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This study aims to investigate the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and financial performance in the case of publicly listed companies in Vietnam for the period from 2019 to 2021. The topic is crucial in understanding how effective governance practices can influence the financial outcomes of companies. The study sheds light on the link between CG practice and firm financial performance. It also provides insights for policymakers and practitioners to improve CG practices.

Due to the potential dynamic endogeneity in CG research, this study uses the generalized system methods of moments to effectively address the endogeneity problem. Financial performance is measured by Tobin’s Q, return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). Based on organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD) standards, these indices were calculated to assess the influence of CG practices on corporate financial performance, namely, for accounting information (ROA and ROE) and market performance (Tobin’s Q and service à resglement différé (SRD) – stock price volatility) for the period 2019–2021. In addition, the study examines the relationship between changes in the CG index and changes in financial performance.

The study’s main objective is to determine the relationship between CG performance scores and financial performance. The study found a positive relationship between transparency disclosure and financial performance and a positive correlation between CG and company size. The COVID-19 pandemic caused a decrease in transparency and information index scores in 2021 compared to 2019 and 2020 due to delayed General Meetings of Shareholders. The study failed to find a relationship between shareholder rights index (“cg_rosh”) and board responsibility (“cg_reob”) and financial performance, concerning which the findings of this study differ from those of previous studies. Reasons are put forward for these anomalies.

Policymakers need to develop a set of criteria for assessing CG practices. They also need to promulgate specific regulations for mandatory and voluntary information disclosure and designate a competent authority to certify the transparency of company information. The study also suggests that companies should develop CG regulations and focus on regulations relating to the business culture or ethics, as well as implementing a system to ensure equal treatment among shareholders. The study found that good CG practices can positively contribute to a company’s financial performance, which is crucial for investors to evaluate the quality of CG practices for each listed company so that investment risks can be limited.

This paper aims to investigate the link between agency costs mitigation via three levels of rights protection (minority rights protection, enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency issues) provides the propitious climate for financing investment opportunities around the world.

We use Bartlett’s three-group method to stratify countries based on how well they protect investors as measured by the scores provided in the Doing Business dataset developed by the world bank for 189 countries. We then test a variety of independent hypotheses that the alleviation of agency costs via three levels of protection (minority investors’ rights, contract enforcement, resolving insolvency issues) is associated with better access to credit via the banking system, better valuation of listed firms via the stock market and higher investment and growth.

Our findings support Agency Theory which explains why the absence of legal protection of external investors leads to stock markets and financial institutions failing to fulfill their role of financing the economy.

The policy implication from this study indicates that countries ought to (1) develop legislation that protects investors’ rights, (2) improve the quality of their judicial system in terms of enforcing the legislation and (3) build the framework for resolving disputes during insolvency as these are important ingredients for a developed financial system.

We use the World bank dataset and a new methodology to quantify the significance of the relationship between minority rights protection, ineffective enforcement, lack of bankruptcy laws and access to firm financing via the banking sector and the stock market. It provides new evidence that the quality of the judicial system in a country matter for firms’ ability to raise financing and enhance value creation.

本文旨在探討一個假設，該假設為透過三級別權利保障（保障少數群體的權利、執行合同、解決破產問題）的代理成本緩減會為世界各地的金融性投資機會提供良好的氣侯。

我們以巴特利特（Bartlett）的三組法把國家分組，分組方法是基於該國家保障投資者的程度，而保障程度是以世界銀行為189個國家而制定的營商資料集內提供的評分來衡量的。我們把國家分組後，便就各樣的獨立假設進行測試。這些假設是：透過三級別保障（保障少數股權投資者的權利、合同的執行、解決破產問題）的代理成本緩減是連繫於透過銀行系統而產生的更佳信貸途徑，透過股市的更佳上市公司估值及更高的投資和增長。

研究結果証實了代理理論，該理論說明為何當外來投資者沒有得到法律保障時，結果會導致股票市場和金融機構不能履行其為經濟提供資金的角色。

本研究具有政策方面的意義，因研究顯示了國家應該：（1）設立保障投資者權利的法律；（2）在執行法律方面，改善其司法系統的素質；（3）建立解決破產時爭議的體系。這些是應該做的，因它們是一個已發展的金融體制的重要元素。

本文強調了一個保障投資者權利的法律環境所需的三個特定要素：對少數股權投資者權利的保障、有效的執行、有效的破產法律及透過銀行部門和股票市場而取得公司融資。這提供新的證據, 證實這三級別權利保障對公司籌集資金及提高價值創造的能力而言至為重要。

Financial and nonfinancial disclosures are still anchored to conventional notions of transparency, whereby corporations “push” information out to various stakeholders. Such information is now “pulled” from various sources and addresses aspects of corporate behavior that go well beyond those envisioned by the disclosure framework. This shift makes notions of values, measurement and accountability more fragmented, complex and difficult. The paper aims to bring the accounting scholarly debate back to what and how transparency can be achieved especially in relation to issues of social inequality and sustainability.

After an analysis of the limitations of current approaches to disclosure, the paper proposes a shift toward normative policies that profit of years of critique of positivism.

