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The purpose of this paper is to give an updated overview over the development of employee-ownership in Italy, France, Spain including Mondragon, the UK and the US with relatively many employee-owned firms. How have the barriers for employee-ownership been overcome in these countries?

The overview is based on updated descriptions of the development of employee-ownership included in this special issue. The analysis follows the structure of overcoming five barriers: the organization problem; the problem of entry and exit of employee-owners; the startup and takeover problem; the capital- and the risk problem.

Italy, France and Spain have overcome the barriers by specific legislation for worker cooperatives, this includes rules for entry and exit of employee members. Cooperative support organizations play an important role for monitoring and managing the startup problem and for access to capital. The Mondragon model includes individual ownership elements and a group structure of cooperatives. The EOT and ESOP models are well suited for employee takeovers, financing are eased by tax advantages and they are all-employee schemes. While the EOT has no individual risks, the ESOP model has the possibility for capital gains for employees but also the risk of losing these gains.

Comprehensive and updated overview of the development in employee-ownership in the five countries to identify successful formats of employee-ownership for implementation in countries with few employee-owned firms.

The paper traces the development of employee ownership in the UK since the 1980s. It proposes that employee ownership is a function of macro-level contexts and micro-level decisions, with the latter framed and guided by the former. The macro context comprises the regulatory framework and the provision of incentives to adopt employee ownership. The paper shows how the evolution of these has led to a steep increase in employee ownership in the last eight years.

The paper draws on several sources of empirical data to chart the development of employee ownership in the UK since the 1980s and to identify the current features of employee ownership. Two firm-level surveys conducted in 2015 and 2020/21 are supplemented by qualitative case study data collected in the early 1990s. An annual census of all employee-owned firms facilitates a comprehensive overview of the current state of UK employee ownership.

It is found that there has been a steep increase in the number of UK employee-owned firms since 2014 after several decades of uneven growth. This is attributed to the introduction of new incentives and to refinements of the regulatory framework. Over the period, there has been a shift from hybrid employee ownership, combining direct and indirect forms, to indirect ownership associated with the employee ownership trust model.

The paper provides an original history of employee ownership in the UK using rich and unique data, along with the most comprehensive picture of current employee ownership to date.

This paper aims to identify the key lessons to learn from the US employee stock ownership plan (ESOP)-model. The lessons are, broad-based employee ownership is difficult to attain and sustain if employees have to use their own money to purchase shares. The paper works better when the shares are held in trust rather than being held individually. Broad-based employee ownership improves corporate performance and employee financial security. Employees care more about how employee ownership affects the stability of their jobs and retirement than having governance rights. If laws require democratic governance there will not be widespread employee ownership. Tax incentives are critical to induce companies and their owners to share ownership.

This paper is based on results from National Center for Employee Ownership research, a review of other research in the field, and the author’s own 45 years of experience in this field.

About one-quarter of the private sector workforce in the USA participates in some kind of employee ownership plan. There are 6,700 ESOPs in the USA with 14 million participants. The ESOPs hold over $1.4 trillion in assets. About 6,000 of these plans are in non-listed companies and the companies employ about two million people. Public companies ESOPs generally own under 10% of company stock; private company ESOPs usually own at least 30% of the stock and a majority of the plans own 100% of the stock. Most of these companies have between 20 and 500 employees.

The article gives a practitioner's overview over the main reasons behind the success of the ESOP model in the USA.

This viewpoint will present some statistical information about employee ownership in the US and interpret and analyze this information in order to address the barriers question using material from qualitative interviews that the authors have conducted over the last ten years with practitioners in the field. There have been few actual empirical studies that sort out the different barriers to employee ownership. The authors have chosen to focus on employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) in the US because this is the principal example from which people could learn from, and the high prevalence of ESOPs plays an important role in the US. This overview will present interpretations of these interviews with conceptual arguments that cannot always be supported with either overwhelming empirical studies or arguments that conclusively eliminate one or other explanation. This is an initial attempt to bring some comprehensive treatment and data to this incipient discussion. This is based on an interpretive analysis of qualitative interviews without quantification or social survey methods used for measurement. The advantage of this approach is that it lays out a completely different level of analysis of the barriers to employee ownership in the US that is “closer to the ground” and more based in the views of front-line practitioners who are actually implementing it.

