canadian financial market regulators must take action about politically connected and concentrated ownership firms in order to further protect minority shareholders’ rights.

This study makes a double theoretical contribution by enriching the literature on corporate governance and by providing one of the first investigations into the direct and comprehensive relationships between political connections, governance and ownership structure.

Effective corporate governance is significant for firms in developing countries because it can lead to managerial excellence and help firms with a weak corporate governance structure to raise capital and attract foreign investors. The purpose of this paper is to examine the barriers, issues, and challenges hindering effective development and implementation of corporate governance in Nigeria.

A combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods was employed to collect information. Specifically, data were collected from 296 managers, company presidents, and board of directors in selected firms. Descriptive data and interview analyses are presented with respect to the barriers and issues hindering effective corporate governance development and implementation in Nigeria.

The study provides significant current information on corporate governance and barriers hindering its development and implementation in Nigeria. The findings reveal a number of constraints that hinder the implementation and promotion of corporate governance in Nigeria. These constraints include weak or non‐existent law enforcement mechanisms, abuse of shareholders' rights, lack of commitment on the part of boards of directors, lack of adherence to the regulatory framework, weak enforcement and monitoring systems, and lack of transparency and disclosure.

The study was limited to four cities in Nigeria. A broader geographic sampling would better reflect the national profile. Another limitation could stem from the procedure used in data collection (drop off and pick up). However, extreme measures were taken to protect the identities of the respondents.

The significance of this study stems from the fact that very few studies have explored the impact of human resource challenges and prospects in Nigeria. The results provide additional insights into corporate governance practices in Nigeria, a sub‐Saharan African country. This region has thus far been neglected by management researchers, and so the insights gained from this study will contribute to the future development of this line of research, particularly in a non‐Western country like Nigeria.

Considering corporate governance (CG hereinafter) practices' variety across Anglo-American and European countries, this study relies on contingency and complexity theories to investigate the effect of environmental sustainability performance (ESP hereinafter) on shareholder value under various configurations of board of directors (BoD hereinafter), firm and country characteristics.

The author used the Thomson Reuters Environment Pillar Score (ASSET4) and the Total Shareholder Return to assess ESP and shareholder value respectively. The author applied a fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA hereinafter) to an unbalanced panel of 2,284 observations from 486 European and Anglo-American non-financial listed firms over the period 2016–2020.

The author found a positive association between ESP and shareholder value and he displayed notable differences between Anglo-American and European economies regarding causal predictors of this positive association. Within European firms operating under civil law code where investor protection is low and family ownership is widespread, ESP creates shareholder value under configurations of causal predictors that significantly differ from those of their Anglo-American peers. The author's findings are robust to different identification strategies.

This study assists researchers, practitioners, shareholders and policymakers the significant roles that BoD diversity, organisational and institutional traits are jointly playing as determinants of the ESP-shareholder value relationship.

The author's study offers a more encompassing, complete and theoretically richer picture of the key drivers and outcomes of ESP.