Drawing on the notion of value-added, the paper ends with a new income statement design, labeled as Value-Added Statement for Nature, which recognizes Nature as a further stakeholder and forces human stakeholders to give voice, or at least acknowledge the lack of voice, for non-human actors.

The author proposes a shift in the perspective, practice and institutional arrangements in which disclosure occurs. Measurement and transparency need to happen in communication exercises, which do not presuppose what needs to be made transparent once and for good but define procedures on how to make fragmented, complex, multiple and volatile notions of value transparent. Income statements and accounting more in general is to be reconceived as a platform where stakeholders will have to continuously negotiate what counts as the common good in the interest of all, including Nature.

Corporate governance principles are living a positive momentum in light of the megatrends reshaping the world. An effective company based on sound governance principles can prevent issues and corporate scandals as the company ensures greater transparency and accountability. Accordingly, this paper aims to investigate the relationship between shareholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms, value and performances in the real estate sector.

This paper investigates the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, performance and value in a sample of 111 USA real estate firms. After collecting data from 2014 to 2018, this paper tests the research hypothesis using the linear fixed-effect model.

The results demonstrate a positive impact of shareholder-oriented corporate governance mechanisms on performance and value. In particular, firms with no chief executive officer (CEO) duality and staggered board mechanisms and recognizing excess variable compensation to the firms' executive have a significantly higher Tobin's Q, return on assets (ROA) and price-to-book performance.

The implications are twofold: on the one hand, this motivates shareholders to establish new corporate control mechanisms to maximize value, attract more capital and improve operating performance. On the other hand, this allows investors to direct the investors' resources toward real estate firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms that may return higher performance and value.

Focusing on the real estate industry, where governance is expected to have a lower impact due to solid regulation, especially in real estate investment trusts (REITs), the research allows the formulation of industry-specific inferences that may be generalized for the general market.

This paper aims to demonstrate that state shareholders are confronted with contradictory logics leading to institutional contradictions that activist shareholders can exploit. The competing logics of the state as shareholder and their impact on corporate governance and shareholder activism offer fertile grounds for research advances in Coordinated Market Economies (CMEs).

Through an extensive literature review of state ownership, institutional contradictions and shareholder activism, this paper analyzes two case studies involving the French State as shareholder.

In the French context, these two cases illustrate how institutional contradictions result in opportunities for shareholder activism. By focusing on the institutional contradictions of the state shareholder, this investigation suggests a need for experimental research to observe how shareholder activists adapt to each institutional change in CMEs. This experimentation can help policymakers to avoid creating additional conditions that shareholder activists can exploit.

This focuses only on France and its state shareholdings. To generalize results, studies of other CMEs and state shareholders are needed.

Policymakers should consider all legislative proposals for their potential to deviate from corporate governance practice by experimenting with them in a laboratory setting. Shareholder activists can compare state shareholders’ actions against the state’s legislation to emphasize institutional contradictions that counter minority shareholders’ rights.

This research is the first to analyze how the state as shareholder can exploit its competing logics to resist against shareholder activism and support management or to become itself a shareholder activist.

The objective of the present study is to examine the impact of corporate characteristics on human resource disclosures in Indian corporate sector.

The study investigates the annual reports of 336 Indian listed companies of NSE-500 Index. The data are collected for the latest time period which contains eight years (FY 2012–13 to 2019–2020). The data of independent variables (company characteristics) have collected from annual reports and CMIE ProwessIQ Database of the Indian listed companies. The data of human resource dissclosure index (HRDI) is collected form annual reports using content analysis approach. For analysis purpose, descriptive statistics, Pearson's correlation matrix, Two-way Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) regression model have been used.

The outcomes show that net sales, market capitalisation, ROTA, return on equity, quick ratio, PAR have significant positive and age, profit after tax, current ratio have significant negative effect on HRDI. On the contrary, debt-equity ratio, earnings per share, type of auditor, listing status have insignificant positive and net fixed assets, promoter's holding have insignificant negative effect on HR disclosures of the selected Indian listed companies.

The HRDI constructed in the present study helps the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) and other regulatory bodies to make some standards regarding voluntary HR disclosure practices in Indian corporate sector.

This study examines the moderating effects of low and high levels of voluntary disclosures (VDs) between corporate governance and information asymmetry (IA).

The study used PROCESS macro to construct bootstrap confidence intervals at the 95% level to estimate the model, and “simple slope analysis” to visualize the model.

The better corporate governance provides a monitoring mechanism that disseminates private information and reduces IA. The effect of corporate governance on IA is contingent on the levels of VDs within a firm, and this relationship is strengthened when the level of VDs within a firm is high, and results remain consistent when levels of sub-indices are high. Additional analysis reveals that effective boards and audit committees reduce IA. Increased inside, an associated company, family and foreign ownership exacerbate IA, whereas institutional owners act as effective monitors to overcome informational disadvantages.

The findings provide implications for policymakers to promote corporate governance and more relevant reporting practices as effective mechanisms for protecting shareholders' rights and attenuating IA in capital markets.

The study is valuable to understand the strength of the relationship between corporate governance and information asymmetries based on the moderating role of different VD levels.