Analysis and interpretation of qualitative interviews.

The list of barriers that has been identified is not exhaustive. The preliminary conclusions are that (not necessarily in this order) limitations of investment banking models, poor supportive infrastructure, complexity and cost and regulatory issues, the lack of support by political parties and social movements, the sale of companies due to financial considerations and legal complexities and lack of clarity and resistance by Federal agencies are major barriers in the US. Various sectors of Wall Street has been amenable to employee ownership with the proper government and private sector support. What is needed now is a series of quantitative surveys and qualitative interviews of retiring business owners in closely held companies and of CEOs and CFOs in stock market companies in order to gauge the barriers that they believe are blocking their own action in the employee share ownership area. The Rutgers Institute for the Study of Employee Ownership and Profit Sharing is working on such a research agenda at this time. In addition, with the future size of the US employee ownership sector at stake, a more intensive one-year interview project would make sense in order to present these different explanations to key actors and practitioners and ask them to provide evidence to prove or disprove the relevance of the different barriers.

Empirical research which can resolve which barriers are more important than others is presented, when possible; however, studies that provide metrics to compare different barriers are not available and need to be carried out.

Other countries considering employee ownership policies can learn from the US experience. US policymakers and legislators can learn from an original, recent discussion of barriers.

If employee ownership sectors are to be developed, a careful discussion of barriers is most relevant.

Original document by the authors based on original interviews.

This study aims to determine the effect of bank ownership on the credit risk of Indonesian Islamic local banks (ILBs).

This study uses the system generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation technique with a sample of 155 Islamic local banks in Indonesia from 2012 to 2019.

The results show that commissioner board (D.COW) ownership has a negative effect on credit risk. This indicates that an increase in the number of shares of Islamic local banks owned by the commissioner board reduces credit risk. On the other hand, government ownership (D.GOW), the Sharia supervisory board (D.SOW) and the director board (D.DOW) do not affect credit risk.

The government, Sharia supervisory board and director board need opportunities to easily own more Islamic local bank shares. Therefore, the provisions regarding the share ownership rights of the government, Sharia supervisory board and director board need to be improved to increase their role in reducing credit risk.

Previous researchers have not studied the effect of government ownership, the commissioner board, the Sharia supervisory board and the ownership of directors on credit risk at the ILB in Indonesia.

This study focuses on listed and over-the-counter (OTC) companies in the Taiwan Stock Exchange. It found that an increase in the ownership proportion of institutional investors (INs), including foreign investors, investment trusts, and dealers can enhance the informativeness of stock prices. The relationship between these factors follows an inverted U-shaped pattern, indicating that excessively high ownership ratios can actually lead to a decrease in the informativeness of stock prices. Additionally, increasing the ownership proportions of foreign investors and investment trusts can reduce the risk of stock price collapse, while dealers show no significant relationship in this regard. This study also reveals that the technical variable of the price deviation rate is an important explanatory factor for post-collapse returns. It is positively correlated with the magnitude of the price decline after a collapse, meaning that stocks with weaker pre-collapse performance experience larger post-collapse declines. When the data during the 2020 pandemic period are excluded, changes in foreign ownership ratios show a significant positive correlation with postcrash returns in both the long and short term. The significant correlation in the short term may be due to a high proportion of foreign ownership. Any reduction in this could put pressure on stock prices, and retail investors may follow suit and sell-off, using foreign investors as a reference. The significant correlation in the long term might be due to foreign investors themselves possibly also trying to avoid the pressure that their own short-term sell-offs could exert on stock prices. The changes in the ownership ratios of investment trusts and dealers indicate that medium and long-term changes have a significant impact on postcrash returns, while the changes in the major players' ownership show no significant correlation. When data from 2020 are included in the analysis, the significance of all INs decreases.

When ownership starts getting dispersed among several individuals, families, branches, and generations, a need for organizing communications and decision-making usually arises to ensure functional relationships within the family. The need for a shared vision and mutually agreed ways of handling the shared ownership emerges, and a process for developing a family governance structure is often initiated. Family governance, hence, appears to be a central topic in family business research, but we still lack a more profound and specific understanding of how the owner family uses different family governance mechanisms to manage specific situations with possible conflicting goals, interests, and opinions, or just to develop the shared ownership further for or together with the next generation. The aim of this chapter is to give an overview and highlight different processes developed by the family within owner families with dispersed ownership to identify and align governance goals. This overview intends to broaden the understanding of what the role of family governance, as a family internal mechanism, can be in owner families with dispersed ownership among several family members.

This paper offers a new perspective on the potential motivation for the adoption of employee ownership based on market power. Employee ownership may be linked to market power, either through contributing to firm growth that leads to market power or through industry leaders adopting employee ownership as part of rent sharing or a broader consolidation of market position. Both employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) coverage and product market concentration (PMC) have been increasing in the past two decades, providing a good opportunity to see if and how these are related.

The authors predict ESOP adoption and termination using multilevel regressions based on 2002–2012 firm- and industry-level data from the Census Bureau, Compustat and Form 5500 pension datasets.

The authors find that the top four firms in concentrated industries are more likely to adopt Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), while having an ESOP does not predict entering the top four, apart from firm-level predictors. Tests indicate the first result does not reflect simple rent sharing with employees but instead appears to reflect an effort by firms to consolidate market power through the attraction and retention (or “locking in”) of industry talent. Other positive predictors of ESOPs include company size, being in a high-wage industry and having a defined benefit (DB) pension.

To better distinguish among hypotheses, it would be helpful to have firm-level data on managerial attitudes, strategies, networks and monopsony measures. Therefore, future research using such data would be highly useful and encouraged.

The paper includes implications for the potential usefulness of ESOPs in attracting and retaining talent and for the design of nuanced policy to encourage more broadly based sharing of economic rewards.

While prior research focuses on firm-level predictors of employee ownership, this study uses market concentration and other industry-level variables to predict the use of ESOPs. This study makes a unique contribution, broadening the current thinking on firm motives and environmental conditions predictive of firm ESOP adoption.

This study aims to investigate how a French multinational enterprise (MNE) is developing employee stock ownership (ESO) in its subsidiaries in Peru and Mexico, both Latin American countries with deep social and economic inequalities.

This is a qualitative case study which conducted interviews with representatives of the French MNE and its subsidiaries in Peru and Mexico.

The employee stock purchase plans offered by the company to its employees support the achievement of the sustainable development goals (SDGs) 1, 8 and 10 in these countries.

The authors argue that MNEs could become flagships in the SDG achievement in emerging economies.

By contributing to better workplace outcomes and enhanced corporate performance, ESO is in line with SDG 8. ESO also fulfills SDGs 1 and 10 by allowing employees to build up savings and wealth, whose lack is the main source of inequality and poverty. Reciprocity and binary economics theories explain these relationships.

This chapter focuses on testing optimal capital structure theory: The role of intervening variable debt to equity ratio (DER) on the influence of the financial performance, Ownership Structure of Independent Board of Commissioners (IBCO), Audit Committee (ACO), and Institutional Ownership on Firm Value. The research design was explanatory research using path analysis. Using purposive sampling, 61 manufacturing companies, observation period from 2014 to 2018 with 286 N samples. The research novelty empirically can prove the role of intervening variable DER on the effect of return on assets (ROA) on firm value and shows the market response to the ROA is fully reflected by DER, indicating the existence of an optimal capital structure. The role of DER on the effect of ROE and IBCO on firm value is a partial mediation with the inverse direction. This phenomenon shows that the mechanism of forming a balance between the responses of investors and creditors relates to debt financing.